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Abstract: The nature of the relationship between language and thought is a 
controversial topic, and it seems every possible position has been defended at some 
point: from the rationalists of old who equated rationality with language to modern 
cognitive science which tends to see language as merely a vessel for communicating 
thoughts. But even these most disparate views share the assumption that the 
relationship is consistent and stable throughout cognition.  
However, the rise of modularity within cognitive science challenges the idea that 
thought is a single homogenous phenomenon, and in this vein, this thesis challenges 
the assumption that the relationship between language and thought is identical across 
all domains of cognition.  
By looking at three different areas of cognition in depth this thesis shows that not 
only does language have a role to play in cognition (a controversial conclusion in its 
own right) but further that this role varies across cognition.  
The first case study deals with how navigational terminology lends a unique flexibility 
to human reorientation capacities, the second illustrates how swearing helps expand 
the domain of our disgust response from the visceral to the moral; and the third 
shows how language allows us to develop concepts of number, for which we have no 
specialized pre-linguistic mental faculty to deal with.  
The existing theories of language’s role in each of these areas of cognition often 
ascribe language too computational a role, casting the language faculty as a domain-
general symbolic manipulator. I am wary of ascribing language such computational 
powers, and instead show how ordinary communicative functioning of language can 
lead to significant cognitive effects downstream. 
The thesis concludes by drawing up a taxonomy of the different mechanisms by 
which language effects cognition, allowing us to see just how multifaceted the 
relationship between language and thought is. 
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Language and thought 
An introductory chapter 
 
This thesis explores the nature of the relationship between language and 
thought. A number of possibly contradictory intuitions guide us in trying to 
answer the question of how language is related to thought, all of which – at 
some point or other – have been nurtured into rich and developed accounts of 
language’s interaction with thought. 
 
Sometimes we might intuitively feel that the link between language and 
thought is very strong. In fact, often it feels like we conduct most of our 
thinking in words through an internal monologue. Perhaps language is the very 
stuff of thought? After all, when we try to think about something particular, or 
particularly challenging, we seem to put the issue to ourselves in words as part 
of our inner speech and produce sentence-like responses to our own 
questioning. It seems that, at the very least, our top level cognitive processing 
is linguistic. The significance of our internal verbal thinking processes is 
corroborated by studies that probed, via self-report, the inner lives of subjects, 
which showed them to be engaged in inner speech more than 50% of the time 
(Hurlburt, 2012). 
 
These intuitions are given philosophical significance in Wittgenstein’s famous 
quote “The limits of my language are the limits of my world,”(Wittgenstein, 
2012, §5.6), that proposes that words demark the entirety of the things we can 
even think about; and many other philosophers, of various stripes, have 
defended the idea that language is necessary for human thought or that 
language plays an important part in shaping our thoughts.  
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However, views that credit language with a critical role in cognition run into 
trouble when we come to ascribe thoughts to infants and non-human animals. 
After all, it is clear that they engage in complicated mental activities that are 
responsive to the situations they find themselves in, that we might well want to 
call thoughts, but they apparently manage to do so without grammatical 
language.  
 
Conversely, certain common experiences of using language lead us towards 
contradictory conclusions. For instance, we sometimes find ourselves “lost for 
words,” when we are unable to capture our thoughts in words at all; or we find 
that a word is “on the tip of our tongue” as if the thought is already in place 
but the word for it is temporarily lost. What is more, we direct children to 
“think before they speak” as if they are separate activities that can be 
completed, potentially, in the wrong order. These phenomena seem to 
presuppose that thought precedes language, that we merely use language to 
express our thoughts, and that on occasion, it is unable to do so faithfully. This 
kind of thinking makes it seem like language can have no effect on the 
processes of cognition. 
 
For Chomsky, language is merely a mirror to thought, meaning that we can use 
it as a means of uncovering the inner workings of the mind. “By studying the 
properties of natural languages, their structure, organization, and use, we may 
hope to learn something about human nature” (Chomsky, 1975, p.4). It seems 
that even the world’s most famous linguist sees language as reflecting thought 
rather than contributing to it, so much so that we can use it as a mirror 
without fear of language distorting the results. 
 
Both of these extreme views – that language is essential to thought, and that 
language is inconsequential to thought – and all the possible views on the 
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spectrum between, seem to make the assumption that thought is a single 
homogenous thing, and therefore that language’s relationship with it is 
constant and stable, performing the same role at all times. If we give up on this 
assumption then we might be able to make sense of our contradictory 
intuitions. Maybe during some cognitive tasks language plays almost no part in 
cognition, acting only as a mirror to the subconscious, non-linguistic cognitive 
processes, while at the same time determining how we think during other sorts 
of task. 
 
Indeed, the modularist’s picture of the mind as a collection of discrete, 
specialized faculties, known as modules, challenges the assumption that all 
thinking processes are of the same type. On this picture, each of these cognitive 
modules evolved in response to some specific challenges faced by our 
forebears, each will have its own limited capacities and will respond selectively 
to stimuli. Accordingly, thinking in one cognitive domain will employ distinct 
cognitive faculties with different capacities than thought in another domain. 
We will look at these modularist accounts in greater detail in chapter one, but 
it is clear that such a multi-faceted picture of cognition makes it possible to see 
how language might interact with different parts of thought differently; such 
an account might well explain our mixed intuitions about it. 
 
How much of the mind is split up into these specialized faculties and how 
much of it is a central intelligence is an open question, and one that falls 
outside the remit of this thesis. Following the massive modularists (Carruthers, 
2005; Sperber, 2001), this thesis will be conducted under an account of 
cognition that claims that even the most conceptual elements of the mind are 
made up of specialized faculties, whose ability to represent information 
conceptually allows us to meet some specific evolutionary demand. Such a 
view holds that there is no central intelligence, no general purpose symbolic 
		 4	
computer that gives us that uniquely human capacity to think about anything 
in the world. Instead it sees the distinct faculties, both conceptual and 
peripheral, as embodying a collection of simple automatic processes 
(“automatic” in the sense that we cannot actively marshal them to our ends) 
that together build up the complex phenomena of human thought and jointly 
enable us to respond to events in world appropriately.  
 
It is unclear however what role we should consider the language faculty to play 
in cognition within a massively modular view of cognition, as many of the 
features of the language faculty seem at odds with the guiding modularist 
principles – it is domain general, can represent anything, its workings are often 
consciously available to us and we seem to be able to intentionally wield it as a 
computational tool. So perhaps we should conclude that it is not a part of the 
cognitive machinery at all. After all, the modular account of the mind sets out 
to show how a full and rich system can arise without the need to postulate a 
system that has these features, associated as they are with a series of 
computational problems that we will look at in the next chapter. Accordingly, 
within most modularist frameworks, the language faculty is treated as if it was 
extraneous to the computational faculties that make up our mind.  
 
This sort of thinking about the mind as a computational system built up of 
discrete functional elements has encouraged the propagation of the metaphor 
that the mind is a computer; under this metaphorical schema, the language 
faculty then is like the input/output elements of the system, the keyboard and 
monitor – and as such plays no role in the actual computation.  
 
Under such a picture the limit of the cognitive effect of language on cognition 
is the transferral between speakers of those concepts which we would not be 
able to develop independently by investigation or experience. For instance, 
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without being taught about DNA or atoms linguistically, very few of us could 
come to have thoughts about them, guided solely by experience. Language 
allows us to spread throughout society knowledge that has been learnt up to 
that point and means that every individual human does not have to work 
everything out for herself. This process of transferral of thought from one 
speaker to another is obviously fundamental to forming a cohesive society and 
to the progress of science, but can it be the only way language contributes to 
human thought? 
 
Even within this multifaceted picture of thought, established by the modularist 
and held by most modern cognitive scientists, we still tend to return to a 
simplified account of language’s role within the mind – one that is at odds with 
the intuitive insight that language is a fundamental component of our mental 
lives. 
 
On the other hand, the fact that we share most of our non-linguistic mental 
faculties with other animals but appear to be very different to them in terms of 
cognitive capacity might yet be explained by appeal to the cognitive 
advantages endowed on us from language. It is a matter of on-going debate as 
to what cognitive capacities set us apart from our nearest relatives but I 
suspect that language is key to these differences. 
 
Subscribing to a modularist account of the mind need not determine how we 
view language’s role in cognition, and following Peter Carruthers (Carruthers, 
2002), I intend to highlight the possibility of language having wide ranging 
cognitive effects, even within a modular framework.  
 
Instead of leaping to proposals of an overall account of how language might 
interact with cognition generally, I suggest that there is merit in looking at 
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various areas of cognition in detail, in order to establish the mechanisms by 
which language plays a role in cognition in these particular domains. After all, 
if cognition functions differently in each domain, we shouldn’t assume the 
effect language can have on it is constant or that a general approach to 
language’s role in cognition to be especially fruitful. We will therefore be 
investigating language’s role in cognition by looking at a series of detailed case 
studies. 
 
The first case study deals with humans’ capacity to navigate after becoming 
disorientated; it provides an interesting starting point as experimental work 
makes it clear that we share most of our non-linguistic navigational machinery 
with other mammals, yet, as adults, we are able to reorientate ourselves in a 
qualitatively and measurably different way to animals. This provides us with 
an ideal case study for exploring the effects of language learning on cognitive 
development; at the same time it will provide the opportunity to explore the 
idea that language provides the mental flexibility that we routinely credit 
humans with, but which the modular theory has trouble explaining. 
 
The second case study investigates the far less measurable effect that language 
has on the disgust response system that initially evolved to help us avoid 
infectious disease (Valerie Curtis & Biran, 2001). It has been observed that in 
modern societies people cite certain moral actions as well as disease vectors as 
disgusting (Haidt, Rozin, Mccauley, & Imada, 1997). This chapter attempts to 
explain this expansion of the domain of the disgust response by appeal to the 
linguistic practice of swearing. This chapter allows us to look at an effect of 
language on cognition that is not immediate to us during everyday experience 
and helps to illustrate just how wide reaching the potential effects of language 
on cognition might be. 
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The final case study deals with number cognition; here again it seems that 
humans display distinctly more advanced cognitive behaviours than our closest 
non-human relatives, despite the fact that on a non-linguistic level many of our 
faculties responsible for numerical processing are found in other species. This 
case study allows us to explore the effects language can have on the 
development of the conceptual repertoire and see how it might play a key role 
in our overcoming the limits of our pre-linguistic representational capacities. 
 
The choice of case studies is in part guided by the work of Peter Carruthers’ 
The cognitive functions of language (Carruthers, 2002) – which in turn is based 
on existing psychological research on the impacts of language on cognition and 
the cognitive domains in which these effects have been studied (Carruthers 
pays particular attention to work done by Elizabeth Spelke and her colleagues 
( including (R. F. Wang & Spelke, 2002), (Hermer & Spelke, 1996; Spelke & 
Tsivkin, 2001a; Xu & Spelke, 2000) . In this paper, Carruthers sets up a 
distinction between what he calls the communicative conception of language 
(which he claims is the standard view held by cognitive scientists) that ascribes 
language a purely translational role; and the cognitive conception of language, 
which holds that language has an important role to play in cognition alongside 
its communicative roles. He uses the case studies of navigation and number 
cognition as examples to back up his own particular, strong account of 
language’s role in cognition. This paper, and the account it proposes, attempt 
to re-establish of a role for language within modern cognitive science. By 
investigating Carruthers’ own case studies in further depth we are able to 
assess Carruthers’ overall claims about language cognition. In this fashion, his 
work can be seen as a foil throughout this thesis, it provides both the starting 
point for our challenge against the standard view of languages’ role within 
cognition, and provides a full characterization of an alternative, which we will 
in turn challenge and asses. 
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The account Carruthers puts forward sees language as an important 
representational capacity that is not limited by the domain-specificity of other 
cognitive modules and thereby provides the possibility of cross-domain 
cognition in humans. This account is initially appealing as it answers the 
problem, faced by modularist accounts of the mind, of how humans built up 
such a flexible intelligence from a modular starting point. What is more, it does 
this without having to posit some novel, distinct, domain-general intelligence 
faculty.  
 
However, I fear that his account ascribes to language too much computational 
power. This point will become clear as we work through each of the case 
studies Carruthers cites in support of his overall view, relying as it does on a 
language faculty with computational capacities we have little reason to believe 
it possesses.  
 
Despite, my criticism of Carruthers particular view, I share his guiding intuition 
that the standard ‘communicative’ view of languages role in cognition belittles 
the actual importance of language in cognition; and so besides acting as a way 
of assessing Carruthers’s own view, the chapters on each of the three case 
studies will provide novel accounts of distinct mechanisms of interaction 
between language and cognition. 
  
The final chapter will then weave together all the threads of our investigation 
to see if there are any general conclusions to be drawn and will produce a 
taxonomy of all the different ways in which language comes to influence and 
affect thought. The final chapter will be a sketch of an overall picture of 
language functioning which readily accommodates both our intuitions that 
language has some key role to play in cognition and the raft of experimental 
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data that shows how much of cognition is completed by universally shared 
modular faculties. I will show that in challenging the particular mechanisms 
appealed to by Carruthers in explaining language’s role in cognition we do not 
necessarily have to give up on giving an account of language which attributes it 
with some computational role, beyond mere translation and communication of 
thought. 
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A note on formatting 
 
Throughout this thesis, we will be dealing with the relationship between non-
linguistic mental representations, linguistic representations in the mind (lexical 
items) and linguistic representations as used in, for example, oral or written 
communication (words and sentences). To delineate between them I will use 
the following formatting conventions.  
 
Non-linguistic mental representations will be written in SMALL CAPS – the 
contents of these concepts may well not parse very nicely into ordinary 
language and so the phrases chosen to represent the conceptual 
representations might be a little bit clumsy at times – the difficulty of this 
translation is, after all, the key topic of this thesis. 
 
Lexical items are the mental representations of words stored as part of our 
language faculty, their nature will be explored at length throughout the thesis 
but in summary they are the atomic elements of our mental language and get 
built up into larger mental linguistic representations. They will be denoted by a 
‘single quotations’. 
 
Words, on the other hand, are the atomic elements of public language, spoken 
aloud or joined together to form ordinary language sentences will be in 
“double quotation marks”.  
 
The distinction between these different levels of representations should 
become clearer as we progress, and this will be made easier by having the 
formatting established ahead of time. 
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Case study 1. 
 
Two accounts of the relationship between language and Reorientation 
 
How much of a role does language play in everyday human cognition? This is a 
particularly difficult question to answer, since on the one hand we might be led 
by our intuition that language and thought are almost one-and-the same (after 
all, much of our explicit mental activity is presented to us the form of inner 
speech), while on the other hand it seems that new findings in psychology and 
cognitive science attribute more and more of our behaviour to subconscious, 
non-linguistic cognitive processes.  
 
Instead of looking at the question as a whole, some progress might be made if 
we approach it by looking at particular types of mental activity in detail. It is 
experimentally much easier to isolate and study language’s involvement in 
particular cognitive tasks than it is to experimentally probe the function of 
language in a wider context. And by looking, in depth, at the language faculty’s 
involvement in one particular domain of cognition we might be able to draw 
conclusions about language’s function in cognition more widely. 
 
Such, focussed, experimental work has begun to be done within the field of 
navigation behaviour, with clear indications of the involvement of language in 
adult human navigation behaviour. In this chapter, I will look in-depth at two 
different proposals for the mechanism of interaction between the language 
faculty and the non-linguistic cognitive faculties associated with navigation.  
  
All animals require some form of navigational capabilities, life depends on 
animals being able to find mates and food; clearly the ability to successfully 
navigate one’s environment is essential to survival but do all animals rely on 
		 12	
the same cognitive tools to navigate? This seems unlikely; over millennia, 
different species will have been faced with very different evolutionary 
challenges, and evolved different cognitive resources to meet them.  
 
Part 1. Reorientation 
 
One key form of navigational behaviour is reorientation. When an animal’s 
other navigational capacities fail (either by natural or experimentally induced 
means) they become disorientated and must locate themselves within their 
environment before normal navigation can proceed. This capacity is known as 
reorientation and has been identified, in some form or other, in all species 
studied so far (see(Cheng & Newcombe, 2005) for an overview of research). 
The cognitive mechanisms employed by humans to perform this navigational 
feat will be the focus of this chapter – but first let us look at how other species 
have been shown to reorientate themselves.  
 
 In 1986 Cheng showed that rats rely entirely on the geometric qualities of an 
environment to reorientate themselves (Cheng, 1986), ignoring other types of 
pertinent information – despite other experiments illustrating that during 
normal navigation (i.e. when not disorientated) rats were able to utilize these 
kinds of information. In a clever experimental paradigm, Cheng placed rats in 
a rectangular room that had partially exposed food in one corner, the rats were 
then disorientated (by being spun around) and the food buried. Once the rats 
were returned to the test room they proceeded to search for the food in the 
corner where the food was buried and the one geometrically identical to it 
(e.g. short wall to the left, long wall to the right), ignoring the other corners. 
This finding showed that rats could form representations of the geometry of an 
environment and use these representations to reorientate themselves. Cheng 
went on to investigate whether other forms of information could be used to aid 
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reorientation, placing various landmarks (both visual and olfactory) at the 
corner with the buried food. If the rats could use this landmark information 
alongside the geometric information we would expect them to search for the 
food solely at the correct corner. However even in the presence of such 
polarizing landmark information rats continued to search both geometrically 
identical corners with equal frequency. This finding shows that rats rely solely 
on geometry during reorientation, despite utilizing other information during 
other types of navigation. 
 
These findings led Cheng to posit the existence of a geometry module in rats, a 
specialized mental faculty that encodes and stores geometric information about 
an environment. It has been argued that from an evolutionary point of view 
reliance solely on the geometry of an environment may have proved fit because 
geometrical features of a landscape (such as cliff faces) are relatively 
unchanging over time, whereas mechanisms that rely on visual recognition of 
landmarks are more likely to be disrupted by seasonal variation or weather 
conditions (such as trees losing their leaves) (Gallistel, 1990a). Cheng suggests 
that the geometry module is an inferentially isolated mental faculty, meaning 
that the representations it creates are not affected by information generated by 
other conceptual modules. From Cheng’s data it is not possible to tell whether 
the geometry module is utilized during normal navigation or is called upon 
solely during reorientation.  
 
Hermer-Vazquez & Spelke ran a slightly modified version of Cheng’s classic 
experiment to investigate whether humans rely on a similar strategy during 
reorientation(Hermer & Spelke, 1994). They found that adult humans, in the 
absence of polarizing landmark features, behave exactly like rats – searching in 
the two geometrically identical corners. This finding is pretty clear evidence for 
the presence of the geometry module in adult humans. However, unlike rats, 
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when completing the reorientation task in an environment containing 
landmark information adult humans navigated exclusively to the correct 
corner. This finding indicates that, during reorientation, adult human 
navigators’ behaviour is sensitive to information from both cognitive faculties, 
in contrast to other animals such as rats. 
 
How is it that representations which appears to be isolated in other animals 
come to be used simultaneously in solving a single cognitive problem in 
humans? Spelke suggests that language plays an important role in 
reorientation by conjoining the two sources of information into a single 
representation that can be used to reorientate oneself successfully(Spelke, 
2003; 2011; Spelke & Tsivkin, 2001a). 
 
Evidence for the claim that language is involved in adult reorientation comes 
from experimental work done by Hermer-Vazquez (Hermer & Spelke, 1994; 
Hermer-Vazquez, Spelke, & Katsnelson, 1999). During a series of studies 
investigating children’s ability to combine landmark and geometric information 
Hermer-Vazquez noticed that they started being able to solve the reorientation 
problem, like an adult would, at about the age of four; around the same time 
that they start to spontaneously produce sentences containing the words “left” 
and “right”. She also noticed that adult subjects often spontaneously produced 
sentences containing the terms “left” and “right” when asked after testing to 
describe how they navigated; prima facie evidence, at least, of a link between 
speech and successful reorientation. 
 
To investigate this observation young children’s performance on a number of 
different cognitive tests were correlated with their performance on a slightly 
modified reorientation room. Six-year-old subjects were tested on non-verbal 
intelligence, vocabulary size, working memory capacity, ability to comprehend 
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sentences containing “left/right” vocabulary, ability to produce such sentences 
and ability to comprehend and produce sentences using a more general 
selection of spatial terminology e.g. “behind” or “above”. These tests were 
supposed to answer the question as to whether language, in particular, is 
responsible for success at reorientation tasks; or whether we should attribute it 
to a more general cognitive development. Hermer-Vazquez’s statistical analysis 
of the results showed no significant correlation between age or IQ and success; 
in fact, the only factor Hermer-Vazquez identified as correlating significantly 
with success at the navigational task was the spontaneous production of 
sentences containing the terms “left” and “right”.  
 
This result indicates that knowing one’s left from one’s right is not enough to 
succeed at the task at hand; children must have significant enough mastery of 
the terms relating to the concepts to generate, unprompted, sentences that 
include them. This is the first clue that it is the language faculty that is 
essential for successful integration of different forms of information during 
reorientation. However, it is important to note that these findings only show a 
correlation between possession of a linguistic concept and success at a 
seemingly unrelated task; these results are not in-and-of-themselves evidence 
of a causal link between language and one’s ability to reorientate oneself.  
 
In an attempt to show that the link between speech production and flexible 
reorientation cognition was more than mere coincidence, Hermer-Vazquez and 
her colleagues developed a novel experimental paradigm that hoped to probe 
whether or not the language faculty was being employed, explicitly, by human 
adults as part of reorientation cognition (Hermer-Vazquez et al., 1999). In a 
test environment, much like those in the previous experiment, adult human 
subjects were required to navigate to one of the room’s corners after 
disorientation whilst also engaging in a secondary task. These secondary tasks 
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were either (i) verbal-shadowing, repeating phrases heard through a set of 
headphones, or (ii) rhythm-shadowing, copying a clapping a rhythm. The 
working assumption of these experiments was that while the verbal shadowing 
paradigm would occupy, and therefore effectively knock-out the subjects’ 
language faculties, the rhythm shadowing would require the same level of 
working memory to complete but leave the language faculty free to perform its 
potential role in reorientation. Hermer-Vazquez’ results were quite striking, 
with those subjects engaged in the rhythm shadowing tests behaving exactly as 
a normal adult human might – integrating both geometric and landscape 
information, and those engaged in the verbal shadowing paradigm behaving 
like infants or rats – relying solely on geometric information to guide 
reorientation. 
 
This experimental paradigm has fallen under significant criticism and it has 
been suggested that Hermer-Vazquez’s subjects failed to reorientate themselves 
effectively in the verbal-shadowing task but succeeded in the rhythm-
shadowing task simply because the verbal-shadowing task is cognitively more 
taxing, and just requires too much working memory to complete reorientation 
while engaging in it. That the working memory requirements are the same is a 
fundamental assumption of the experimental design and so any challenge to 
this brings into question any positive results obtained. Furthermore, Samuels 
(2002b) suggests that there is good reason to believe that the verbal-
shadowing task requires the involvement of certain extra-linguistic, cognitive 
processes, that are simply not required in rhythm-shadowing. He puts forward 
briefly a theory of speech production that requires a greater degree of general 
processing than it is presumed rhythm shadowing requires (Samuels, 2002b). 
Hermer-Vazquez’s experimental results can, just as readily, be viewed as 
supporting Samuels’s account of speech production as of the account favoured 
by Hermer-Vazquez, that language is key to adult reorientation. 
		 17	
 
Even besides these criticisms, the data from these experiments give little 
insight into how the causal mechanism between language and reorientation 
might work. This question will be addressed throughout the remainder of this 
chapter. I will put forward two distinct accounts of how the language faculty 
leads to flexible reorientation cognition. As we develop the accounts and an 
understanding of the differences between them it will become clear that the 
different sets of experimental data do not offer equal levels of support to both 
mechanisms. Accordingly, we shall return to the data at various points in the 
exegesis to see exactly which conclusions about the nature of the relationship 
between language and thought that each data-set warrants. 
 
Part 2. Syntactic conjunction 
 
The first account I want to look at comes from Peter Carruthers and is 
primarily expounded in his 2002 BBS target article The cognitive functions of 
language. In this paper Carruthers’s primary focus is to demonstrate the 
plausibility of the claim that language is essential to human cognition, 
particularly in those types of thinking that contain elements from more than 
one conceptual domain.  
 
Carruthers’s account focuses on the language faculty’s syntactic capacities to 
conjoin representations from conceptual modules and generate novel, 
compound representations in a linguistic format that contains information 
from both conceptual sources. He suggests that these representations go on to 
figure in further cognitive activities such as reasoning and action planning. 
These novel linguistic representations thereby allow us to reason about certain 
things in ways that we could not have done without language. 
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In Carruthers’s view, language evolved a unique ability to access all of the 
conceptual modules so as to be able to communicate each of them to other 
members of a social group. To achieve this given the diverse outputs of these 
distinct mental capacities (which modularism holds each have their own 
representational format), the language faculty must first convert all of these 
distinct representations into a single, unified, homogenous format. Following 
Chomsky, Carruthers calls this format “logical form” (or LF). For Carruthers LF 
is a symbolic mental format that preserves all the syntactic qualities of words 
but strips them of their phonological and sensory qualities. Carruthers claims 
that representations in LF can be entertained subconsciously, interact with 
each other, and most importantly, act as an interface between the conceptual 
modules and the language faculty.  
 
By transforming these distinct representations into a single format the 
language faculty can process representations from distinct modules together, 
conjoining them into one single linguistic representation. The syntactic 
structure of LF mirrors that of natural language sentences, such that 
information from the conceptual modules can slot into syntactic gaps in the LF 
representation, much like adjectives do in natural language sentences. 
 
In describing how this conjunction might work Carruthers looked at the 
sentences subjects in Hermer-Vazquez’s original reorientation study 
spontaneously produced when asked how they had gone about reorienting 
themselves. Often test subjects reported navigating to a spot because they 
knew the target location to be (for example) “left of the blue wall”. Carruthers 
notes that these sentences contained, in one single representation, information 
from both the landmark (“the blue wall”) and geometry module (“left of the 
…”). If such a representation could be reported when describing post hoc how 
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one navigated, then such a representation could presumably also be generated 
during the process of navigation cognition to aid navigation, although we 
should not assume this representation would necessarily be consciously 
accessible during reorientation. To look at how these representations are first 
generated and then utilized we need to look briefly at the structure of the 
language faculty. 
 
We can split the language faculty into three distinct functional elements: 
speech production, speech comprehension, and the lexicon (lexical item 
storage). Speech production allows us to pick out words from the lexicon and 
generate linguistic representations (composed of smaller atomic lexical items) 
that express the meaning we want to get at. Many different accounts have been 
proposed as to exactly how this is done and to what degree different factors 
affect word choice; it is not necessary, at this point, to go into this mechanism 
in too much detail. It is safe to presume that however it is done in the case of 
generating sentences containing information from one single conceptual 
module, it is similar to how sentences containing information from two distinct 
concept modules are constructed, save for the act of conjoining the two sources 
of information. 
 
Speech comprehension is in some ways the mirror image of speech production: 
it allows us to break down communicated representations and feed them back 
into the conceptual modules, so that we might understand the meaning of the 
sentence similarly to how we would if we had experienced the reported facts 
ourselves. The hearing of a known word activates the associated pre-linguistic 
cognitive representation, and it is on this basis that we can come to understand 
others’ spoken sentences and can come to believe things via testimony. The 
nature of the relationship and the mechanism of activation between linguistic 
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representations and pre-linguistic representations will be looked at in greater 
depth later in the thesis.  
 
The final functional element is quite different from the other two: the lexicon, 
it is where the basic atomic lexical representations of words are stored; during 
speech production the appropriate lexical items to express the intended 
meaning are picked out. The lexicon can be seen as a form of memory, as it 
stores the lexical items and information associated with them for retrieval at a 
later time. The syntactic characteristics of each lexical item are contained as 
part of its entry in the lexicon and these go on to guide proper sentence 
production alongside the information relating to their phonetic characteristics. 
Lexical items probably also contain at least some semantic or meaning 
information so as to guide sentence production (as indicated by the fact that 
we find sentences that contradict common sense almost as repulsive as 
sentences that contradict grammatical rules, and rarely generate them). 
Alternatively production may more simply be guided by learnt associations 
between lexical items without the need to store information pertaining to 
meaning as part of the lexical item. Exactly what amount of conceptual 
information is stored with each word is not straightforward and will also be 
returned to at length in second half of this chapter. 
 
With this cursory understanding of both the pre-linguistic navigational 
capacities of humans and of the structure of the language faculty in place, we 
are in a position to look at exactly how Carruthers thinks the functioning of the 
language faculty comes to play a key role in the flexible navigational behaviour 
witnessed in humans. 
 
Under Carruthers’s account, when we are confronted with a visual array that 
triggers representations from two distinct conceptual modules, language gives 
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us a means of expressing both at once - in a single representation. The 
syntactic process of conjunction provides ready-made slots into which 
representational information from the various modules can neatly fit 
(Carruthers, 2002, pg. 669), producing a single representation containing 
information from both conceptual modules. The representations this process 
generates are compound and can exist solely in a linguistic format. The 
syntactic qualities of certain lexical representations, in this case ‘left of …’ and 
‘right of …’, provide the framework into which the information contained in 
representations from the geometry and landmark recognition modules can be 
added. Once these representations are generated Carruthers suggests that they 
are utilized in action planning – allowing us to formulate a course of action 
from a representation of the environment that contains information from both 
sources. 
 
These novel compound representations are formed online during navigational 
tasks and are situation-specific. The content that makes one such 
representation fit for purpose during navigation is relevant and useful only in 
its one particular reorientation situation. These representations have little 
function once the process of reorientation is completed. For Carruthers, 
language is not responsible for creating new cognitive tools that can be used 
over and over again in a range of situations, but instead generates flexible and 
broad representations of concrete, particular situations that cannot be 
otherwise produced. The upshot of this mechanism is that the speech 
production subsystem must be active and available at all times for 
reorientation to make use of it.  
 
Carruthers’s account covers how these representations are formed, but he has 
less to say about how they get utilized in solving reorientation problems. On 
the one hand it seems simple: once we have a representation that contains 
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enough information to solve the problem we fix our attention on that 
representation and consult it whilst reorienting, reading from it as we go. 
However, it is not at all clear how the interface between the language faculty 
and higher level of action planning is supposed to work or how these processes 
are supposed to utilize representations that can potentially only be entertained 
in a linguistic form.  
 
 
To answer these general questions about the relationship between linguistic 
representation and the higher decision making processes, let us look again at 
the process occurring during navigation, in a little more detail. During initial 
exposure to the test environment we might say to ourselves (either out loud or 
internally) the goal is ‘to the left of the blue wall’ or some such verbal 
representation of the layout of the space1. After disorientation, when 
confronted by the same scene the navigators summon to their attention the 
representation – and use it to remind themselves where the food is. This is a 
familiar story, often when we need to remember something or when we are 
confronted with a problem we find ourselves repeating a phrase over and over 
in our heads - utilizing short term verbal memory loops to keep something 
critical in our attention. But this obviously cannot always be the case in 
reorientation, since we often navigate and reorientate ourselves without 
repeating mantras regarding the layout of the place. In this case, the LF 
representation containing the appropriate spatial information must therefore 
be entertained and utilized at a subconscious level. How do these LF 
representations go on to play a role in action planning without being broadcast 
as inner speech to be dwelt on and consulted directly? 
																																																						
1	Carruthers makes it clear that this mental phonological representation (saying it to 
ourselves in our heads) is not strictly necessary – the representation can be generated at the 
level of LF, below the conscious threshold. 
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During normal functioning language faculty must have the ability to send at 
least some information back down to the conceptual modules, because without 
this neural back-pathway we would not be able to comprehend or utilize the 
information relevant to the conceptual module’s cognitive domains that we 
receive in testimony. However this cannot be the mechanism by which novel 
forms of thought are generated: the conceptual modules can only utilize a 
strictly limited amount of information in their processing so the language 
faculty feeding them back representations that contain information they cannot 
use will have no effect. The novel information contained within the linguistic 
compound representation is not the kind of information that the conceptual 
modules deal with and so cannot lead to any form of novel cognitive 
behaviour. Only during processes operating on the representations from the 
language faculty can the two distinct forms of information be cognized 
simultaneously. It does not seem possible that the conjoined representations in 
LF go onto generate flexible human thought by feeding novel information back 
into the conceptual modules – these modules are by their very nature unable to 
operate on information outside of their strict input. 
 
So if these new compound linguistic representations cannot be fed back into 
the conceptual modules to generate novel and flexible thought processes, how 
do they go on to be utilized in the mind in such a way as to generate the cross-
domain thoughts Carruthers claims that they do? Carruthers is clear that he 
believes the representations go on to play a part in further inferences and 
provide the flexibility that we see in human cognition. For this to be so, some 
other reasoning faculty must take up the representations from the language 
faculty and be able to utilize them in further computations; Carruthers posits 
the existence of a general purpose abductive reasoning faculty capable of 
generating a hypothesis to the best explanation, processing and utilizing 
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representations in LF format. The hypotheses generated by the abductive 
reasoning faculty go on to be utilized in action-planning cognition. It is 
through positing the existence of such a general-purpose reasoning module 
that Carruthers sees the language faculty’s representations being involved in 
wide-reaching, cross-domain reasoning. Having information from the different 
conceptual modules as part of a single representation allows the various 
sources of information to be weighed against each other during action 
planning, something that would be impossible without language’s ability to 
conjoin conceptual representations.  
 
Carruthers’s account relies on a very particular evolutionary history; he sees 
the abductive reasoning faculty evolving after, and out of the LF 
representational capacities of the language faculty and as “taking LF sentences 
as input and generating LF sentences as output”(Carruthers 2002, p.671). It 
seems like he is effectively claiming that the evolutionary demand for effective 
communication of mental representations through language arose before the 
need for abductive reasoning. Hence the abductive reasoning faculty utilizes 
the representational capacities of the language faculty and not the other way 
around. 
 
This does not seem quite right – it is not so obvious that our pre-linguistic 
ancestors could not perform cross-domain abductive inference. In fact, the 
story Carruthers uses to exemplify abductive reasoning is about hunter-
gatherers inferring the movements and mood of their prey from marks and 
tracks, which is a sort of behaviour that surely predates language. Consider 
how successful hunting requires the combination of information from lots of 
pre-existing conceptual domains. For example, judging the relative age of 
tracks requires information from the accumulator (the mental time keeper), 
while judging heading of the quarry’s heading requires folk biology (which way 
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hooves face) and an understanding of walking/running patterns of animals 
(potentially from a biological movement detector). It seems that the ability to 
integrate and utilize all of this information in our behaviour would need to be 
in place at a fairly early juncture for us to have survived long enough to have 
evolved fully fledged language.  
 
One way of avoiding the very difficult question of which came first (abductive 
reasoning or language) is by suggesting that both the language faculty and 
abductive reasoning utilize a set of representations from a shared prior system 
– the system that integrates the outputs of the conceptual modules into a single 
unified form. Up to now we have been referring to this encoding system as a 
subsystem of the language faculty and the representations it generates in a 
format referred to as LF (in accordance with Chomsky (Chomsky, 1995)). But 
what reason do we have for characterizing this ability to translate all the 
various forms of mental representation into a single homogenous form as part 
of the language faculty? Is it just the enticement of the “translation” metaphor 
that makes us think that it must be a part of the language faculty?  
 
We might alternatively flip Carruthers’s view on its head, and suggest that the 
system responsible for integrating the representations of the conceptual 
modules into a single unified format actually evolved as part of the more 
general reasoning capacities of humans and that later on language capitalized 
on these single format representations as the evolutionary demand to 
communicate grew with the increase in social group size. According to this 
picture, language would play no role in cognition beyond merely 
communicating the representations generated by pre-linguistic mental faculties 
– which is exactly the view that Carruthers’s paper sets out to challenge. 
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On the basis of the verbal shadowing data discussed earlier, which Carruthers 
sees as the primary reason to accept his account, we have no reason to believe 
that the LF interface between conceptual modules and high order reasoning 
systems is part of the language faculty specifically. It just does not follow from 
the experimental data that the ability to conjoin outputs into a single unified 
format is a task completed by the language faculty. Though Hermer-Vazquez’s 
data shows that humans can in some way combine or at least utilize two 
distinct sources of data during reorientation, it cannot speak to the mechanism 
behind that capacity. Even if we accept Hermer-Vazquez’s findings that 
occupying the speech production in general, through verbal shadowing, 
prevents us combining distinct conceptual representations in to a single LF 
representation, the experiment does not distinguish whether the LF encoding 
required to complete the task is performed by the language faculty per se or 
some other downstream more general cognitive faculty that is also occupied 
during the quite challenging verbal shadowing task. 
 
Carruthers’s stated motivation behind his cognitive functions of language was to 
begin to challenge the assumption, pervasive throughout cognitive science, that 
language serves a purely communicative role in the functioning of the brain, 
serving merely as an external vessel by which conceptual thought can be 
transmitted between thinkers. For Carruthers to successfully challenge this 
assumption we require his account to show clearly that there is good reason to 
believe that the language faculty in particular is playing an essential important 
role in the integration of representations from different cognitive domains; the 
weaker claim that such representations are able somehow to be integrated and 
can then be expressed in natural language is not enough for Carruthers’s 
conclusion to hold. Yet we are given no reason to characterize the integration 
process as part of the language faculty rather than as part of some other, 
downstream, mental faculty. 
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But to be charitable, however we decide to carve up the LF translation system, 
speech system, and the abductive reasoning system – and whatever 
evolutionary story we choose to tell about them – we must still accept that at 
the core of Carruthers’s account of how flexible cognition proceeds there must 
be some mechanism employing all three of these elements. We cannot see the 
abductive reasoning faculty as extraneous to Carruthers’s account of 
linguistically aided navigation. Accordingly, I will proceed with the analysis of 
Carruthers’s account as a view concerning the interaction between all three 
elements, and not worry too much about the question of how we should carve 
up the language faculty - which elements of the overall system we should 
characterize as part of the language faculty and which elements we should 
view as outside of it 
 
The problem of explaining flexibility in modular terms 
 
Carruthers is initially motivated to invoke language as a key element in flexible 
human cognition as a response to Fodor’s problem. Fodor has pointed out that 
any system built out of an inferentially isolated modular framework has 
immense difficulty in accounting for the perceived levels of flexibility and 
creativity witnessed in everyday human cognition (Fodor, 1983; 2001). Here 
we characterize flexible cognition as cognition that is not bound by the 
modular boundaries that evolution has established. Carruthers believes that his 
account of linguistic conjunction of modular outputs can account for flexible 
human thought without having to give up on a massively modular framework 
(Carruthers, 2002; 2003).  
 
It is important that any account of cognition we put forward for further 
investigation be realizable - to be at least prima facie compatible with how 
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brains function in the real world. To this end we want the computations that 
power any proposed system to be tractable in a real-life timescale given the 
computational limitations of the human brain. Any system that proposes a non-
modular system faces serious challenges on this front. A domain-general 
system, one that is not split up in to specialized modules but that has access to 
all conceptual representations seemingly must consult a vast database of 
propositional beliefs as part of any operation. The number of calculations 
involved in this type of processing becomes astronomical even with relatively 
few beliefs. A good example comes from belief acquisition. We might want to 
suggest that when a human acquires a new belief they asses (subconsciously) 
its consistency with their pre-existing beliefs; but an example from Cherniak 
shows that if this checking were to be done by a domain-general computation 
device the suggestion rapidly becomes ridiculous. “Consider how one might 
check the consistency of a set of beliefs via a truth-table. Even if each line 
could be checked in the time that it takes a photon of light to travel the 
diameter of a proton, then even after 20 billion years the truth-table for a set of 
just 138 beliefs (2138 lines) still wouldn’t have been completed(Cherniak, 
1990). It becomes patently clear that though not a logically impossible 
operation this is not how the human brain deals with consistency of newly 
acquired beliefs. 
 
This example highlights clearly how easily computational explosion can cripple 
an account of mental processes. No computation is free, even the simplest take 
time and computational resources. If the system is set up in such a way that 
even the most commonplace of operations require a great number of these 
computations, the system quickly becomes unviable – especially when working 
with the physical limitations and timeframes of the human brain. But how can 
a system be structured such that it avoids running into these problems? 
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Modular encapsulation avoids these problems by making sure each module 
only has a very small amount of data processing to do in completing its 
operations and only a small database to consult. Each module is task-specific, 
designed to complete a particular task and generate outputs of a single format. 
A system built of these small processing systems is a computationally cheap 
way of structuring a complex system that responds to a wide variety of stimuli 
and arguably provides the only chance we have of proposing a tractable mind. 
 
The problem is that this efficiency comes at the expense of flexibility. Modular 
systems can only deal with the problems they have been set up (either by 
evolution or design) to face. If some phenomenon (or some feature of a 
phenomenon) in the world cannot be represented by one of the modules of a 
system, it cannot be represented by the system in general. This characterization 
does not seem to fit with our intuitions of how the human brain works - we 
appear to be able to think about anything. We are left with a dilemma: while a 
modular structure appears to be our only hope of having a computationally 
realizable human brain, it struggles to explain one of the key qualities of the 
human mind – flexibility. 
 
Carruthers wants it both ways, a mind that is both modular and flexible, and 
believes that language is the key to this. He must show a way in which 
language overcomes modular boundaries without becoming the kind of 
domain-general symbol manipulator that is open to the problems of 
intractability. But does language really avoid the problems associated with 
domain-general systems? The analogies between Carruthers’s account of the 
language faculty and the kind of domain-independent symbolic manipulator 
computation devices, that he wants to move away from, are apparent.  
 
Part 3. Challenges to Carruthers’s account 
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The processes that Carruthers calls on the language faulty to perform are 
notably similar to the logical operations we might expect of a hypothetical 
domain general symbol manipulator. Further, because of the language faculty’s 
unique place within the wider architecture of the mind, the set of 
representations it draws on during routine processing is (potentially) the 
complete set of conceptual representations within the mind. Does this large 
database not open up the language faculty, as described by Carruthers, to 
challenges from combinatorial explosion?  
 
Carruthers does offer an interesting response to this potential challenge by 
clarifying exactly which systematic processing traits do open a system up to 
computational explosion and shows that the language faculty does not possess 
these traits. Carruthers shows that combinatorial explosion does not simply 
arise in all systems with vast input databases but only in those cases where the 
computational processes of a system requires systematic access to large 
databases – in essence: computational explosion does not occur wherever a 
system can access a vast database but only where it does access a vast data 
base as part of its normal operating procedure (Carruthers, 2003). For 
example, I might have access to every book in the library but this fact does not 
slow me down in laying my hands on the book I desire unless I follow a 
systematic search pattern such as starting at the beginning of the first book in 
the stacks and working through them alphabetically. A system can operate 
effectively with a large database as long as the operations over it are effectively 
guided and controlled somehow. With this clarification in mind we should 
avoid simply equating domain-general operation with computational 
intractability. Avoiding combinatorial explosion does not necessarily require a 
small database but instead requires some form of limit on the amount of 
information a system routinely accesses. 
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In the case of conceptual modules this limit is in the form of strictly limited 
potential input sources, we will call this a case of input-encapsulation. 
Carruthers also suggests that modules can be process-encapsulated, by which 
he means that the processing of a module does not systematically require large 
database searches even if such vast swathes of information are available to the 
module when needs be; for example the process might have a built in targeted 
search algorithm that automatically blacklists certain database entries (we 
shall look at how semantic information might be the key to such a process of 
limiting access in the next section). The processes themselves form the crucial 
limitations on the computations the module performs, allowing us to have 
some degree of flexible cognition at reduced operational cost. 
 
Though process-encapsulation offers a potential get-out, can we be confident 
that it is how the language faculty is structured? It is possible that the language 
faculty can simultaneously have access to an incredibly vast database and yet 
be process-encapsulated in such a way that avoids it systematically consulting 
vast portions of its database, and thereby avoids the dangers of combinatorial 
explosion: although the LF interface can access nearly every conceptual 
representation generated by the conceptual modules, it only ever needs to 
actually access those that are required for speech production at any one time. 
An encapsulation process whereby only those representations that are 
pertinent to the situation are made available to the language faculty to get 
translated into LF would provide the kind of security against combinatorial 
explosion Carruthers needs. 
 
We might be able to get this process encapsulation by characterizing word 
selection during speech production as a process that is guided from the bottom 
up by the representations generated through perception: for example, when we 
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see a blue wall those representations from the landmark recognition module 
are activated and get fed into the language faculty, whilst those less pertinent 
representations from, say, the folk psychology module (how does a blue wall 
feel, sad?), do not. Rather than seeing the process of speech production as a 
top-down process (where the language faculty searches through all the 
representations available to it when trying to construct a sentence), under the 
bottom up conceptualization we begin to see how the language faculty might 
be domain-general yet not open to the problems of combinatorial explosion. 
The actual workings of sentence production are still a matter of ongoing 
research, but given that in everyday life competent sentence production is a 
computationally tractable problem, we must assume that this is also true of 
those sentences that are generated that contain information from two or more 
distinct conceptual modules. Whatever computationally tractable mechanism 
accounts for normal speech production, Carruthers can safely claim is also at 
the base of his syntactic conjunction mechanism. The fact that the language 
faculty evolved for communication via speech production (and not for domain-
general cognition) provides it with a degree of process encapsulation that 
would not be present in an all-purpose symbol generator. 
 
Even if we can avoid the problem of combinatorial explosion by showing that 
the language faculty is suitably process-encapsulated, we might worry that 
Carruthers’s account drifts dangerously close to the position, so beloved by the 
rationalists of old, that language and reasoning are one and the same. 
Carruthers’s account of the processes of the language faculty still bears striking 
resemblance to a domain-general thinking device - acting like a logical 
inference machine operating over various symbolic representations. We might 
worry that Carruthers is ascribing extra-computational capacities to the 
language faculty that we have no reason to believe it has and that go way 
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beyond those that could plausibly have evolved to meet the relatively simple 
pressure to communicate. 
 
Carruthers responds to this challenge by saying that language does not perform 
all the various forms of logical inference that we would expect of a domain-
general symbolic manipulator. Instead he suggests that the language faculty’s 
logical processing is limited solely to those that are part of normal grammatical 
competence, such as conjunction or negation. He argues that in learning the 
proper syntactical operations of simple linguistic conjunctions such as ‘and’, we 
develop the ability to do syntactic conjunction over all of the LF 
representations generated by the language faculty. For Carruthers, the ability 
to conjoin linguistic outputs comes part and parcel with learning language and 
is not a distinct computational capacity of the language faculty. Language then 
does not require any further computational powers in performing the 
conjunction than are required during normal speech production.  
 
However, it does not seem to me that simple grammatical conjunction is all 
that going on in Carruthers’s mechanism. I suggest that for Carruthers to 
obtain the computational benefits he wants from the language faculty’s 
involvement he must accept that something a little more inferentially 
significant is happening than mere syntactic conjunction.  
 
Let us try and break down clearly exactly what is going on as we generate 
novel representations through the conjunction mechanism. While it is easy 
enough to spell out the linguistic representations equivalent to the outputs of 
the two pre-linguistic modules as: 
(i) ‘the toy is in the corner with a long wall on the left and a short wall 
on the right’ 
and 
		 34	
(ii) ‘the toy is by the blue wall’ 
 
It is not quite clear what the product of the conjunction mechanism should 
look like. Carruthers’s account relies on characterizing the final output, as 
something akin to 
(iii) ‘the toy is in the corner by the blue wall with a long wall on the left 
and a short wall on the right,’  
 
In which the two sources of information have been totally inferentially 
integrated, however, a conjunction in accordance with the strict grammatical 
conjunction rule (as appealed to in Carruthers’s competence defence), that uses 
only the information available from the conceptual representations would 
surely be more along the lines of: 
(iv) ‘the toy is in the corner with a long wall on the left and a short wall 
on the right and the toy is by the blue wall’  
I suggest that while (iii) has enough information to specify precisely which 
corner of the room the toy is hidden in, (iv) does not. We can therefore 
conclude that the process of getting from (i) and (ii) to (iii), requires some 
fairly clever, abstract inference beyond that inherent in simple linguistic 
conjunction. This is highlighted if we look at what extra information is 
required to use (iv) to successfully locate the toy; we can assume any extra 
information required for reorientation and contained in (iii) but not in (iv) 
must have been calculated as part of the computational process that gets from 
(i) and (ii) to (iii).  
 
To navigate using (iv) requires that we first understand that the 
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representations from the two conceptual modules share common referents – 
i.e. the toy, and also requires a complete representation of the space with 
which to check our two facts2. Only with reference to a complete 
representation of the space can we work out whether our description of the 
toy’s location in (iv) makes sense as a definition of one single location in which 
we should search or if the two separate elements of the description refer to two 
different corners. On the other hand, the fact that there is one single corner 
matching that description is already apparent and assumed in (iii), which 
refers to a single referent (the corner by the blue wall with a long wall on the 
left and a short wall on the right) as the location of the toy. Working out that 
there is only one corner which conforms to the description of the toy’s location 
requires a full representation of the space and to infer that the two 
representations have the same referent, which is exactly the kind of 
representation Carruthers says that only linguistic conjunction can produce. 
 
It is clear then that extra cognitive steps are required to get from the 
conceptual representations of the geometry and landmark modules to a 
linguistic representation rich enough to be used in successful reorientation 
without the need to refer to any other complete spatial representation. 
Carruthers’s account claims that all of this inferential work is done by the 
language faculty. However, this does not seem compatible with his assertion 
that the language faculty furnishes us with representations that can be used in 
planning reorientation behaviour purely via the process of simple linguistic 
																																																						
2	We might want to suggest that we use the room itself as the model that we check of our 
linguistic representation against, however, if this is the case then the linguistic representation 
is doing nothing that couldn’t be achieved more simply by checking (i) and (ii) against the 
room in a serial fashion. If this were how reorientation proceeds we would expect infants to 
succeed at the task where adults fail. 
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conjunction. 
 
Carruthers’s account set out to show how we manage advanced navigational 
feats without reference to a complete, non-linguistic representation of the 
navigational environment. If the conjunction mechanism does only generate 
representations such as (iv) that require reference to another complete 
representation to be usable in navigation then Carruthers account has failed. It 
seems then that Carruthers must accept that the language faculty cannot 
generate representations rich enough for successful reorientation by ordinary 
language conjunction alone; some other logical inference processes must be at 
work. Should we assume that the language faculty contains the sort of non-
linguistic logical inference capacity that is required to do this? I can see no 
justification in attributing the language faculty with this much reasoning 
ability, we have no reason to believe that it is such a general-purpose reasoning 
device. As Robbins succinctly puts it “Language is one thing, reasoning is 
another”(Robbins, 2002). It seems that Carruthers account of conjunction 
consigns him to too strong an account of the language faculty’s reasoning 
abilities, that we have no independent reason, evolutionary or evidential3, to 
believe that it has. 
Finally, Carruthers’s account suffers from another problem that has to do with 
unsubstantiated claims. We should remember that Carruthers is not making 
claims purely about navigational cognition but instead claiming that the 
evidence that linguistic conjunction is involved in navigation behaviour 
provides evidence for the much more wide reaching claim that language is, in 
																																																						
3 I appreciate that Carruthers’s account is put forward as an attempt to explain experimental 
evidence, and so in some way it is supported or at least in line with this evidence; here I 
mean rather that there is no independent evidence that supports Carruthers’s position that 
language demonstrates abstract reasoning capacities, beyond the aforementioned evidence 
showing it is involved in certain areas of cognition. 
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general, the source of flexible thinking in humans (Carruthers, 2002; 2003). 
Though the navigation data does provide some support for this overarching 
claim it is striking that further evidence for this claim is lacking – Carruthers 
only cites data from two cognitive domains: navigation and number cognition 
(and it is not clear how much the data from number cognition evidences 
Carruthers conjunction mechanism). If we are to believe that language plays a 
fundamental role in cognition, we would expect to see evidence of that 
interaction much more widely than we actually do. Flexible, cross-domain 
thought is rife in our daily lives, from planning what we will say to someone to 
get them to do what we want to do, to understanding a character’s behaviour 
in a movie and therefore the plot; if Carruthers were correct we would expect 
to see much more experimental evidence of language’s involvement in it. 
 
Carruthers does suggest further research avenues and is hopeful that the verbal 
shadowing and other related experimental paradigms will be transferable to 
other cognitive domains but in fact since the piece’s publication experimental 
data published has come to challenge Carruthers’s claims directly. 
 
One such challenge comes from Rosemary Varley’s research with aphasics 
(Bek, Blades, Siegal, & Varley, 2010). Aphasics are people, who through brain 
trauma, have lost some or all of their linguistic abilities. In some ways these 
subjects offer the perfect experimental opportunity to probe the role of 
language in various areas of cognition – if participants who do not have 
language can perform some cognitive task to the normal standard then we 
must conclude that the two elements are disassociated, and that language is 
not involved with that particular aspect of cognition.  
 
In this vein, Varley re-ran the dual task studies by Hermer-Vazquez testing the 
navigational abilities of aphasic patients and using linguistically normal 
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participants as a control group. First, she had both sets of participants 
complete the simple reorientation task used in previous studies without any 
form of secondary task (single task condition); this task should prove simple 
for the non-aphasic subjects but, if Carruthers is correct that language is 
required for successful reorientation under such conditions, we would expect 
aphasic subjects to have lower success rates. In a second condition, Varley also 
had subjects complete the reorientation task whilst engaging in verbal 
shadowing tasks simultaneously (dual task condition), much like in Hermer-
Vazquez’s experiment, although the verbal shadowing task had to be simplified 
for those aphasic patients who could not repeat prose. The results show quite 
clearly that the aphasiac patients despite, lacking normal syntactical abilities 
still managed to complete both single and dual reorientation tasks in line with 
the performance of the control group. Interestingly, in both groups 
performance was only slightly diminished during the verbal shadowing 
paradigm, a result that stands in contrast to Hermer-Vazquez’s original finding 
that verbal shadowing inhibits successful reorientation. This diminished 
performance during the dual task condition supports the critique that it was 
the increase in working memory load from completing verbal shadowing 
during reorientation that led to normal subjects’ lower success rates in Hermer-
Vazquez’s original study – not the preoccupation of the language faculty. 
 
Crucially for Carruthers, these results show that syntax is not actively involved 
during reorientation. Varley makes it clear that during initial linguistic trailing 
her aphasic subjects demonstrated no ability to use syntax to form ordinary 
linguistic conjunctions when trying to describe verbally spatial locations. Given 
that the aphasiac participants cannot perform linguistic conjunctions during 
communication, even under explicit instruction, it seems unlikely that they can 
utilize the skill subconsciously in the completion of reorientation tasks.  
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In response, Carruthers could argue that some residual linguistic ability is the 
source of the aphasics’ success; Varley’s initial linguistic trialling did reveal that 
all patients tested had at least some basic understanding of the meaning of key 
spatial linguistic terms. This suggests that if we do wish to maintain that it is 
the residual linguistic capacities of the aphasic patients that are responsible for 
their navigational capacities, the mechanism at play is likely to be one powered 
by the lexical representations themselves and not syntax 
 
We should take Varley’s results with a pinch of salt: As we saw earlier the 
language faculty is made up of many different subsystems, the interrelatedness 
of which is not fully understood. Each patient will have a unique profile, with 
different aspects of language being differently affected. This, combined with 
the relatively few aphasiac subjects and the intrinsic difficulty of explaining the 
complexities of the experimental paradigm to patients with severe language 
impairments, means that the implications of results from experimental work 
done with aphasics are not quite as stark or reliable as we might hope. 
Accordingly, we should be hesitant to see Varley’s results as a killing blow to 
Carruthers’s view, though evidence against it they certainly are. 
 
Conclusion of investigation into Carruthers’s account. 
 
To conclude, I believe that Carruthers’s account ascribes too much 
computational power to the language faculty to constitute a plausible account 
of how navigational behaviour proceeds. Besides this theoretical challenge, 
Varley’s experimental results from the performance of aphasic patients 
threaten to undermine the original results which motivated Carruthers’s view 
in the first place, and suggest that Carruthers’s claim that syntactic operations 
are at the root of human reorientation behaviour in particular – and thus 
flexible cognition generally – is mistaken. 
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Part 4. A novel account 
 
I would like now to offer an alternative account of the role language plays in 
navigation. As with the foregoing account from Carruthers, its aim is to explain 
the correlation data linking possession of lexical items to mature navigation 
behaviour in humans; further I hope to give an account that does not run into 
the theoretical problems that dog Carruthers, namely those problems that arise 
from ascribing too much computational power to the language faculty. The 
account I am going to put forward tries to firmly ground the role of the 
language faculty in navigation within its normal communicative functioning. 
Where Carruthers stresses the computational potential of grammatical syntax 
in solving problems that fall outside the remit of one particular cognitive 
module, I will stress the ways in which the linguistic items interact with each 
other and with our conceptual representations in explaining how we can come 
to thinking beyond the limits of the conceptual modules.  
 
This account takes its inspiration from the work of Elizabeth Spelke(Spelke, 
2011; Spelke & Tsivkin, 2001a), both in drawing on the data provided by her 
and also trying to flesh out the mechanism in a way that is sympathetic to the 
intuitions she puts forward in the discussion sections of the experimental work. 
Spelke herself never gives a holistic account of what she thinks is happening 
during adult navigation, but I will try and bring to the navigation debate 
insights from her work on number cognition (which we will also return to at 
length in the third case study). Spelke focuses on the idea that language is 
responsible for the development of the numerical concepts in humans, and that 
these concepts power our more advanced numerical abilities(Spelke & Tsivkin, 
2001a). I want to explore a similar account of the linguistic origins of the core 
concepts that power our navigational abilities. 
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Carruthers’s account stressed the computational power inherent in 
grammatical speech production as the key factor in explaining the more 
advanced cognitive abilities of human navigators. In contrast, the account I am 
going to put forward here sees the structure and features of items of the 
lexicon as key in explaining how humans can combine elements from different 
representational repertoires in solving problems. 
 
Before we go into details of the account let us look again at the two distinct 
representational systems in the brain. The first is the rich conceptual system 
that we share in part with animals. This is not a single unified system of 
representation but a heterogeneous collection of representational systems we 
have been calling conceptual modules. Representations of this class include 
those from the geometry module, etc. and are rich analogue representations 
that contain non-symbolic information. Being generated by various, distinct 
encapsulated modules each with their own distinct representational formats. 
 
On the other hand, we have the linguistic representational system. All of the 
representations of this sort are entertained by a single faculty – the language 
faculty – and are in a single unified format. The language faculty is unique to 
humans and so we must assume that only humans have the representational 
capacities associated with it. The language faculty’s representations, in contrast 
with the rich analogue conceptual representations, are symbolic (or as Evans 
puts it: parametric)(Evans, 2015).  
 
In the case of conceptual representations, it is clear what kind of information 
they contain, for example, representations from the geometry module encode 
information about the geometric layout of the environment and so on. But it is 
not quite so apparent what kinds of information lexical items encode. For a 
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start, we might suggest that each lexical item contains syntactic information 
that determines its proper grammatical usage. But to what degree does a 
lexical item contain information relating to the meaning of the word? Does the 
lexical item ‘wood’ contain any information about the substance wood or just 
information about its proper grammatical usage? 
 
A good way to investigate this question is to highlight cases where a lexical 
item has no conceptual representations associated with it and to see how much 
meaning sentences containing those lexical items appear to have. There are at 
least two clear types of words that have no semantic associations. First, new 
words: the hearer of a new word cannot have any associated conceptual 
representations for them, yet we are able to infer from the semantic context 
quite a lot of the meaning of a word and approximate a conceptual 
representation of it (Taylor & Zwaan, 2009). Secondly, functional words: 
words in any language that appear not to have any conceptual representation 
attached such as ‘the’ and ‘a’. Such words do still carry with them a substantial 
amount of meaning information, in this case about the uniqueness of whatever 
was being described. Given that these smaller words seem to have semantic 
information I think it is safe to say that lexical items (or perhaps the lexicon in 
general) contain(s) at least some semantic information, though these thought 
experiments do not make it clear how this information is stored, we will come 
back to this question in the final chapter. 
 
If we consider one of language’s primary functions as effectively 
communicating pre-existing conceptual representations to other minds we can 
see that there is good reason for lexical items to contain at least a small 
amount of semantic information. First, the semantic information allows us, 
during sentence production, to generate sentences that make reasonable sense 
without having to activate and consult all the conceptual representations 
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associated with each word. Also, in much the same way that the syntactic 
information associated with lexical items means that the sentences we produce 
are grammatically correct, the corresponding semantic information ensures the 
sentences we produce make reasonable sense. We very rarely, under normal 
conditions, make nonsensical but grammatical sentences. For instance, we 
would be unlikely to make the mistake of saying “before putting on his shoe, 
John put his foot in his jumper,” instead of “before putting on his shoe, John 
put his foot in his sock” – despite the fact that ‘jumper’ and ‘sock’ have almost 
identical syntactic properties. This trait is an upshot of the semantic 
information of a word being checked against the semantic background of a 
sentence before utterance (we shall return to the mechanism behind this later). 
 
We must remember that the semantic information encoded in a lexical item is 
not the same as the information encoded in the associated conceptual 
representation. The two representations are not in same format or used in the 
same types of cognition, and furthermore no direct translation can occur 
between them. Lexical items are only used during linguistic cognition and are 
not used to represent facts about the world to be used in further inferences in 
their own right but only facilitate the communication of the conceptual 
representations. We can see this distance more clearly if we consider story-
telling behaviour – when we hear a story for the first time, our understanding 
of the narrative is delivered through the words in which we hear it told, 
however experimental evidence shows that after a short while the original 
linguistic form is forgotten (Bransford & Franks, 1971) and when asked to 
recount the story we can only do so in our own linguistic form. Only the 
conceptual core remains, which itself can be expressed, linguistically, in a 
variety of different ways. If the semantic representational capacities of the two 
systems were directly corresponding we would expect that the linguistic form 
of the story would be remembered alongside the conceptual information. 
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Now that we have established the two systems of representation as distinct in 
nature we must look at the functional relationship between them. Following 
Vyvyan Evans’s Lexical Concepts Cognitive Models (LCCM) theory (Evans, 
2006) I believe the best way to characterize this relationship is in terms of 
access points between the lexical items and the conceptual representations 
they are associated with. So for instance the lexical item ‘left’ might have an 
access point in the geometry module to a representation of the geometric 
relationship of X IS LEFT OF Y. These access points facilitate activation of the 
appropriate representations during speech production and comprehension. 
When we hear a word, during speech comprehension, the semantic access 
point instigates the activation of the associated conceptual representation. 
Conversely when we are trying to put our mental representations into words 
the access points activate the appropriate word in the lexicon.  
 
Different lexical items will have a differing numbers of access points, from 
lexical items such as ‘an’ or ‘uhhh’ that may well have none to lexical items like 
‘mother’  or ‘white’ which will likely have myriad conceptual associations and 
therefore access points. The mapping of these access points throughout the 
conceptual system develops as we learn the various meanings of words. 
Interpersonal differences in learning then explain difference in insinuations 
and connotations attached to words by different people. 
 
Lexical items can have a number of associated concepts, not all of which are 
appropriate for proper meaning construction at any given moment. For 
instance, the lexical item ‘France’ in some context means the nation, and in 
others might mean the 15 men chosen to represent the nation at rugby. 
Obviously for one to properly decode meaning efficiently not all these 
multifarious concepts should be activated on hearing a word. During a 
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conversation about the idea of nationhood in modern Europe, I do not upon 
hearing the word “France” think of the rugby team – to do so would be 
distracting and inhibit effective communication. A system is clearly in place 
that limits the involvement of the conceptual representations to those pertinent 
to the semantic background of the utterance. 
 
What is more, these various access points can be spread amongst different 
conceptual modules; clearly not all the various meanings of a word come from 
the same cognitive domain, for instance the lexical items ‘black’ or ‘white’ 
might have access points to representations from both the colour perception 
faculty and social in-group/out-group faculties. With this realization, it seems 
that words might offer some inroad into the problem of how humans engage in 
cross-modular thought – words can under the right circumstances lead to the 
activation of concepts from different modules simultaneously. 
 
During normal speech comprehension the words heard trigger the 
corresponding lexical items which in turn activate the associated concepts, 
once these have activated we are doing something akin to experiencing the 
representations that we would be having had we experienced the event 
ourselves. We create a mental model of the situation based on the words we 
hear, as opposed to the things we have experienced. Obviously, the depth and 
richness of experience from testimony is not as great as that from first-hand 
experience, and there is therefore an acute phenomenological difference 
between testimonial and personal experiences (a good storyteller can reduce 
this difference significantly). These mental models then go on to feed into our 
action-planning cognition. Just as seeing a green man at the pelican crossing 
leads me to act in a certain way i.e. crossing the road, so too does hearing my 
friend say: “green man” if I happen to be looking the other way or distracted. 
The mechanism by which mental representations become action plans is far 
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beyond the scope of this chapter and a staggeringly diverse problem; suffice to 
say that once the conceptual representations are activated a distinct causal 
chain will lead to courses of action regardless of whether they have been 
activated via lexical items or as a result of experience itself.  
 
Different representations being activated leads to different plans of action and 
so any new unique combination of activated conceptual representations can 
potentially cause some novel action-planning cognition. At the heart of 
language’s ability to facilitate novel cognitive behaviour is its ability to activate 
new combinations of simultaneously-activated conceptual representations that 
lead to novel action plans and physical behaviour. 
 
Now to get back to the case in hand, navigation. I believe that some of the 
lexical items associated with navigation actually facilitate reorientation 
cognition by virtue of their having access points in both conceptual modules 
utilized in navigation. Importantly the lexical items ‘left’ and ‘right’ map onto 
representations of relationships encoded by both the geometry module and the 
landmark recognition module. When we experience a relationship of this 
nature, from either pre-linguistic module, we automatically prepare to encode 
the experience linguistically, activating the appropriate lexical item. 
Subsequently whenever this lexical item is activated (say ‘left’) the conceptual 
representations it has access points in are also activated, or at least those that 
are appropriate within the semantic context of the situation do. In practice this 
means that whenever the geometry module generates a representation of the 
relationship LEFT OF the lexical item ‘left’ is activated, which in turn activates 
loosely the equivalent representations from the object recognition module 
(note that during navigation situations our concepts of SOCIALISM and 
CAPITALISM are not activated by the firing of the lexical item ‘left’ as these 
concepts are not relevant to the situation that is being prepared for encoding 
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into speech). Language effectively brings to bear in action planning two 
potentially associated conceptual representations that otherwise might not 
both have been activated. We know that in the absence of language something 
inhibits the representations from the landmark recognition module being fired 
or at least brought to our attention; lexical items having access points in both 
modules overcomes this inhibitive process and fires the landmark 
representation, allowing us to reorientate ourselves using both sets of 
representations.  
 
Language’s encoded nexus of associations between lexical items and 
conceptual representations allows us to attend to certain conceptual 
representations that might not have been activated by perceptual and other 
non-linguistic cues, leading to new combinations of activated conceptual 
representations that must be factored into action planning. In the case of the 
reorientation task, the representation from the normal geometry module might 
encourage the action plan: GO TO THE CORNER WITH THE SHORT WALL ON THE LEFT; 
the activation of this representation will in turn activate the lexical item ‘left’ 
by the process which primes lexical items ready for communication (this 
process of lexical priming will be the focus of the next chapter and elaborated 
extensively there). The activation of the lexical item ‘left’ in turn activates the 
landmark recognition module, which we know is not normally activated during 
reorientation behaviour. The landmark recognition module in turn will 
encourage the action plan: GO TO THE CORNER OF THE BLUE WALL. In this situation 
only one action plan, GO THE CORNER OF THE BLUE WALL WHICH HAS THE SHORT 
WALL ON THE LEFT satisfies both demands simultaneously and therefore is the 
plan that is put into action. Only humans can navigate according to this kind of 
complex action plan because only through the language faculty can both sets of 
conceptual representations be activated and influence decision making 
simultaneously. Without language, animals have no capacity to stimulate the 
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activation of semantically linked conceptual representations from the landmark 
recognition module during reorientation and therefore attend only to the 
geometric information. 
 
For this associated firing mechanism to take place, the appropriate terminology 
must be in place, and the semantic information associated with each term 
sufficiently woven into the association nexus embodied by the lexicon. We 
must remember the link between the geometry module and landmark 
recognition module is only manifested in the semantic associations and 
conceptual access points encoded in the lexical items associated with 
navigation. Only once these words have been properly learnt and all the 
various access points developed, do these links become a functioning part of 
reorientation cognition. The semantic nexus embodied in the lexicon prescribes 
all the potential links between modules and determines the kinds of cross-
domain thinking that can take place.  
 
By learning a language, we learn once-and-for-all how to do the kinds of 
advanced cognitive behaviours we have been investigating, namely 
reorientation using both landmark and geometric information. This once-and-
for-all developmental account of reorientation cognition fits more closely with 
the correlation data from Spelke & Hermer(Hermer & Spelke, 1994) than 
Carruthers’s syntax-based account does. Spelke & Hermer’s research showed 
that the developmental threshold that needed to be crossed before children 
could complete navigational tasks requiring attention to two different sets of 
representations was not general intelligence or vocabulary size, but specifically 
mastery of the terms “left” and “right” to the level where children could use 
them correctly in spontaneous speech. I assume that this ability to competently 
use a term in spontaneous speech indicates that the term in question is a 
relatively well-developed lexical item.  
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While the fact that the key factor in completing the reorientation tasks is 
linguistic supports the general claim that language is key to reorientation, it is 
not clear how much support this finding lends to Carruthers’s more specific 
claim that it is the language faculty’s syntactic abilities that provide the 
computational power to complete these tasks. Instead we might suspect that 
the syntactic ability to conjoin representation would be signalled 
developmentally by children’s mastery of basic grammaticality or conjunction 
terms like “and” rather than mastery of the terms “left” and “right”. 
 
It is important to note that the mechanism described above of patterns of 
activation determined by access points between lexical items and conceptual 
representations does not rely on a few special lexical items such as ‘left’ or 
‘right’, after all if this were so we might only engage in advanced navigation on 
those occasions where we characterized a situation exactly as ‘left’ and not 
with some other lexical description such as ‘near’ or ‘beside’.  
 
This is the case because as well as the access points between lexical items and 
conceptual representations the associated access mechanism also relies on the 
semantic associations between words to work. As discussed earlier, when a 
lexical item is activated it partially activates all the other lexical items that are 
semantically associated with it; this is the means of generating the semantic 
background which aids speech comprehension and also leads to the 
phenomenon of lexical priming. Moreover, in regard to our investigation into 
language’s role in cross-domain thinking, we can see how this associated 
semantic firing might lead to a leaking over of activation from one domain to 
another. We might hear a word, which in turn activates an associated lexical 
item, in line with the semantic background being generated; then the 
conceptual representation associated with that second lexical item is activated. 
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So even if the first word did not have an access point to that particular 
conceptual representation, if its semantic association with a word that does is 
strong enough it might lead to activating the representation anyway. This 
bleeding of associated conceptual representations between lexical items means 
that we do not rely on a number of special lexical items	to trigger cross-
modular thought, as Carruthers’s account suggests; but instead triggers and 
associations are dispersed throughout linguistic cognition. This mechanism will 
be addressed in detail during the next chapter. 
 
Dealing with the challenges facing Carruthers: flexibility and 
computational explosion 
 
So how does this account fare against the challenges Carruthers’s account was 
met with? As with any domain-general thinking mechanism the dangers 
associated with computational explosion are always looming. Each word in the 
lexicon has potentially limitless access to conceptual representations, there is 
no systematic reason it could not have access points to a vast number of 
conceptual representations that must be consulted on hearing the word. If too 
many conceptual representations were fired we might assume that the action-
planning element of the mind would have too many variables that needed 
consulting and would suffer computational overload. 
 
In practice this clearly does not happen. The lexical item’s semantic 
information allows only those access points to conceptual representations that 
are appropriate to the current usage of a lexical item to fire and are therefore 
factored in to action planning etc. Just as the syntactic information of a 
sentence requires agreement between all of the words in that sentence, 
providing a background grammatical structure, the semantic information 
associated with each word in a sentence generates a background of semantic 
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information that helps us deduce what a given lexical item might mean in that 
context, only those access points to conceptual representations that are 
appropriate to this meaning context are activated during speech 
comprehension. The semantic information associated with lexical items 
functions as a limit on how many of the many potential associated 
representations are activated, allowing only those that are likely to be relevant 
to the meaning context to go on to be used in further reasoning behaviour. 
 
There is also a second limiting factor on the number of conceptual 
representations that a given lexical item will fire. The mechanism depends on 
the nature of lexical items, in particular their semantic information and the 
mapping of its access points to conceptual representations. The set of access 
points of a given lexical item is learnt as part of the process of learning the 
words of a language. Learning a word then instils a culturally agreed-upon 
limit to the amount of semantic information associated with any given lexical 
item; its meaning and therefore its set of access points is delimited by the 
language group. Word meanings evolve in response to a need for 
communication, this means that they tend not to have too many access points 
to representations in the same cognitive domain, as this would lead to serious 
ambiguity in a language. This external requirement for effective 
communication offers another practical limit on the number of conceptual 
representations consulted as part of normal linguistic cognition, limiting the 
dangers from computational explosion. 
 
Another significant advantage of this account over Carruthers’s is that it does 
not credit the language faculty with any computational powers that go beyond 
those used in everyday communication. The operations it performs are not 
quasi-logical inferences and it does not ascribe language the power of 
generating novel forms of representation. Despite the fact that at this early 
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stage the details of the account have yet to be spelt out we can see how we are 
moving towards a picture of cognition where normal language processing can 
lead to enhanced and adaptable cognitive behaviour. This will become a 
guiding principle of this thesis, that goes on to illustrate how purely 
communicative mechanisms of the language faculty can go on to have tangible 
effects on cognition downstream. 
 
Response to Varley’s data 
 
What about the results from Varley (Bek et al., 2010), that stands in opposition 
to the evidence from dual task studies? I believe the current account does not 
stand and fall with the dual tasks studies, in fact it makes no predictions about 
whether verbal shadowing should prevent navigational abilities at all. The 
account maintains that although language is involved in facilitating cross-
modular cognition, it is not in online active linguistic cognition that this cross-
modular thought occurs. Hence, we do not have to be actively engaged in 
linguistic cognition to complete navigational tasks and therefore verbal 
shadowing should not hinder our ability to do so. All that is required to 
facilitate cross-modular thought (and thereby adult navigation) is for 
experiential data to activate various lexical items, potentially in preparation to 
express them linguistically later, and that these lexical items in turn activate 
the conceptual representations prescribed by the make-up of their conceptual 
access points and in-line with the semantic background. Note that this requires 
no active involvement of speech production’s syntactical abilities.  
 
Accordingly, even Varley’s agrammatical subjects who have lost syntax 
comprehension are still complete the reorientation task. Classically aphasic 
patients’ communications are limited to disjointed nouns or noun phrases. 
Though these lexical items can no longer be combined syntactically during 
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speech production, the access points and semantic information that allows 
them to be used in even the most basic forms of communication of thoughts 
may remain intact and so the process of associated activation can still take 
place. Because these patients learnt these lexical associations before becoming 
their brain trauma, the neural pathways ( the access points between lexical 
items and conceptual representations) required to facilitate cross-modular 
thought are already in place. And because the mechanism requires no online 
use of grammatical or linguistic skills these patients are able to behave much 
like patients who still have a full set of linguistic capacities. 
 
This idea that the language faculty is constantly encoding experience in such a 
way as to later communicate it, facilitating cross-modular thought, will be 
explored in later chapters in great depth. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite positing no specialized representational machinery, I am confident that 
the access point account put forward here provides a feasible way of explaining 
the experimental observations linking language to navigation in human 
navigators. It shows how language can be seen as being responsible for our 
ability to utilize simultaneously representations from the two different pre-
existing conceptual modules associated with navigation in non-human animals 
and human infants in reorientation. 
 
The preceding investigation into navigation leaves open the question of 
whether activation of specific lexical items is required for cross-domain 
thought or whether some looser pattern of activation is sufficient. Hermer-
Vazquez’s data points to the association between possession of certain terms 
and success at reorientation tasks. However, I suspect that a mechanism that 
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focuses on a few key terms to explain the myriad subtle and varied cases of 
cross-domain cognition will run in to difficulties. For every special term, which 
has the capacity to activate the necessary mental representation it seems that 
there is the possibility of their being another term that is semantically 
appropriate but does not have an essential access point that means cross-
modular thought does not proceed simply for the sake of word choice. It seems 
intuitively unlikely that the choice of the word ‘left’ might allow us to solve a 
reorientation problem but use of the word ‘beside’ might lead us to fail the 
same problem. However, this may well be the case but the data from 
reorientation throws a little light on this question. 
 
In the next chapter I will focus on how semantic background is built up via 
activation between associated lexical items and how this might alleviate the 
problems associated with endowing a few lexical items, such as ‘left’ and ‘right’ 
with special importance in certain cognitive behaviours.  
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Case study 2. 
 
“Don’t do that, it’s f**king gross”: 
An investigation into the roots and transmission of moral disgust and its 
relationship to obscene language 
 
Caveat – this chapter contains swear words, quite a lot of them. As will be 
discussed later, swear words have an immitigable negative psychological 
impact on the reader or hearer, even when used in the anodyne setting of 
academic writing, leaving them repelled or revolted. Please try not to let the 
repeated usage of swear words throughout this piece impact negatively on 
your appraisal of the work contained.  
 
Introduction 
 
This second case study is quite distinct from the last, and it is the only case 
study we look at that is not investigated by Carruthers or others who work on 
the effects of language on cognition. Accordingly, it takes quite a different turn 
from the chapters on navigation and number, which follow the pattern of 
comparing attempts at explaining certain experimental results by positing 
differing accounts of how the language faculty in general can affect cognition.  
 
This chapter instead proposes another potential mechanism by which language 
affects cognition, namely by facilitating the expansion of the remit of our pre-
linguistic disgust response; but instead of describing a mechanism based in 
language functioning in general, it focuses on one particular linguistic 
behaviour, swearing, which exhibits unusual and interesting effects on 
cognition. 
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The first port of call for this investigation will be a brief look at the human 
disgust response, detailing its physiological characteristics and its evolutionary 
past. We will look at how disgust evolved to meet the challenges posed by 
infection and illness, and find out why we find so many potential disease 
vectors disgusting. However, this is only half the story, it will become clear that 
this disease-avoidance explanation cannot help us answer the riddle of why we 
also find morally outrageous behaviour disgusting.  
 
This observation is the starting point of an investigation into the deeply 
entwined relationship of morality and disgust. This investigation will bring to 
the fore the fundamental question I want to answer in this chapter: how do 
normative acts come to take on moral significance and become issues of 
disgust?  
 
I believe that the answer to this question comes, in part, from language, 
particularly obscene or taboo swear words, . We shall look at some of the 
unique characteristics of swear words and subsequently try to explain these 
within the framework of the account of cognitive linguistics put forward in the 
preceding chapter. I intend to show how the complex relationship between 
disgust and swear words is the key to answering our question. I will proceed by 
sketching out a mechanism for how our reflexive swearing at times of outrage 
comes to tarnish certain behaviour with disgust-triggering offensiveness.  
 
Before we begin to look at the relationship between the two elements of the 
proposal we should look at the two distinct elements, the disgust response and 
swear words, individually. 
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Part 1. The disgust response and mores 
 
The briefest investigation into the emotion of disgust is enough to highlight its 
slightly paradoxical nature. On the one hand it seems primitive, basic and 
uncontrollable - ultimately animal. No amount of the higher rationality that 
humans are so proud of can suppress or prevent a disgust response; yet it turns 
out that humans are actually the only animals that display the behaviour in its 
full sense (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). And it is clear with only the most 
cursory glance at social history that what is considered disgusting varies 
significantly between populations and individuals.  
 
Given the heterogeneous set of things that trigger the disgust response - 
disgust elicitors - why do we continue to refer to it as a single, unified 
psychological phenomenon? In short: because, despite the variety of disgust 
elicitors, the response itself is remarkably stable and homogenous across 
populations and individuals. 
 
The disgust response is characterized in terms of revulsion and avoidance. The 
clearest physiological elements of the disgust response are oral: a distinctive 
facial expression in which the nose becomes wrinkled, closing the nasal 
passage stopping further inhalation of bad odours, and mouth gapping to 
encourage discharge of offending material from the mouth. This can be 
followed by the gag response in an attempt to expel offending articles of food 
from the digestive system.  
  
This facial expression has the ability to trigger further disgust reactions in 
those witnessing it. This ability to directly induce the disgust response in others 
through an involuntary facial expression has been referred to by Kelly as 
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semantic signalling (Kelly, 2011) and has important ramifications for the social 
role of disgust. 
 
Other physiological elements of the disgust response include nausea and a 
lowered heart rate (this is in contrast to fear and outrage which increase heart 
rate). In very extreme cases nausea leads to vomiting, which might be 
considered as an attempt to undo mistakes and reject offensive objects that 
may have already been ingested.  
 
These physiological responses are accompanied by a very strong psychological 
response in which the disgusted party tries to remove themselves from the 
offending object and rejects the disgust elicitor. When we are disgusted by 
something we cannot help but try to move ourselves away from it and remove 
any part of our body from contact with it. Anything associated with the object, 
or that has touched the object, also becomes repulsive. 
 
The degree to which we are disgusted varies with the nature of the experience, 
meaning that perhaps not all these effects are triggered. We are able to have 
mild disgust reactions, where a mere hint of the gape face in the form of lip 
twisting up, might just flicker across our face, to full-blown repulsion 
responses. Though the scale of the reaction might change, we never exhibit 
other responses alongside the disgust reaction that contradict it. For example: 
our disgust face doesn’t occur alongside a desire to touch or get closer to the 
disgust elicitor. 
 
Overall the disgust response is very stable, that is to say that different cultures 
do not exhibit disgust in idiosyncratic, culturally-defined ways. We can see this 
clearly in Ekman’s facial recognition studies that show that disgust is 
recognisable in others by people across massive cultural divides. Yet on the 
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other hand the stimuli that can trigger a disgust response in any given 
individual vary massively both intra- and inter-culturally (Ekman & Friesen, 
1971; 1986). At this juncture let us run through and attempt to categorise the 
various stimuli that might be considered offensive and disgusting. 
 
Disgust elicitors  
 
The most basic, and (potentially) universal, disgust elicitors are bad-tasting 
food stuffs; in fact, the word “disgust”, etymologically speaking, means “bad 
taste”. Any food stuff that is too bitter or sour can set off a disgust response; 
these foul foodstuffs are the most universal of disgust elicitors, occurring in all 
populations, though, as we shall see shortly, individual food stuffs can come to 
be culturally accepted despite contradicting the general rules of distaste. This 
response likely evolved to meet the dangers associated with humans’ 
evolutionary niche as omnivorous scavengers. Haidt et al. point out that while 
being an omnivore opens up to humans vast amounts of potential food stuffs 
and alleviates dependence on one single food source, it also puts us at risk of 
falling ill if we chose to eat something that had gone bad or is simply 
indigestible (Haidt, Rozin, Mccauley, & Imada, 1997). While some animals are 
genetically pre-disposed to recognise certain things as foodstuffs, humans, and 
other omnivores, must learn what can, and what cannot, be eaten. The disgust 
response helps us to avoid consumption of things that are likely to cause us 
illness or discomfort such as rancid meat and bitter, unripe fruit. Once we have 
eaten something disgustingly bitter or rancid the disgust response acts to 
promptly expel it from our mouth and prevents us smelling it by blocking the 
nostrils with an upturned lip. After this initial oral response, we might also try 
to remove the offending stuff from us, throwing it aside or walking away. 
Subsequently we then tend to avoid contact with the offending foodstuff and 
seemingly similar foodstuffs in the future. This learnt avoidance depends on a 
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strong associative process of one-shot learning(Garcia, Hankins, & Rusiniak, 
1974), that is to say, we are apt to find a potential foodstuff disgusting even 
after a single distaste-experience. This makes evolutionary good sense; when it 
comes to survival it is better to be safe than sorry, and it is not surprising that 
such a trait might have been selected for. 
 
But personal experience is not the only way we come to find things disgusting. 
Witnessing a disgust response in someone else often sets off a disgust response 
in ourselves, we exhibit a mild disgust response in response to witnessing the 
disgust response in others yet we also seem to know that the thing that set it 
off in them is disgusting(Goldman & Sripada, 2005; Kelly, 2011). This sharing 
of disgust elicitors through semantic signalling helps us learn what is, and is 
not, to be eaten without our having to eat potentially toxic things. It means 
that, in short, if we witness someone being disgusted at a food stuff, we know 
not to eat it; without having to go through the experience ourselves – which 
might ultimately prove dangerous.  
 
In this way bad-taste disgust elicitors can be spread throughout a culture, 
without individual members all having to make the same mistakes. The process 
guides and shapes societies’ particular elaborate food cultures. The rules 
governing these cultures do not necessarily follow the simple distaste reaction 
in finding only things that are especially bitter or rancid unacceptable 
foodstuffs. Nonetheless the sharing of the food rules utilises the same 
mechanism as witnessed in distaste. For example, the taste of cat meat is no 
more likely to set off a distaste reaction than the taste of beef but in many 
cultures eating it would be seen as disgusting, and cat meat is treated as if it 
was truly distasteful on a purely gustatory level. It is indicative of how strong 
these food conventions are that many cultures have food stuffs as part of their 
normal food culture, that to outsiders might seem disgusting and contradict 
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distaste rules, such as (rotten) fish sauce in Chinese cooking, blue cheese 
(rancid) in French culture or American’s drinking whisky sours (sour).  
 
Disgust therefore cannot be considered simply as guarding us against 
foodstuffs that present a potential danger of illness. Otherwise eating human 
flesh or slugs should not be particularly disgusting as they do not pose any 
extra danger of immediate infection than their less disgusting counter parts 
beef and whelks. There must be some other element involved in making 
something disgusting.  
 
It seems then that disgust must also trigger in response to something 
psychologically distinct from bad taste. Haidt et al. characterize the quality 
something has that makes it trigger the disgust response as offensiveness - it 
seems that offensiveness goes beyond bad taste. For instance, food that has 
been walked over by a cockroach is not disgusting because the taste has 
changed but because of an association with cockroaches which are offensive 
themselves. 
 
There are other non-food disgust elicitors 
 
The above examples indicate that foodstuffs are not the only disgust elicitors, 
in the above example the cockroach is perceived as disgusting and not because 
it is likely to taste bad. What kind of things, other than distasteful foods might 
elicit a disgust response? The most common way of studying disgust in a cross-
cultural way is by simply asking people from different communities to list the 
things that they find disgusting. This self-report methodology has the 
advantages of being able to collect relatively large samples quickly and easily, 
and this way we get a good picture of the full spectrum of disgust elicitors. 
Besides inappropriate food stuffs, when asked about what disgusts them, 
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subjects frequently mention: obscene sexual acts, open or infected wounds, 
body deformations and mutations, almost all bodily fluids and corpses – 
especially those visibly decaying (Valerie Curtis & Biran, 2001; Haidt, Rozin, 
Mccauley, & Imada, 1997). The plethora of variations on these themes given 
by subjects from different cultures illustrates the amount of variation between 
cultures in what is thought of as disgusting: different cultures find slightly 
different sexual acts taboo and have different ways of dealing with corpses that 
are considered appropriate (and therefore not disgusting). 
 
However, what unites these various elicitors is that they can all be seen as 
increasing fitness by guarding against risk of infection, parasites and illness 
(for experimental support of this claim see (Val Curtis, Aunger, & Rabie, 
2004)). The disgust response firstly acts to expel indigestible or potentially 
dangerous food stuffs and secondly affects our behaviour to prevent us coming 
into contact with potential disease vectors. We are repelled by disgusting 
things and attempt to distance ourselves from them – this massively lessens the 
likelihood of infection. If the evolutionary pressure of the threat of infection 
was enough to change our physiology in the form of adaptations specifically 
tuned to prevent infection (hydrochloric acid in the stomach, constant 
shedding of gut epithelium, enzymes in saliva), then it is not unreasonable to 
suggest that the same pressure may have altered our behavioural traits too, in 
this case in the form of altering our disgust response to fire in cases of 
potential infection, as any behavioural pattern that prevents infection was 
likely to be selected for (especially during pre-medicine times, when any 
serious illness was likely to severely inhibit chances to produce fertile 
offspring). All disgust elicitors that can loosely be seen as related to avoidance 
of disease and infection I shall call visceral disgust elicitors, as they are related 
to bodily health. 
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Further evidence for this theory of disgust as a health preservation mechanism 
comes from a study by Curtis and Biran (Valerie Curtis & Biran, 2001): Curtis 
and Biran notice that the disgust elicitors most commonly mentioned in their 
surveys map closely onto a list of disease vectors associated with the most 
dangerous infectious diseases. They point out that all bodily fluids pose a very 
high risk of infection of very serious diseases (chlorella from faeces, whooping 
cough from phlegm etc.) with the exception of tears, which are not associated 
with any serious infectious diseases. They note that this fact is reflected in their 
studies of disgust elicitors across cultures – where despite frequent mentions of 
all other bodily fluids from members of all sampled cultures, not a single 
subject listed tears as disgusting. 
 
Contagion  
 
One of the most important features of disgust is just how contagious the 
quality of offensiveness is. This is illustrated by the earlier example of a 
cockroach crawling over a plate of food, we can see clearly that the 
offensiveness of the contaminated food stuff is changed even though the plate 
of food has not been altered in such a way that would affect the taste, the 
contagion effect is not limited to events that change the physical properties of 
the original thing, offensiveness is an invisible property an object has and can 
be spread invisibly by the merest contact or even conceptual association. This 
fact might help explain why there is such a breadth of things that are 
considered disgusting: it seems almost anything has the capacity to be infected 
with offensiveness and so become disgusting. Through contagion, when 
something is associated with something disgusting it readily becomes 
disgusting in and of itself, even if we know that the new thing cannot make us 
ill or does not share other properties of the original object. Evidence for this 
comes from studies carried out by Nemeroff & Rozin that probed people’s 
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sensitivity to offensiveness. They noted that the reluctance of subjects to put on 
a jumper that had been laundered (and therefore posed no risk of infection) 
but previously worn by a stranger increased massively if the subjects were told 
that the stranger had lost a leg or had committed a murder, and increased so 
much so as to make the jumper totally disgusting if they were told that it had 
once been worn by history’s worst moral monster: Adolf Hitler (Nemeroff & 
Rozin, 1994; 2000). This shows that something can become disgusting just by 
virtue of being conceptually associated with something disgusting, even if we 
know that it in no way poses a risk to our health. Disgust is so contagious that 
often even a single associating experience is enough to render something 
disgusting. We see this in the one-shot food learning mechanism, that means 
people are unlikely to want to eat again something that they previously ate 
prior to getting ill, even if later they find out that it was not the thing that 
caused the illness at all.  
 
Moral Disgust 
 
The above example illustrates that the explanation of disgust evolving as a way 
of preventing infectious disease only explains so much of the workings of the 
human disgust response. We have already briefly touched on two examples 
that do not quite fit with this explanation: firstly, that of eating cat or human 
meat (there is no immediate risk of disease associated with eating either of 
these foodstuffs) and secondly the disgustingness of a jumper purportedly 
worn by Adolf Hitler.  
 
In fact when quizzed about what they found disgusting, only about 25% of 
participants’ responses fell into the category of visceral disgust (Haidt, Rozin, 
Mccauley, & Imada, 1997) that are associated with risk of infectious disease 
(sample taken from both American and Japanese university students). The 
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remainder of responses given described moral transgressions, which on the 
face of it pose no immediate risk of infection. Examples of moral disgust 
elicitors included: lawyers who chase ambulances, people who abandon elderly 
relatives, people who embezzle money from pension funds, betrayal, insulting 
behaviour, men who beat women, cruelty to horses (examples taken from 
(Haidt, Rozin, Mccauley, & Imada, 1997)and (Valerie Curtis & Biran, 2001). 
 
It is notable that the degree to which moral disgust elicitors vary from culture 
to culture appears greater than the degree to which visceral disgust elicitors 
vary across cultures(Haidt, Rozin, Mccauley, & Imada, 1997). This is clear in 
Haidt’s study in which, despite the fact that the percentage of responses that 
involved moral disgust elicitors was similar between the Japanese and the 
American groups, the focus of the content of the responses differed 
significantly. This was to such a degree that it seems unlikely that any 
American presented with the list of Japanese responses would even register 
that the list was of reported disgust elicitors. This contrasts with the visceral 
disgust elicitors, which seem much more homogenous across cultures, with 
only slight variation. Haidt’s studies show that Americans’ ideas of morally 
disgusting acts focused on senseless violence, dehumanizing acts and 
infringements of personal liberties, whereas Japanese responses included 
failing to meet expected standards, being spoken too harshly and not finding 
one’s name on a board naming people who passed an entrance exam (public 
humiliation). There appears to be almost no overlap in these two samples, and 
for Western readers it is difficult to see how the Japanese examples can be seen 
as disgusting in the same way that the visceral disgust elicitors are.  
 
One unifying thing about these moral disgust elicitors is that they can all be 
characterized as acts of transgression of societal norms. However, it is obvious 
that not all social norm breaking could appropriately be met with disgust. 
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Some social norms can be broken without triggering the disgust reaction in 
witnesses, for instance think of someone crossing the road not at a traffic light 
or of someone wearing socks and sandals (or any slightly eccentric dress code). 
These transgressions are unlikely to trigger in us revulsion or disgust; more 
likely they will perplex, vex or annoy us. On the other hand some societal 
norms seem imbued with real moral significance. Take for instance the norm in 
liberal Western society that we should not cause harm to other people – (under 
normal circumstances) any transgression of this is met with horror, dismay and 
disgust.  
 
I propose a terminological distinction that will make the coming investigation 
easier. I will call those rules governing proper societal behaviour, the 
transgression of which does not warrant disgust and which are not imbued 
with any significant moral meaning, “norms”; and those rules which are 
imbued with important moral significance and the breaking of which is met 
with disgust “mores” (singular: “mōs”). To clarify this distinction, think of the 
difference in response we might have witnessing someone jaywalk versus 
seeing a mother smoking with her baby in her arms. Though the don’t-cross-
the-road-dangerously societal code has been in place a lot longer than the don’t-
expose-children-to-cigarette-smoke code, it does not have the same moral 
weight. By my terminological definitions, the first is an example of a norm and 
the second of a mōs.  
 
This terminological clarification brings to light an important question: Why are 
morality and disgust so closely linked? It is clear that the idea of moral disgust 
elicitors do not fit with the characterization of disgust as an infection-
avoidance mechanism – avoiding people who perform these morally disgusting 
actions is unlikely to decrease our risk of infectious disease; after all, moral 
corruption is not infectious in the same way that bodily disease is. It is difficult 
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to see immediately what evolutionary fitness benefits accrue from our 
responding to certain moral transgressions with disgust, that could have led to 
the co-opting of the disgust response from the visceral to the moral realm. 
 
In Yuck!, Kelly offers an account that establishes the importance of following 
mores in successful cooperation when living in large social groups (though he 
does not share this exact terminology) and suggests the evolutionary pressure 
to live in larger groups led to the adaptation of the pre-existing disgust 
response to serve social purposes(Kelly, 2011). He argues that as we lived in 
larger and larger groups more coordination and collaboration was necessary 
for survival. Wasting time and resources trying to cooperate with people that 
were not going to return the favour could be costly in survival terms. 
Therefore, he argues it became important for us to have a way to identify 
fruitful co-operators and thereby to avoid interaction with those people, with 
whom cooperation might be difficult and unfruitful, namely people from 
different cultures. Kelly suggests that the disgust mechanism was co-opted to 
fulfil these new social roles. By responding to transgressions of societal norms 
with repulsion and disgust we were able to ensure that we were not going to 
attempt to cooperate with those who did not share our social norms. Kelly 
argues then that we are evolutionarily biased to find people that do not share 
the outward signs of abiding by our shared social norms disgusting. Avoiding 
contact with outsiders – xenophobia – Kelly argues was essential for group 
survival, and we ensured this bias by co-opting the disgust system to respond 
not only to visceral disgust elicitors that might cause infection but also to 
moral transgressions. 
 
However, xenophobia cannot directly account for why we find the act of 
breaking social mores disgusting; and it seems unlikely that breaking a mōs is 
disgusting because it indicates we are from a different social group. It is not 
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clear in Kelly’s account why breaking a mōs sets off the disgust response but 
breaking another, less morally significant norm does not – surely the breaking 
of a norm, such as a fashion code, is just as indicative of belonging to a 
different cultural group as breaking a moral code governing proper behaviour. 
In fact given that conforming to certain norms is a significant outward 
expression of group membership (and therefore of suitability for cooperation), 
fashion codes that determine our external appearance seem like the ideal 
norms to become imbued with special significance. 
 
It seems much more obvious that the breaking of some moral codes is 
disgusting in-and-of-itself and not because doing so signifies outgroup 
membership, but this raises the question why are some social norms moralized 
and relevant to the disgust response and others not. What is it about the 
breaking of mōs that means they are disgusting and how do they get to become 
disgust elicitors? 
 
Is moral disgust “disgust-veritas”? 
 
An important part of this chapter will be the answering of the question: Is the 
use of the term “disgust” to label our response to the breaking of mores a 
reflection of our true physiological response to the acts? Or in other words: are 
we genuinely disgusted by so called moral disgust elicitors or is the use of the 
term “disgust” in labelling our response to them purely metaphorical? This 
question is important because if we cannot establish that moral disgust is 
disgust-veritas then very simply the answer to the question we set out to 
answer – “how do social norms becomes the kind of things that can set of a 
disgust reaction?” – is simple: they don’t. 
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If use of the term “disgust” to label our response to moral transgressions is 
metaphorical then we are claiming that the emotion we feel when presented 
with a moral disgust elicitor is physiologically distinct from the response we 
might feel when presented with a visceral disgust elicitor. This is slightly odd 
given the ease with which the two sets of elicitors are set side by side when 
subjects are asked what disgusts them. The two sets of things are clearly 
associated with the concept of disgust in the minds of the respondents. So why 
might we suspect that the use of the term “disgust” in the realm of morality is 
purely metaphorical?  
 
Nabi argues that the kinds of things that we describe as disgusting in the moral 
realm (mōs transgressions) are actually more akin, in their psychological 
effect, to acts that cause outrage or annoyance (Nabi, 2002). Traditional 
psychology expects the public transgression of a societal code to be met with 
outrage and not disgust and she argues this is what respondents feel when they 
see the transgressions they later report as disgusting. To explain this 
discrepancy Nabi suggests that the public usage of the word “disgust” must 
have become divorced from the stricter, scientific term, as used traditionally by 
psychologists. She conducted studies probing subjects’ understanding of the 
meaning of the term “disgust”. She claims that her findings show that the term 
“disgust”, as used in common parlance, also refers to behavioural responses 
that the psychological community would in fact characterize as anger or 
outrage. In the lay sense then the term “disgust” might have taken on a wider 
meaning to encompass outrageous acts to emphasize just how serious the 
transgression is deemed. We can see why humans might want to do this, for 
instance describing a politician’s actions as disgusting might be a good way to 
rhetorically emphasise disapproval of them and to cast serious aspersions as to 
their character, without ever really meaning that their actions were actually 
physiologically disgusting. 
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Nabi therefore claims that we should pay heed to the fact that when subjects 
use the term “disgust” in a lay conversational setting (such as the settings of 
the questionnaires probing what they find disgusting) they are not necessarily 
referring to the physiological response the psychologist calls “disgust” but their 
answers may also be referring to emotional responses that in a strictly scientific 
sense might be thought of as outrage. The upshot of this for our current 
investigation is that we can no longer be confident that just because, when 
quizzed on disgust elicitors, subjects mention moral acts alongside visceral acts 
that these two types of disgust are in fact physiologically congruent. We then 
have no way of telling from their own accounts whether the subjects are using 
the term “disgusting” to label the physiological response of disgust or of 
outrage (or something different again). 
 
However, Nabi’s studies do not illustrate conclusively that the disgust we feel 
at moral elicitors is not the same as the disgust we feel at visceral disgust 
elicitors, merely that verbal self-reporting isn’t an accurate way for us to 
identify assuredly disgust elicitors. For the current investigation to proceed we 
must find some other way of establishing the fact that moral disgust is disgust-
veritas. For this let us look back to the disgust response itself. As discussed 
earlier, the set of behavioural and physiological traits associated with the 
disgust response are stable across the population and well documented. 
Chapman et al. (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009) use this fact to 
establish whether patients witnessing moral transgressions experience disgust-
veritas by measuring the movement of the muscles associated with the 
archetypal gape face. By digitally measuring facial responses in subjects to 
distasteful and disgusting liquids compared to controls of neutral and sweet 
tasting liquids Chapman et al. built up a detailed picture of the muscle 
movements associated with the true disgust responses. They then exposed the 
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subjects to photographs containing images of morally taboo behaviours 
(alongside equally negative but purely sad photographs as a control) and 
measured facial responses again. The results found that subjects had 
physiological responses identical to those associated with a proper disgust 
response to the images of moral transgressions. This was not the case for the 
sad or upsetting images which were met with an entirely different 
physiological response. This finding indicates that disgust at moral 
transgressions is physiologically identical to disgust at visceral disgust elicitors 
and therefore that the description of moral transgressions as “disgusting” by 
patients is not merely metaphorical. 
 
In a follow-up study Chapman et al. had subjects play a version of the 
Ultimatum Game, whereby subjects are given an offer of a share of a pool of 
money by either an experimenter or another test subject. If they accept the 
offer then both parties receive the money, split as per the offer made; however, 
if they reject the offer then neither party receives any money. It is therefore 
always in the subject’s best, financial, interest to accept any money offered – an 
unjustly small share of the money is still worth more than nothing. Chapman et 
al., following Rozin’s analysis of moral disgust in Western society (Rozin, 
2008), reasoned that unfairness is a key component of morally disgusting 
behaviour (at least for his Western test subjects) and therefore that if moral 
disgust is disgust-veritas then receiving a clearly unfair offer should be met 
with a disgust response. Instead of relying on measurement of facial 
movements, results were obtained through self-reported non-verbal accounts: 
after offers had been rejected or accepted subjects were asked which of a series 
photographs, illustrating the canonical emotion facial expressions, best 
matched their own emotional response. By trading on the fact that the basic 
emotions are universally recognisable in this way, Chapmen et al. avoided the 
challenges arising from Nabi’s analysis of the term “disgust” as used in 
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common parlance. The results show that subjects predominately select the 
traditional gape face (associated with disgust) as best describing their 
emotional response to an unfair offer. Chapman et al. conclude that the 
subjects genuinely did feel disgusted at the person presenting an unfair offer. It 
is interesting to note subjects showed a high tendency to reject offers they 
deemed as unfair, as rejection or aversion is a key element to the behavioural 
response we have to disgust elicitors. A genuine disgust response in subjects 
might explain the rejection of offers despite it being economically irrational to 
do so, as disgust is known to override more rational considerations (Rozin, 
Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986). Despite these uncertainties surrounding the 
relationship between disgust and outrage I conclude that there is enough 
evidence from Chapman et al.’s studies to conclude that moral disgust is 
disgust-veritas.  
 
Chapman’s results do not rule out the possibility that outrage or anger may 
also be associated with the normal response to transgression of social norms, 
just as Nabi has suggested, and the relationship between outrage and disgust is 
something that we shall explore later in this chapter. Given that our ordinary 
language term, “disgust”, appears to map onto both outrage and disgust 
responses we might expect that the relationship between them runs deep.  
 
From norms to mores 
 
This conclusion leaves our original quandary intact; we are still looking for a 
mechanism detailing how disgust might come to be transferred from the 
visceral to the moral realm and how some social norms come to be transmuted 
into mores while others do not. 
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The fact that there is such variety in what counts as morally disgusting 
between cultures gives us some clues about the nature of the mechanism that 
renders certain normative transgressions disgusting to us and others not. I 
believe the mechanism is active on a societal and not a genetic level, in so far 
as we do not appear to be predisposed to find any particular behaviours 
disgusting and others not. The same cannot be said for the visceral disgust 
elicitors which appear to be much more constant across societies and are 
therefore more likely to be genetically determined, at least as far as distaste 
disgust elicitors. 
 
Further evidence that the process of moralization operates on a societal level – 
and therefore that what becomes moralized is socially, rather than genetically 
determined – comes from Rozin’s study of the cigarette smoking behaviour in 
the U.S.A. His research shows that even within a lifetime smoking has gone 
from being an act without any moral implications to a being a highly moralized 
issue (Rozin & Singh, 1999). Rozin’s research involved probing people who 
grew up during a time when smoking had no moral connotations about their 
current responses to the morality of smoking. He shows that even people who 
grew up and became active in society during a time when smoking had no 
moral implications still conformed to a modern interpretation of smoking as a 
morally laden issue. The fact that the norms surrounding smoking can become 
moralized so fast again implies that the change is brought about by societal or 
cultural processes. 
 
Rozin mentions a number of possible ways in which this process of 
moralization happens. These include abstract rational reflection, particularly 
striking personal experience and education. For instance we might become 
vegetarian and find the eating of meat a morally laden issue after visiting a 
slaughter house, reflecting on the sanctity of life or by being brought up that 
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way by vegetarian parents. All of these mechanisms might describe how for an 
individual a norm might become a mōs. 
 
I would like to discuss another particular mechanism that I feel is particularly 
important. It is, in a sense, analogous to the case of the gape face being a 
semantic signal that triggers the imperative and unquestionable transferral of 
food norms, as it is a mechanism by which norms become mores in a similarly 
imperative fashion, without the need for personal experience or consideration 
of the issue. This capacity for imperative transfer of moral norms between 
members of a culture leads to greater cultural homogeneity than the other 
mechanisms outlined by Rozin can ensure, which tend to work with varying 
degrees on different individuals.  
  
Part 2: Language in general and swearing in particular 
 
I suggest that the adaptation of the pre-existing disgust response to operate 
over normative behaviour developed out of disgust cognition’s interaction with 
language. In particular, I propose that it arises from our innate tendency to 
swear when outraged and the interaction of this reflexive swearing mechanism 
with disgust’s capacity to come to be associated with a wide variety of stimuli, 
across different modalities. 
 
In order to elaborate this theory, a fairly thorough analysis of the phenomenon 
of swearing is first required, especially with regards to how swearing behaviour 
differs from ordinary language use. I will eventually elaborate this difference in 
terms of the associated access account of cognitive semantics developed in the 
previous chapter. Once we have an understanding of the phenomenon of 
swearing firmly in place we will be able to look at just how it contributes to the 
process of moralization of social norms. 
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Hearing swear words 
 
Loosely defined, swear words (or taboo words – following Jay (Jay, 2009b), I 
will use the terms interchangeably) are exceptionally offensive lexical items. 
Swear words are unusual both in their effects on us and in the ways we wield 
them. We predominantly swear to achieve certain elaborate social ends, often 
with little recourse to the swear words’ literal meanings and without intending 
to communicate the concepts associated with the terms. Swear words play an 
interesting and controversial role within society, variously being accused of 
being dangerous to young children, explicitly legislated against, and rarely 
protected under free-speech acts. Alongside these unusual social roles and 
quirks they have unusual cognitive qualities to match: swear words are 
powerfully repellent and offensive to us in a way that other words are not, and 
to such a degree that, much like stray animals and muddy feet, we might not 
allow them in the house. 
 
Swear words have a unique way of striking us, they are hard to ignore and 
once heard they have a distinct psychological and emotional impact on us. 
Pinker illustrates just how distracting and attention grabbing they are with a 
foul-mouthed version of the well-known Stroop test, a test in which a set of 
coloured words are displayed and the subjects have to read off the colours the 
words are printed in, ignoring the meanings of the words themselves. This is 
infamously more difficult to do if the words are the names of different colours; 
we cannot help but read out the colour names instead of naming the colours of 
the printed words. Pinker’s even more devilish version shows that if the words 
are swear words there is comparable difficulty in seeing past the words and 
reading off the colours of the ink they are printed in; it is clear that swear 
words grab our attention and distract us from the cognitive task in hand. 
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Pinker describes this phenomenon as follows: “Once a [swear] word is seen or 
heard, we are incapable of treating it as a squiggle or noise; we reflexively look 
it up in memory and respond to its meaning, including its connotation”. We 
cannot overlook it and carry on with the task in hand, its full meaning is 
mandatorily brought to conscious attention. This is clearly not the case with 
words in ordinary language, where the full conceptual meaning of a word need 
not be consulted for normal speech production to continue, we do not have to 
think about the nation of France every time the radio commentator says the 
name of the team during the rugby match.  
 
Later we shall describe this immitigable response in terms of the associated 
access account, outlined in the previous chapter, but for now let us look at the 
kinds of meanings swear words have that we are forced to be aware of.  
 
Swear words tend to refer to visceral disgust elicitors (Jay, 2009b), for 
instance, the words “shit” and “piss” are names of excretory products 
associated with disease transmission. It is not quite so immediately obvious 
why the word “fuck” might be considered to refer to a disgust elicitor; in fact, it 
might at first seem counter intuitive for humans to be slightly disgusted by sex, 
as surely a drive to have sex increases our gene’s chances of survival, but given 
the serious potential that sexual relations carry for infection (which can often 
lead to infertility) it is not surprising that the disgust reaction fires in response 
to the idea of sex, especially in the unhygienic, animal fashion that the word 
“fuck” brings to mind. Further, Rozin has argued that many of the things that 
we think of as disgusting remind us of our animal nature (Rozin, Haidt, & 
McCauley, 1999) and as the term “fuck” connotes the sheer animal act of 
copulation and does not call to mind the higher romantic conceptions of 
“making love”, for example, it seems to fit with this characterisation. Swear 
words are the names of disgust elicitors stripped of any euphemism, they are 
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the words that refer to the visceral disgust elicitors directly, without recourse 
to any metaphorical or euphemistic conceptual stand-ins. 
 
However, swear words are not always the words for obvious visceral disgust 
elicitors, there are exceptions. For instance, in the English language, the word 
“nigger” is often cited as the most offensive and disgusting word, and society-
wide taboo still tightly controls its use. Just as other swear words such as “shit” 
and “fuck” are disgusting because they are associated with strong visceral 
disgust elicitors, I would argue that this taboo word is disgusting because of its 
association with a very powerful moral disgust elicitor – slavery. As we saw 
before, amongst Westerners, impingement on freedom and unfair treatment 
are significant moral disgust elicitors; it may well be that the word “nigger” is 
so offensive and disgusting because it is the product, and therefore is 
associated with, a system that, like no other, broke these moral codes.  
 
There are exceptions to the characterisation of swear words as words that refer 
to disgust elicitors. Notably, French-Canadian swear words are almost 
exclusively to do with religious artefacts, e.g. “Tabernacle”. These words are 
still treated as disgusting and unacceptable within most social contexts, just as 
with the more scatological swear words found in English. These exceptions 
raise the interesting question of how words get to become swear words when 
they are not associated with explicitly disgusting things, a question sadly we do 
not have space to go into here. What is important for the arguments that 
follow is that swear words are disgusting to us, regardless of how this comes 
about 
 
As well as (mostly) referring to disgust elicitors, swear words are themselves 
disgust elicitors. Evidence for this claim can be seen in the way we treat them 
within society, as harmful and contaminating, and our physiological response 
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of repulsion to them. When we hear them we are struck by a strong negative 
emotional impact(Dewaele, 2004; Jay, 2009a). This impact, I argue, is akin to 
the emotional impact felt when we come into contact with any other mild 
disgust elicitor. Our reaction to an offensive swear word shares all the 
characteristic traits of a mild disgust response: we are repulsed, and offended 
and wish to distance ourselves from anything associated with the swear word 
(person or referent). Further: in the studies of what kinds of things people find 
disgusting that we looked at earlier responses included “offensive language”, 
“rude words” and “swearing” (Valerie Curtis & Biran, 2001; Haidt, Rozin, 
Mccauley, & Imada, 1997). It seems that not only are swear words linguistic 
descriptions of disgust elicitors, the words themselves are disgust elicitors.  
 
That being said, the offensiveness, and therefore the disgustingness of swear 
words can vary from context to context. When we are with our friends we use 
swear words frequently without causing the slightest discomfort in our 
listeners; and swear words are most offensive and therefore most disgusting 
when they are said loudly, aggressively and outside of a convivial, humorous 
context (Beers Fägersten, 2007; N. Wang, 2013). In these relaxed contexts it 
appears some of the disgusting potential of the swear words is muted, perhaps 
this is because we feel relaxed and not at risk (and therefore not wary of 
infection) during these safe environments. These times of comfortable 
swearing has many important socializing effects, including increasing group 
bonding and facilitating discussion of very personal issues(N. Wang, 2013); 
and might contribute to the sharing of socially stipulated disgust elicitors and 
moral or hygiene standards. 
 
Saying swear words 
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However, despite the massive impact of swearing on hearers, swear words are 
often uttered with no intention of referencing the things they mean. In times of 
stress, outrage or pain other mammals whimper or howl, while humans yell, 
swear, cuss, or exclaim. On one level these speech acts fulfil the same 
communicative results as howling in non-human animals, including: raising 
alarm and letting nearby animals know you are in pain and need help or 
scaring off other animals. However, in addition to these results swearing also 
confers extra semantic information to those listening that is often incidental to 
the speaker’s purpose. 
 
When we swear in exclamation, we are not trying to express the meaning of 
the swear words, it is not the same as normal considered language use but an 
almost automatic response to outrage or danger. Jay describes these swearing 
acts as non-propositional (Jay & Janschewitz, 2008); van lanker 1987)4. 
Swearing at these times is an automatic vocal response, and not part of our 
usual communicative linguistic behaviour. Accordingly, when we swear 
responsively at times of high emotion, we do not utilize the same semantically-
rich linguistic faculties that we do during ordinary communicative language 
use.  
 
When we swear in this non-propositional way very different areas of the brain 
are activated than those normally associated with speech production. In 
particular, non-propositional swearing appears to be accompanied by 
activation of the amygdala – an area of the brain otherwise associated with 
emotion cognition. Further evidence for the disconnect between our swearing 
																																																						
4 Interestingly we do not immediately have the negative psychological impact that normally 
goes along with the hearing of the words. I believe we are not disgusted by the swear words 
we utter when angry because when we are angry we are unable to be disgusted - anger and 
outrage suppress the disgust response, though this claim needs further research. 
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response and normal propositional language use comes from aphasic patients 
who often maintain the ability to swear coherently in frustration at their 
situation despite having lost the rest of their linguistic abilities(Van Lancker & 
Cummings, 1999). Similarly, the uncontrollable swearing of Tourette’s 
syndrome patients highlights the difference between swearing and ordinary 
propositional speech and the fact that Tourette’s patients’ Coprolalia symptoms 
are more pronounced during times of stress (Van Lancker & Cummings, 1999) 
is indicative of swearing’s role in response to outrage and emotional intensity. 
  
Obviously at other times we do use swear words communicatively, with their 
semantic meaning intended; for instance, when we make a dirty joke that 
relies on specific meanings of a swear word or when we are reflecting on a 
swear word’s etymology in an academic sense. At these times we utilize the 
semantic meanings associated with the term just as we would with any other 
lexical term. Swear words live a dual life: firstly, as ordinary lexical items 
deployed at will for communicative purposes and secondly as exclamations of 
pain or outrage, reflex-like and without intentional semantic meaning.  
 
But just because often swear words are used without the intention of 
communicating the literal meanings of the words does not mean that they 
aren’t understood by hearers in these terms. A heard swear word still has the 
same negative psychological effects that we described earlier on the hearer, 
regardless of the reasons and semantic intentions behind its utterance. The 
negative impact of swear words is in fact at its highest when they are said 
explosively, viciously and in outrage (Beers Fägersten, 2007), exactly like they 
are in the non-propositional swearing behaviours we have just outlined. It 
seems then these acts of swearing in outrage or pain are the ones most likely to 
trigger disgust reactions in hearers. 
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There appears then to be a unique and interesting discrepancy with swear 
words: Though they are easy to say, or rather hard not to say, under certain 
circumstances; they are hard and unpleasant to hear. The ease with which we 
say them is not well matched to the impact they have on the hearer. 
 
Swearing in terms of lexical access points  
 
With this understanding of the relationship between swear words and disgust 
elicitors in place I would like to look at the role swearing has in the turning of 
social norms into social mores. In short I suggest that it is the discrepancy 
between the ease with which we swear at times of norm transgressions and the 
strong negative psychological effects hearing swear words have that provides 
the crack through which disgust gets into the normative world. 
 
To see how this mechanism might function I would first like to look at the 
phenomenon of swearing in terms of associated access points outlined in the 
last chapter. Under this account, we see the mind as having two distinct levels 
of representational faculty: firstly, the heterogeneous representations from the 
various conceptual modules in the mind and secondly, the homogenous unified 
set of linguistic representations of the lexicon. 
 
The conceptual representations that are explicitly important in this scenario 
are those that are generated by all the various mental faculties that come to 
trigger the disgust response, for instance our conceptual representation of 
faeces, deformity or putridity. It is not necessary at this juncture to assess 
exactly the form of the representations the disgust response works with or its 
functioning in more detail, we just need to know that the disgust response fires 
in response to certain conceptual representations activated in turn by 
perceptual information. 
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And on the linguistic side of the coin: I suggest that the linguistic 
representations of swear words are of the same form and structure as any other 
lexical item stored in the lexicon. They are connected with other, semantically 
associated, lexical items via a set of lexical access points, and to conceptual 
representations via a set of conceptual access points, just as other lexical items 
are. Given this general similarity to the other items in the lexicon, how do we 
account for the unique characteristics of swearing that we looked at in the 
previous section, namely the immitigable nature of their negative effects on 
hearers? 
 
Normally words only activate the conceptual representations associated with 
them that are relevant to the speech, as determined by the semantic 
background generated by the speech, and only if the activation of the lexical 
item is strong enough i.e. it reaches a certain activation threshold. The lexical 
items are connected in such a way as to allow speech comprehension to 
proceed without the conceptual representations associated with the terms 
being activated in order for speech to be comprehended. An example: my 
conceptual representation NATION OF FRANCE will not fire if either the word 
“France” is only mentioned in passing during speech or if the conversation is 
actually about rugby and the conceptual representation that is more 
appropriate to proper speech comprehension is FRENCH NATIONAL RUGBY TEAM.  
 
I suggest that in the case of swearing, swear words function like ordinary 
lexical items – building up the semantic background by priming associated 
lexical items and then only firing the conceptual representations appropriate to 
the context as determined by the pattern of lexical items that are activated. 
The difference in the case of swearing is that the firing of the conceptual 
representations associated with the swear words (normally a disgust elicitor) is 
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almost assured by hearing the swear words. This is because each associated 
access point has a different threshold of activation that has to be met before 
the conceptual representation is fired, and in the case of swear words this 
threshold is exceptionally low, and so fires almost every time the word is 
heard.  
 
This suggestion can explain why swear words leap out of a page at us, why 
they stand out so boldly when dropped into normal speech and why subtle 
variations on them make such effective branding campaigns (think: FCUK). 
The question we are left with is: What makes the threshold so low? Briefly, I 
suspect that it is a mixture of social cues that these are special terms, 
conditioning during childhood and memories of punishment associated with 
saying them during childhood (Jay et al., 2006). The way we bring our 
children up with swear words and the efforts we make as a society to protect 
vulnerable people from their effects may account for why we maintain such 
sensitivity to them even into adulthood and after much exposure. 
 
Swear words as disgust elicitors 
 
 When we hear a swear word we are initially disgusted because hearing it 
automatically triggers the representations associated with the swear words 
which, as discussed earlier, are, mostly, representations of disgust elicitors. So, 
hearing a swear word activates a disgust elicitor representation which in turn 
triggers the disgust reaction. This mechanism works because the disgust 
reaction triggers in response to the activation of a representation of a disgust 
elicitor, regardless of how that representation came to be activated. This is the 
unique power of language: it can activate, through testimony, representations 
of non-experienced objects or events. Language triggers the disgust response to 
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fire in response to a conceptual representation of something offensive by 
activating that representation. 
 
However, I believe that the offensiveness of swear words goes beyond the 
mandatory firing of conceptual representations of other disgust elicitors. I 
suggest that with time the lexical items of the swear words are themselves the 
representations that trigger the disgust response directly without having to 
activate the conceptual representations associated with the lexical items. 
 
If each time we hear a swear word uttered, we automatically activate the 
disgust-eliciting representation associated with it, the swear word (lexical 
item) will come to become associated with the disgust response via traditional 
conditioning. With exposure, I suggest that the lexical item of the swear word 
becomes so associated with the conceptual representation that it comes to be a 
disgust elicitor as well. Remember disgust is very contagious, and something 
can readily become disgusting simply by being associated frequently with 
something that is already disgusting.  
 
The disgust response mechanism clearly has the potential to fire in response to 
a large variety of stimuli, and there is no reason to believe that it would not 
respond to lexical representations as well as the more traditional conceptual 
representations associated with disease vectors. As an established example of 
the breadth of the form of potential elicitors, remember the way the disgust 
response fires in response to seeing the gape face in others: in this example 
representations from the facial recognition module have become offensive, 
despite this having no direct potential to transmit disease. I do not think it is 
contentious to suggest that linguistic representations of disgust elicitors in the 
form of swear words might also become disgust elicitors despite no direct 
relationship to disease risks. 
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This claim is backed up by the self-reporting studies we looked at earlier that 
detailed what people found disgusting. Subjects frequently cited obscene 
language alongside, and separately, to the disgust elicitors those rude words 
and obscene language refer to. However, as noted with the moral disgust 
elicitors it is not clear whether these self-reporting studies are an accurate 
portrayal of the set of disgust elicitors5.  
 
Part 3: Tying the leads together – the role of swearing in moralization of 
norms 
 
I said earlier that I believed language has a large role to play in answering the 
question of how disgust became transferred from the visceral to the moral. This 
question mirrors the more focussed question: how do social norms become 
mores? I will here begin to sketch the mechanism by which this comes about, 
first in general terms, then later in the explicit terms of the associated access 
account of cognitive semantics. 
 
This story starts with an emotion other than disgust: outrage. Our usual 
reaction to witnessing the breaking of societal norms is not disgust (this only 
happens in already moralized cases) but outrage. Think about a 
																																																						
5 It would be fantastic if some empirical studies were done that looked into the offensiveness 
of swear words by measuring the physiological traits of the disgust response in patients. Until 
this is done I will continue to proceed under the assumption that after a certain amount of 
exposure and associative formations the lexical items of swear words are disgust elicitors in 
and of themselves, i.e. they do more than mandatorily activate their associated, disgust 
eliciting ,conceptual representations as in this case it is still the conceptual representations 
that cause the disgust response to fire rather than the swear words themselves. 
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 A British person watching someone push in a long queue ahead of them, it is 
unlikely that they feel disgusted by this behaviour, but more likely they would 
feel cross or outraged. If the breaking of the social norm is extreme enough, 
their anger might even cause them to swear, it has been suggested that such 
acts of swearing are a means of venting rage and avoiding physical conflict 
(Jay, 2009b; Jay, King, & Duncan, 2006; N. Wang, 2013). Swearing in this sort 
of context is reflexive, we often do not think about what we are saying, and it 
has reportedly a cathartic quality for the swearer, reducing anger. 
 
However, for anyone hearing the outburst, including the swearer themselves, 
the effect is quite different. By swearing about social acts we begin to tarnish 
such acts as disgusting in the eyes (or rather ears) of any witnesses. The act 
becomes associated with the swear word and so begins to become disgusting 
too. This is, in essence, the core of the mechanism I am suggesting, that the 
association of swear words and outrageous acts can come to render those kinds 
of acts as disgusting to anyone witnessing the outraged swearing outburst. Two 
further qualities of the contagiousness of disgust lead me to believe that the 
scenario sketched above is feasible. 
 
Firstly, the fact that such little exposure is needed to render something 
disgusting: for example food walked over quickly by a cockroach becomes 
disgusting even though exposure was passing. Contagion is so strong in 
humans because the disgust system is set up to create new disgust elicitors 
after even a single experience (one-shot learning) to ensure that we do not eat 
food that has made us sick previously. With this in mind, we can see how the 
temporary association between the swear word and the normative 
transgression, established during the transitory speech act of outraged 
swearing could be enough to render the transgression disgusting. After all, 
swear words are most disgusting in exactly the types of context this scenario is 
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embedded in, when they are used forcefully and angrily (Beers Fägersten, 
2007). Accordingly the disgust response is liable to be relatively strong in these 
scenarios, and therefore we are more likely to be susceptible to contagious 
associations. 
 
The second quality of disgust that supports my theory is that the rendering of 
some new thing as a disgust elicitor through contagious association with an 
existing disgust elicitor can happen across modalities. This is illustrated by the 
fact that witnessing the gape face in someone makes whatever they are 
disgusted at disgusting to us too. In this case disgust triggered by a 
representation from facial recognition faculties has caused a representation 
from object recognition faculties to become associated with the disgust 
reaction and a disgust elicitor in its own right. Disgust can be triggered by 
verbal testimony, visual experience or taste, and new disgust elicitors set up in 
this way continue to set off disgust even if they are subsequently encountered 
via a different modality. For someone who found hotdogs disgusting after a 
particularly bad case of food poisoning, the sight of hotdogs might set off the 
same disgust reaction as the smell of them or a hearing a story about someone 
consuming hotdogs. The process of new disgust elicitors being established by 
contagious contact with an existing disgust elicitor is clearly not limited to 
representations from the same representational capacity or from one single 
sensory modality. 
 
Given that we know that disgust is transferred easily in a single experience and 
across modalities I do not believe that it is outlandish to suggest that it can be 
transferred from the swear words (which we have seen are certifiable disgust 
elicitors) to transgressions of normative acts (which we know to be the kind of 
things that can become disgust elicitors). These factors only indicate that such 
a transferral is plausible but they in no way describe how it might come about.  
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A more detailed account of the mechanism  
 
I will now describe how this process might happen in the framework of the 
associated access account. First let us look at what must be in place for this 
mechanism to operate: firstly, we need the lexical items for the swear words to 
be in and of themselves disgust elicitors. Secondly, we need a set of conceptual 
representations of social norms (presumably generated by a specialized norm-
regulating mechanism) that have access in points in the appropriate lexical 
items. This norm-regulating mechanism must also be able to trigger outrage 
and swearing at times of perceived, serious norm-breaking. And finally, we 
need a disgust mechanism that has the potential to acquire new disgust 
elicitors by association with old ones (via contagion). 
 
I believe the preceding investigation has established that all these pieces of the 
jigsaw puzzle are present in normal humans, so let us now see how they all fit 
together. In the forthcoming exegesis I will draw on the example, first fleshed 
out by Rozin, of how smoking in social situations has become a morally-laden 
issue. I choose the example of smoking because, at the time of writing, the 
view that smoking in public is morally wrong is just on the cusp of becoming 
widespread, so that we both have the intuitions that it is a moral issue but can 
also imagine a world in which it is not a moral issue, a world that for many of 
us is within living memory. Hopefully, this actively changing example will 
grant us insight into the progression of disgust elicitors becoming shared by 
society.  
 
The following passage have particularly story-time overtones, I have chosen to 
write it up this way because I feel that these vignettes are apt to stir more 
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realistic responses when presented in the everyday language we might actually 
encounter them in. 
 
Imagine a cab driver lighting a cigarette while ferrying a family with young 
children around. The father outraged yells “Fuck, man! What are you doing?” 
The father is outraged because he is witnessing what he believes is a 
disgraceful transgression of a social norm, that is putting his children at risk. In 
this scenario we can presume that the swearing was a non-propositional speech 
act, it was involuntary and the father had no intention of expressing to the 
driver the semantic information he associates with the lexical item ‘fuck’. The 
other passenger in the car, say the mother of the child, comprehends the 
speech in the usual fashion: the words heard build up a semantic background 
so that she can understand that the father is angry about the driver’s 
behaviour, and that he did not mean to express the concept of copulation by 
saying the word “fuck”. She understands the intended communicative purpose 
of the exclamation knowing full well that the father does not intend to 
communicate the concept of ANIMAL-LIKE COPULATION.  
 
Nonetheless her lexical item ‘fuck’ is activated during speech comprehension 
and due to the strong emotional effects of swear words, she has a mild disgust 
reaction. So even though she does not actively think about, or fire the 
conceptual representation ANIMAL-LIKE COPULATION, the disgust response still 
fires in response to the lexical item ‘fuck’.  
 
At the same time, her cognitive mechanism that recognizes and represents 
social norms (and their transgressions) also comes to fire in response to the 
transgression. She registers that the outburst of rage from her partner was in 
response to this transgression, the disgust reaction she felt (from hearing the 
swear word) was caused then (indirectly) by the act. The transgression of the 
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social norm will become associated with the disgust response from that point 
forward. In this case, the conceptual representation for the transgression DON’T 
SMOKE AROUND CHILDREN will become a mild disgust elicitor in its own right by 
having been associated with a disgust reaction. I suggest that the one-shot 
learning mechanism, characteristic of the disgust response, allows norm 
transgressions to become moralized relatively quickly with very few such 
incidents. And once something has become associated with the disgust 
response it is difficult for it to become un-disgusting, things tend to become 
disgust elicitors for good6. This moral association with social norms becomes 
established, remembered and embellished by future exposure to them. 
 
We should note that this mechanism does not require the conceptual 
representation of the transgression to develop an access point to the lexical 
item ‘fuck’ to work. All that is necessary for the mechanism is that the word 
“fuck” activates the disgust reaction, which is extremely sensitive to disgust 
contagion, even across modular boundaries. 
 
This observation begins to answer a question left open in the previous chapter 
about whether simultaneous firing of two cognitive faculties, as brought about 
by general lexical activation can be enough to generate new cognitive 
behaviours. Or if in fact, relatively few lexical items have access points to more 
than one conceptual representational capacity and that only the activation of 
these special items leads to interesting, novel cognitive behaviour in humans. 
This later type of account is typified in Carruthers’s account of navigation, 
which places special importance on the key lexical items ‘left’ and ‘right’ to 
drive the mechanism.  
																																																						
6This might be why people tend to become more conservative as they get older, after a whole 
life lived vast swathes of social norms have probably been transmuted into mores and taken 
on serious moral connotations. 
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I think the case of swearing shows that activation of various cognitive faculties 
can be triggered by almost any words, we do not need particular terms to have 
direct access points in two distinct mental capacities for this to work. Though 
the mechanism relies on a few special terms (swear words), it is not their 
unique pattern of access points in many mental faculties that facilitates the 
novel forms of cognition we are interested in but rather their ability to 
generally activate a particular cognitive faculty – in this case disgust. If we look 
at the case in point the word “fuck” does not need to have associated access 
points that simultaneously activate both conceptual representations of social 
norm transgression and of disgust elicitors when the word is heard for the 
mechanism to happen. All words that have the ability to activate distinct 
mental capacities in whatever way have the ability to prompt original and new 
cognitive behaviour and new action plans.  
 
Further, I suggest that as the actual activation patterns a sentence triggers in 
our conceptual faculties is dependent on the semantic context determined by 
the relationships between lexical items, and not just by each word individually, 
we should see the interesting effects of language on cognition not as 
dependent on a few important lexical items with dispersed conceptual access 
points but as a product of the complex nexus of semantic associations stored as 
part of the lexicon. We will return to this suggestion in further detail during 
the final chapter. 
 
Even at this interim stage it seems clear that we should conclude that 
language’s ability to trigger new cognitive behaviour is likely much richer, 
subtler and invariably more complex than Carruthers’s more rigid account of 
syntactic conjunction might suggest. The kind of mechanism Carruthers cites in 
his navigation example can only occur in those few cases in which we have 
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lexical items with association points in conceptual representations from two 
distinct, but overlapping faculties, the relatively small number of such cases (as 
a percentage of the overall lexicon) sets an upper limit on the potential acts of 
cross modular thought that we can engage in. And so, it seems unlikely that 
this mechanism can account for the very flexible (a cross-modular) behaviour 
we normally like to credit humans minds with, the mechanism I have put 
forward above shows that such flexible thinking, as facilitated by language, can 
occur without the special terms and overlapping faculty remits, that Carruthers 
account relies on. 
  
Difference to ordinary language learning 
 
It is important to notice how clearly the above mechanism differs from the way 
we ordinarily learn new things (in this case the moral importance of certain 
social norms) via language. Normally when we are presented with new 
information linguistically, we are at liberty to evaluate the statements and see 
if we agree with them before we take on them on board. We are able to judge 
for ourselves whether we believe them, and whether we will incorporate them 
into our problem solving and action planning behaviour. This is equally true of 
learning, via linguistic instruction, the moral codes that might come to guide 
our behaviour in society. Just because someone tells us, “eating vegetables is 
morally wrong because it removes potential food for the animals,” it does not 
mean that we necessarily will come to hold the same views or even agree; we 
are at liberty to reject this moral code and not live by it. However, if we are 
presented with a moral judgement through the swearing mechanism detailed 
above, we are not able to reflect on it in the same way; our response is 
determined reflexively by the swear word triggering a disgust response. 
Experiments have shown that no amount of rationalization can supress the 
disgust response: subjects still find eating a brown object that resembles faeces 
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disgusting no matter how confident they are that it is in fact chocolate (Rozin 
et al., 1986). The same thing occurs on hearing a swear word uttered in 
response to a social transgression. We cannot help but become disgusted at 
hearing the swear word and therefore come to begin to find the act disgusting 
in itself, even if quizzed outside of the situation we might not describe the 
action as particularly disgusting. 
 
Our immitigable disgust reactions mean that we cannot help but come to 
associate the immoral act and disgust, we cannot but accept the judgement 
given to us by others in society. In much the same way as semantic signalling 
via the gape face allows for the mandatory exchange of food preferences 
throughout society, swearing facilitates mandatory exchange of moral codes 
throughout society.  
 
This is not to say that we necessarily come to hold any old moral codes after a 
single swearing experience; the mechanism can only work if we are already 
aware of the social norm that is being transgressed and represent its 
transgression conceptually alongside the other social norms in the mental 
faculty dedicated to representing these rules. It is this pre-existing conceptual 
representation that then becomes associated with the disgust response. Hence, 
if we do not hold the view that such-and-such a behaviour is socially 
unacceptable already, it cannot come to be moralized through this swearing 
mechanism.  
 
Part 4: Some objections 
 
Love and marriage, horse and carriage – outrage and disgust  
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Earlier we came across the objection that the use of the term “disgusting” to 
describe a morally taboo action was sheer metaphor, and that actually the 
emotional response to seeing immoral actions was more akin to outrage or 
anger than proper disgust. It is interesting to show that, while the experimental 
data shows that moral disgust is disgust veritas, outrage does play an important 
role within this proposed mechanism. The fact that both responses are part of 
the same overall mechanism might explain the reasons for the objection being 
raised in the first place. Hopefully the above mechanism shows that both 
outrage and disgust are genuine reactions to transgression of certain norms. 
 
Head-banging problem 
 
A serious worry: if swearing at times of high intensity has the ability to render 
the activity that accompanies the swearing disgusting why do we not find 
things like stubbing our toe or banging our head disgusting? Whenever we do 
these things we are apt to swear reflexively in response, just as we might 
during times of normative indignation. Surely all the necessary components are 
there to make the mechanism work. Disgust-eliciting swear words, acts for the 
words to become associated with, etc. Yet it is clearly preposterous to think 
that these accidental injuries might take on serious moral connotations. 
 
One potential response to this objection is to suggest there is a limit on the 
kinds of things that are eligible to become disgust elicitors. In short, the disgust 
response system is such that representations of other types of action are not 
the kind of thing that the disgust system can trigger in response to. I argue that 
we have to have the conceptual representations of the transgressions of social 
norms firmly in place before they are eligible to become disgust elicitors. 
Representations of other kinds of behaviours, including accidents, are not 
represented in a conceptual form that is appropriate to become a disgust 
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elicitor. Though there is, currently, no experimental work to support such a 
suggestion, it does neatly answer the head banging problem but leaves open 
the question: why might disgust be particular relevant to moral issues and why 
might the disgust response evolved such an affinity for representations of social 
codes? I believe we have already come across the answer to this question in 
Kelly’s assessment of the evolutionary fitness arising from finding normative 
transgressions as disgusting.  
 
Conclusion 
 
A little word on the intended scope of this theory: I am not trying to suggest 
that the swearing mechanism detailed above is the only way things become 
disgusting, this is clearly not the case, many food stuffs become disgusting via 
the process of semantic signalling or even first hand experience of getting ill 
after eating a certain foodstuff. Further, I am also not trying to suggest that 
this process is the only way norms can be transmuted into mores, and therefore 
brought under the remit of the disgust response. Rozin highlights a number of 
different ways by which this process of moralization can come about including 
rational contemplation of an issue say after reading a book, after particularly 
powerful affective experiences, say visiting a slaughterhouse, or simply via 
instruction during childhood.  
 
The swearing mechanism I have put forward might seem a little far-fetched but 
I believe that the fairly thorough investigations into disgust and swearing 
provide ample bedrock for the theory. That having been said, though this 
investigation can provide an excellent reason to believe in the mechanism put 
forward, it cannot hope to prove it. For that we need experimental work. In 
this particular area of study it seems to me that experimental work can be quite 
fruitful. The universal stability of the disgust reaction makes it quite easy to 
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measure the legitimacy of any proposed disgust elicitor, this could be utilized 
in the first instance by checking whether swear words are genuine disgust 
elicitors. As this claim is a cornerstone of the overall thesis, it could well stand 
empirical backing. 
 
My aim in this chapter was merely to highlight the way in which a very special 
type of linguistic cognition (swearing) has a role to play in cognition more 
widely and to try and spell this out in terms of the account of language 
functioning, that through various case studies, I am trying to develop in this 
thesis. My goal is to show that through lexical items’ ability to interact with the 
full gamut of our conceptual representational capacities in various different 
and interesting ways, lexical items can come to instigate cognitive behavioural 
patterns that could not be achieved in the absence of the human language 
faculty. In this case study we have seen how language can help to co-opt and 
redistribute the cognitive capacities behind even our most primitive emotional 
responses and allow them to be utilized to meet different evolutionary 
demands, without the need to evolve new representational faculties.  
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Case study 3. 
Learning to count: language and conceptual development 
 
This final case study deals with another cognitive domain cited by Carruthers 
in The cognitive functions of language, in support of his overall account of 
language as a cross-modular thinking device: number cognition. However, 
despite Carruthers’s equivocation over language’s role in navigation and 
number cognition, we shall see that they are actually very different. By 
comparing the different mechanisms behind language’s role in number and 
navigation cognition we will be able to see just how varied the effects of 
language on cognition are. We will see that as well as increasing our cognitive 
capacities and making us more flexible thinkers, language is fundamental to 
the development of other, non-linguistic conceptual representations, making it 
all the more clear that we should not see language’s role in cognition as 
consistent or uniform across all domains. 
 
We have a unique human capacity to represent large numbers exactly, which 
has made possible all sorts of uniquely human achievements from escaping the 
earth’s gravity on board spaceships to founding economics systems that span 
the world. We also have a unique human ability to produce linguistic 
representations of almost anything. It is not clear to what degree our ability to 
represent numbers accurately is due to our ability to represent them 
linguistically. 
 
There are a variety of types of number that we can represent: from the positive 
whole numbers, known as the integers, that are the numeric correlate of the 
sizes of sets of real objects; to the fractions that represent the relationships 
between the sizes of two sets; to the negative numbers which appear not to be 
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represented in the real world at all. Though we have the capacity to produce 
mental representations of all these types of numbers, their gradual discovery 
(or invention?) took thousands of years. It seems obvious that the most 
primitive type of number representations are the integers (though even this 
assumption has been challenged by developmental psychologists (Gallistel & 
Gelman, 2000)) and arguably all of the other number representations we use 
in the more advanced mathematical processes are developed from these 
representations. Accordingly, this chapter will focus on our ability to come to 
mentally represent the full spectrum of whole numbers accurately. 
 
From the outset, there seem to be three possible general ways to characterize 
language’s relationship to our number representations: (i) that linguistic 
representations have nothing to do with our conceptual representations of 
number beyond allowing us to express them. (ii) that our linguistic 
representations of number are our accurate representations of large integers 
and hence are utilized during numerical cognition. Or, (iii) that our linguistic 
representations of number are instrumental in our developing conceptual 
representations of number, but are not themselves necessarily utilized during 
numerical cognition. In this chapter I will be looking at accounts that fall into 
all three categories, before finally developing an account that credits language 
with a key role in the development of our concepts of number by framing the 
mechanisms behind it in terms of the associated access account of language. 
 
Part 1. The pre-linguistic representations of number 
 
To claim that our linguistic representations of number simply allow us to 
express our distinct conceptual representations of number is to pre-suppose 
that our pre-linguistic capacities at representing number are able to explain all 
of the mathematical behaviour witnessed in humans. This hypothesis is easy to 
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test, for if our lexical number representations – LNRs do nothing other than 
allow us to express the products of our numerical cognition then there should 
be evidence that we can do mathematical tasks without recourse to language 
or that non-linguistic humans perform normally on tasks probing mathematical 
abilities. 
 
It seems that we require an investigation into the pre-linguistic numerical 
capacities of humans and what the form of the mental representations that 
underpin them is. One potential way of investigating what human pre-
linguistic representations look like is by investigating the representational 
capacities of animals, as much of the cognitive machinery in human minds is 
inherited from and shared with other animals. This side-by-side comparison 
can only get us so far, as we cannot preclude the possibility that we may 
possess some other mental faculty, beside language, that sets our numerical 
skills apart from the other animals.  
 
It is obvious that animals must be able to discriminate between quantities to 
survive, stealth predators must work out whether there are too many members 
of a prey species around to make a successful hunt impossible, and Western 
scrub jays have been shown to respond to variation in the perishability of cached 
foodstuff by returning to caches in an order that means the least food is wasted; 
displaying some ability to represent quantity of time (Clayton, Emery, & 
Dickinson, 2006). To remember and respond to quantity in the world like this, 
implies that these animals are capable of representing numerical value in some 
form or other. 
 
The extent of this ability has been probed experimentally; in one famous 
experiment, by Platt and Johnson, rats are trained to press a lever, lever-A, a 
number of times before pressing lever-B to receive a small amount of food. If 
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lever-A is pressed an insufficient number of times before lever-B is pressed, then 
the rat must endure a short time-out sequence before having to begin again. 
There was no reprimand or negative feedback for pressing lever-A too many 
times. After an initial learning period, the rats tended toward pressing the 
correct number of times more and more accurately. They learnt how many times 
lever-A needed pressing and eventually began to respond selectively to the 
varying number of presses specified in each trial. However, no matter how 
experienced the rats became their responses remained only approximately 
correct and always erring on the side of caution, always pressing too many times 
rather than too few. The rats’ behaviour followed this pattern regardless of the 
number of presses though larger target numbers yielded larger average errors 
(Platt & Johnson, 1971). Many variations on the experiment provide evidence 
that the rats really are responding to numerosity and not some other feature. 
For instance, Mechner & Guevrekian set up an experiment that controlled for 
duration simply by varying the hunger levels of the rats working on the 
assumption that hungry rats will press faster (Mechner & Guevrekian, 1962). 
This increase in pressing rate (and therefore decrease in duration of the task) 
had no effect on the rats’ ability to press the lever the correct number of times. 
Experiments have also been run that require rats to combine and enumerate 
stimuli of different modalities including tasks that involved enumerating sets of 
both noises and lights (Meck & Church, 1983) which show that the rats’ 
responses to numerosity are not modally bound and therefore that the numeric 
information they represent is not tied to the nature of the experience, for 
instance it is not stored as a visual memory of the array, but in abstracted 
numerical form. Taken together these studies are clear evidence that rats are 
able to represent numerosity, somewhat inaccurately. These results have been 
replicated with myriad different animals from chimpanzees to fish (for a full 
description of these experiments see(Dehaene, 2011)) with quantitative rather 
than qualitative differences found between species; pigeons, it seems, can more 
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accurately respond to higher numerosities than rats. The pattern of inaccuracy 
animals display conforms to two laws: 
 
The Magnitude Effect 
 
Performance for discriminating numerosities separated by 
an equal amount declines as the quantities increase. For 
instance, it is harder to tell 10 from 12 than to tell 2 from 4, 
even though the difference between the pairs is the same. 
 
The Distance Effect 
 
Performance for discriminating two numerosities declines as 
the distance between the two decreases. For instance, it is 
harder to tell 3 from 4 than to tell 3 from 8. 
 
(taken from Dahaene 2011, quoted in 
Laurence & Margolis, 2005, p.218) 
 
To explain these results, Gallistel & Gelman posit the existence of the 
accumulator, a cognitive system for representing quantity and magnitude 
(Gallistel, 1990b; Gallistel & Gelman, 2000), found evidence for in both 
humans and non-human animals. The accumulator does not represent discrete 
representations of cardinal values but continuous representations of quantity 
or magnitude. It functions across modalities, and is used in keeping time and in 
judging quantity. Gallistel & Gelman give the analogy of the measuring cup 
that is gradually filled, the level of the cup is equivalent to the final 
representation of the quantity, representations from the accumulator can be 
stored and compared to allow for discrimination between quantities. The 
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accumulator is inaccurate, its representations do not represent exact numerical 
values but quantities, its ability to produce precise representations declines in 
line with the distance and magnitude effects. Witnessed behaviour that follows 
these laws can be presumed to be the product of the accumulator. 
 
The accumulator in humans 
 
Humans clearly can represent numbers accurately; further, we have no more 
difficulty discerning the number 18 and 19 than 4 and 5 and so it appears that 
we are not bound by whatever causes the magnitude and distance effects seen 
in animals’ ability to represent number. Could this be because our accumulator 
is more developed or refined than the one witnessed in animals and can 
generate accurate representations of the integers?  
 
One way to check this is to look at the mathematical behaviour of infants that 
have yet to learn to count linguistically. We presume that before children have 
learnt to use the count terms they must be using whatever pre-linguistic 
numeric representational capacities humans are endowed with to discern 
different numbers. Spelke and Xu conducted experiments to investigate infants’ 
ability to represent number by probing their ability to discriminate between 
sets of different sizes (Xu & Spelke, 2000). These experiments work by 
habituating the subjects to seeing an array of either 8 or 16 dots (the actual 
arrays are controlled so as discrimination cannot be done on the basis of area 
of the set or size of the individual objects in it). When presented with an array 
of novel numerosity number (i.e. showing the 8 array to infants who were 
habituated to seeing the 16 array and vice versa) the infants exhibited extended 
looking time behaviour indicating that they could discriminate between the 
two sets. The tests were repeated with arrays of closer or larger numerosities 
numbers leading to the discovery that the ratio infants can respond to lies 
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between 1:2 and 2:3. Being surprised by the novel array demonstrates that 
infants have the ability to approximately represent numerosity, and therefore 
to be surprised when a different numerosity is displayed. Though this evidence 
shows that infants do have an accumulator module the findings show it clearly 
does not have the capacity to represent exact number. We cannot conclude 
from this however that an accumulator in adults does not produce accurate 
representations of number, this finding might equally be explained by the fact 
that the accumulator in infants has not yet reached maturity. Just because a 
system is innate that does not necessarily mean that we are born with it 
functioning fully (Samuels, 2002a); many systems that we are born with 
develop over time. 
 
Perhaps over time the accumulator’s representations become more refined and 
accurate. To test this, Whalen, Gallistel and Gelman set up an experiment that 
tested adult subjects’ accumulator performance, in which subjects respond to a 
displayed numeral by tapping a lever the equivalent number of times (Whalen, 
Gallistel, & Gelman, 1999). This experimental paradigm inhibited adults’ 
capacity to count out the correct number taps using our verbal linguistic 
capacities by having them tap at a rate that far exceeded our best estimates of 
the rate of sub-vocal counting. The results show that in such situations adults 
generate the same sort of approximate representations used by non-human 
animals; the inaccuracy of these representations display the same magnitude 
and distance effects as seen in rats. 
 
It appears then that we do not fare any better at non-linguistically representing 
number than animals. It clearly cannot be the pre-linguistic representations of 
number from the accumulator that allow us to represent exact number and 
thereby perform advanced mathematical thought. 
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It appears that claims about number words simply mapping on to our pre-
linguistic representations of number are false, as we clearly do not have 
accurate pre-linguistic representations of large integers. 
 
The addition of language 
 
Gallistel and Gelman interpret the evidence from adults as showing that the 
accumulator actually represents the entirety of the set of real numbers not just 
the integers inaccurately (Gallistel & Gelman, 2000), claiming that its 
representations are not discrete and inaccurate, but continuous and precise. 
For them the perceived inaccuracy of the system, comes from problems in 
recalling and utilizing the exact representations not that the representations 
themselves are inaccurate. Limitations on memory, or representational capacity 
mean that we cannot use the truly fine-grained representations of number the 
accumulator generates. 
 
They suggest that the addition of language to the system overcomes these 
shortcomings and allows us to utilize the exact representations of the 
accumulator to represent the integers. If the accumulator does represent the 
entirety of the reals a small subset of its potential representations must be 
representations of the integers. The number words allow us to pick out these 
representations. The nature of the number words as discrete allow us to pick 
out the integers from the infinite number of representations of real numbers, 
as Gallistel and Gelman claim that they are the numbers that a discrete 
symbolic system, such as language, can represent. By learning to count, infants 
simply map the number words onto the pre-existing representations of the 
integers. Language, by being a discrete representational format overcomes the 
inherent difficulty we have in recalling exact quantities represented by the 
accumulator. 
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Laurence and Margolis (Laurence & Margolis, 2005) identify two fundamental 
ways to challenge Gallistel and Gelman’s account of how we learn to represent 
large exact integers: firstly, by challenging the assumption that the 
accumulator does innately represent the entirety of the reals and amongst 
them exact integers. And secondly by challenging the assumption that 
language mapping onto the representations from the accumulator will 
assuredly pick out the integers. 
 
Firstly, the data from animal and human behaviour provide no desiderata on 
why we should believe Gallistel and Gelman’s account of a hyper-accurate 
representational system hampered by memory recall issues, over the much 
more simplistic account that sees the accumulator as only being able to 
represent approximate quantity. There is nothing in the witnessed behaviour of 
the rats pressing levers that demonstrates that we should attribute them with 
the capacity to represent the difference between 19.000005 and 19.000006, 
especially when the much simpler explanation that they cannot represent the 
difference fits the data just as well. Of course, Gallistel and Gelman are 
perfectly entitled to say that we simply have not developed experimental 
paradigms delicate enough to sense such discriminatory ability yet, but it does 
seem hard to envision an experiment that would make their claims about the 
representations of the accumulator falsifiable and so it seems that the onus of 
proof lies with them. All existing evidence indicates the fact that humans have 
only approximate pre-linguistic representations of number, not hyper-accurate 
ones. 
 
Secondly, Laurence and Margolis challenge Gallistel and Gelman’s assumptions 
about language only representing discrete number by pointing out that 
language is not limited to representing only discrete quantity but can in fact 
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represent approximate quantity through linguistic quantifiers (such as “some”, 
“lots”, “truck-loads”, etc.) - which evidence has shown are linguistically prior to 
the number words(E. V. Clark & Nikitina, 2009). Language can also readily 
represent irrational numbers through names such as “pi” and “the square root 
of two”. If there is no reason to assume that language will naturally pick out 
the integers rather than any other numbers, then there is no reason to follow 
Gallistel and Gelman in thinking that the interaction between language and the 
accumulator will lead to the number words getting mapped directly onto the 
integer representations. Nothing in the accumulator indicates that the 
representations of integers are of special importance and require particular 
mapping to the LNRs. We might just as well learn that the word “one” maps 
onto the accumulator’s representation of 1.1, “two” to 1.2, “three” to 1.3 and 
so on. 
 
In conclusion, it seems that the language faculty cannot provide a simple 
mapping between our pre-linguistic representations of the integers and the 
number words, primarily because we do not appear to have pre-linguistic 
representation of the integers. 
 
For the remainder of this chapter I will be referring to the mental faculty that 
generates approximate representations of quantity and magnitude, above 
referred to as the accumulator, as the Approximate Number System (ANS) 
partially to distinguish it from Gallistel and Gelman’s account and also so as 
not to make any implicit claims about the mechanisms behind its 
representational capacities. 
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Part 2. Language and the other set of numerical representations 
 
So perhaps the linguistic numerical representations do more than just express 
our pre-linguistic capacities. We might even be tempted to say that our 
linguistic numerical representations are our sole representations of numbers. It 
is hard to tease apart our representations of quantity from the lexical 
representations of them, the quality of numerosity in some way feels more tied 
to the number word or symbol we use to refer to them, than say colours do, it 
does not feel like we can conceptualize numbers distinct from the number 
words or symbols we use to represent them. 
 
This intuition is supported by evidence from people growing up in numerate 
and linguistic societies but who have no access to language (from being deaf 
and not part of a formal signing linguistic community) that appear not to 
develop fully developed number representations (accurate representations of  
large numbers) and cannot complete exact numerical tasks despite having to 
deal with numerical problems on a daily basis (Spaepen, Coppola, & Spelke, 
2011).  
 
In line with these intuitions Spelke has put forward accounts of number 
cognition that credit language with an unrivalled place in our number 
cognition. She claims that representations of exact large numerosities are 
formulated by and can only be entertained by language(Spelke & Tsivkin, 
2001a)7, and that we have no other dedicated mental faculty that represents 
																																																						
7	This view is in line with Carruthers’ account of the cognitive-conception of language and is 
actively endorsed by him in the cognitive functions of language (Carruthers,2002); however, at 
times, Carruthers strong position on the role language in cognition lead him to make claims 
that go beyond those that Spelke explicitly makes, for this reason this current section will 
deal with Spelke’s view explicitly but we should tacitly assume that the same position is held 
by Carruthers. In a later section we will look at the details of Carruthers synthesis of Spelke’s 
view on number cognition into his own overall account of the cognitive conception of 
language.	
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number. She therefore seems to be claiming that the representations that we 
utilize when doing advanced numerical calculations or even when we consider 
large exact numerosities are linguistic representations and that these LNRs 
contain all the information necessary for a number concept. Under this type of 
account, the integers are only ever mentally represented in a linguistic format 
and cannot be cognitively entertained in another way, though she does 
suppose that there are mental faculties that utilize representations generated 
by the language faculty in their more domain-general cognitive roles. 
 
Before we look at the mechanism behind language’s representation of number 
or assess this account, let us look at the structure of the cognitive architecture 
of the brain that this accounts presupposes. 
 
The account posits two pre-linguistic faculties that produce representations 
that contain some numerical information. The first is the ANS, that we looked 
at in the last section. Additionally, the account relies on a conceptual system 
that keeps track of small numbers of distinct objects. This object tracking 
system can keep tags on the locations of up to three or four numerically 
distinct objects in the visual array. Though not explicitly representing number, 
the ability to represent distinct objects in the visual array and to compare with 
sets of previous representations in the working memory does allow us to 
perform seemingly numerical tasks. For instance, Wynn has shown that infants 
of only five months display increased looking time, and by hypothesis are 
surprised by, the sight of two distinct objects moving behind a screen which is 
then lifted to reveal 3 objects. This finding she argues shows that infants 
represent the mathematical fact that 1+1=2 and this explains why a display of 
1+1=3 is surprising to them (Wynn, 1992a).  
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Importantly for this account, the object tracing system generates exact and 
individual representations of quantifiable things that make up the set of 
objects; the number of these representations correlates exactly with the 
cardinal value of the number of things within a set. It does appear then to 
facilitate exact enumeration in a way that the ANS cannot. However, like the 
ANS the system operates within a distinct set of performance limits. Most 
significantly the maximum number of objects tracked has been shown to be 
three in infants, maturing to four in adults, and the object tracking module 
does not represent objects after they have been obscured from view for an 
extended period of time. 
 
The object tracking system cannot really be said to be explicitly representing 
the quantity of a set of objects as it does not represent the number of the 
objects in the set but instead tracks them all as individuals, it cannot therefore, 
alone be the root of our more advanced enumeration skill. The representations 
of the object tracking system are not fully-fledged number concepts; and 
infants cannot use their representation of sets of two or three objects from the 
object tracking system in numerical tasks just as adults use their more 
developed number concepts of two and three. In this sense, we might describe 
it as proto-numerical, as it does not create representations of numerosity, but 
rather a set of representations of objects that can go on to be enumerated 
precisely and exactly. 
 
Neither of these two pre-linguistic cognitive faculties by themselves furnishes 
us with large exact representations of number, which we are taking to be the 
hallmark of adult human numerical cognition.  
 
Both of these systems have a long evolutionary history and are not only found 
in humans, but are present in our closest evolutionary ancestors; for Spelke 
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what sets us apart from the other species with whom we share these pre-
linguistic mental capacities, is the evolution of the language faculty in humans. 
She argues that it is the workings of the language faculty that give rise to our 
more advanced numerical abilities; specifically, she sees language as a domain 
general combinatorial system that can conjoin the representations delivered 
from the two pre-linguistic systems to form our proper numerical concepts. 
 
Through this process of conjoining distinct representations, we end up with 
representations that overcome the limits of each pre-linguistic system, number 
concepts that are both exact, like the representations from the object tracking 
system and unbound in terms of size, like the representations from the ANS. 
The representations that are produced by this conjunction are linguistic in 
format.  
 
The case of number is a key case study in Spelke’s wider theory about language 
as the means of conceptual development. This theory claims that language is 
what makes humans such flexible thinkers, not bound by the limits set by 
encapsulation of the cognitive (Spelke, 2003). Language allows us to cognize 
together different bits of information from different mental faculties that 
otherwise would be informationally isolated. By conjoining these various bits 
of information, language allows us to represent things that we are not able to 
solely with the suite of cognitive capacities inherited from our pre-linguistic 
ancestors. Accordingly, only the language faculty has the capacity to represent 
the large integers accurately, and we must therefore conclude that Spelke 
believes that our linguistic representations of number are the number 
representations we use to perform numerical cognition – the LNRs are our 
number concepts (Spelke, 2001). 
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We saw another case study for this type of account in the chapter about 
navigation. Though there are immediate similarities I believe the form of the 
conjunction described in each case is subtly different, and as such I will 
attempt to assess Spelke’s claims about the formation of linguistic number 
representations afresh and on its own terms and highlight where Spelke makes 
assumptions based on her view that the two cases exemplify twinned 
mechanisms.  
 
To support his claim about the role and importance of language in number 
cognition Spelke cites three main sources of evidence that the language faculty 
is utilized during mathematical cognition; firstly evidence from Aphasics, 
evidence from literate people brought up in innumerate societies and finally 
evidence from bilinguals. Each case is important here because they allow us to 
investigate the disconnect between approximate mathematical abilities, and 
the exact mathematical abilities and in each case, probe the role of linguistic 
representations of number. 
 
Evidence from aphasia 
 
There are a number of recorded cases of aphasic patients who lost their ability 
to use exact numerical concepts but did not lose their ability to perform 
approximate numerical tasks when their language faculties were damaged. For 
example Dehaene and Cohen present evidence from a patient who failed to 
identify errors in mathematical statements that required an accurate grasp of 
number, such as “7+3=11”, but could identify errors when the mistakes were 
large enough so as to only rely on approximate representations of number, 
such as “7+3=17” (Dehaene & Cohen, 1991). This evidence seems to show 
that there are two distinct systems of calculation in the normal human brain: 
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one linguistic and exact, and another non-linguistic and approximate. The loss 
of the language faculty appears to only affect the former. 
 
If the language faculty was responsible for the formation of our exact 
representations of number, but once formed it played no active role in 
numerical cognition, then we might expect the aphasic subjects to still be able 
to perform exact numerical cognition so long as the damage happened after 
the process of forming the LNRs was completed. However, Dehaene’s patient 
clearly has trouble with precise mathematical tasks, despite previously being 
capable of them and therefore at least once was in possession of fully formed 
LNRs. 
 
This case, therefore, implies that language is actively involved in number 
cognition and that some linguistic activity is required each time we need to 
represent an exact numerical quantity. From the fact that the symbolic 
representations of number still cause the patient to bring to mind approximate 
numerical representations we can conclude that the lexical items for the 
number words themselves are not entirely damaged but that they no longer 
contain or access the extra information about exact quantity that the 
conjunction mechanism endows them with. 
 
This strongly seems to support Spelke’s claims about the ongoing involvement 
of language in numerical cognition, however the trouble with any data from 
aphasic subjects is that we cannot know for certain that whatever damage 
caused the loss of language abilities did not also do secondary damage to some 
other system that might hypothetically have been responsible for those 
cognitive capacities. In this case it might have been that some separate 
mechanism that is responsible for cognitively representing large exact numbers 
might have been damaged alongside the language system when the brain 
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trauma occurred. It is impossible to rule out such a possibility without many 
more similar cases being studied. However, the number of aphasic patients 
from which to gather evidence is very small. Even more challenging to Spelke’s 
claims are the findings from some other aphasic patients who exhibit relatively 
unimpaired numerical skills (Varley, Klessinger, Romanowski, & Siegal, 2005).  
 
These counterexamples might lead us to conclude, contra our previous 
conjecture, that once the number concepts have been initially formed and have 
become items in the lexicon they can be utilized by some other general-
purpose computational device that drives our numerical abilities. In this case, 
the role of the language faculty is to generate the number representations in 
the first place; but is not necessarily involved in the numerical cognition that 
follows. In the case of the aphasic patient who has lost the ability to construct 
or decipher sentences we might suggest that though they have suffered 
damage to the speech production and comprehension subsystems of the 
language faculty their lexicon has survived relatively undamaged and thus any 
representations in it can go on to be used in cognitive faculties downstream, 
just as they might in the case of non-aphasics. 
 
However, Spelke does not clarify her position on whether the language faculty 
is actively involved in number cognition beyond just the initial formation of the 
representations; or if its role is purely developmental. Therefore, the 
counterexample of numerate aphasics may not necessarily be contradictory to 
the account. Either way the data from aphasics is so sparse and apparently 
contradictory that it is not on its own strong enough to convincingly support 
Spelke’s position on language. 
 
Evidence from literate people brought up in innumerate cultures 
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The Pirahã language, spoken by an isolated Amazonian tribe, lacks terms for 
exact numbers or quantities. The three words they do have for quantity: “hói” 
“hoí” and “baágiso” have each been shown to refer to a variety of overlapping 
numerosities (Gordon, 2004), and it has even been argued that these number-
like terms do not even encode approximate numerical quantities at all but 
actually encode comparative quantities – such as “more” or “less” rather than 
“few”, “some” or “many” (Frank, Everett, Fedorenko, & Gibson, 2008).  
Whatever the case, it is clear that this language lacks the resources to represent 
large-scale numbers accurately and speakers of the Pirahã language display 
unusual cognitive shortcomings in the cognitive representations of number. In 
matching tasks that require subjects to match the number of items in a set of 
objects with another set of objects, Pirahã speakers are able to match the set 
size precisely when the initial set is visible, but fail when they have to match 
the numerosity of a set that has been obscured from vision, this implies that 
they have no mental structure that can represent the numerosity once the set 
has been occluded that can then be used to contrast with their constructed set. 
It appears then that language is the cognitive tool that allows for the storing of 
representation of exact number (Frank et al., 2008; Spaepen et al., 2011). 
It has been argued that success in the initial one-to-one matching task shows 
that members of the Pirahã are able to represent the exact numerosity of the 
set (Frank et al., 2008) even if they are unable to recall that information later. 
The ability to store and recall these representations is required to complete 
more difficult tasks where the initial set of objects are obscured before being 
matched but not for the direct matching trials. This explanation equates 
completion of the initial one-to-one matching task with representing the 
numerical value of a set, however it seems clear that a simple process of 
serially matching each item in turn would suffice to successfully complete the 
task without ever having to rely on mentally representing the cardinal value of 
the set as a whole. If this interpretation is correct then it seems that members 
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of the Pirahã might be entirely unable to represent accurate quantities of sets 
even when they are presented with them. A finding that confirmed this 
potential would go a long way toward confirming the suspicion that numerical 
language is essential for accurately representing large exact number at all. 
 
However, it is very difficult in this kind of situation to determine to what 
degree numerical language, or lack thereof, is responsible for any particular 
behavioural finding rather than a societal factor. After all, all native speakers of 
Pirahã come from one very homogenous social group and so it is entirely 
possible that, for example, the lack of mental number representations in the 
population is due to a shortcoming in the Pirahã education system and not 
necessarily due to limitations of their language – we can conceive of another 
tribe whose language also contains no words for exact representations of 
number but who, through rigorous training, teach their youngsters to represent 
number exactly, and so we should be hesitant about claims linking the Pirahã’s 
lack of number words and their inability to represent exact numerosity 
 
Bilingual training studies 
 
The final piece of evidence in support of the account comes from Spelke and 
Tsivkin (Spelke & Tsivkin, 2001b; 2001a), who set up an experiment whereby 
Russian-English bilinguals were taught a series of different skills and then 
tested in those skills in both the language they were taught in, and the 
untaught language. The tasks probed the impact of training in a particular 
language in one of four sets of skills: (1) approximate number skills 
(approximating cube roots), (2) exact numerical skills, and finally recalling 
historical and geographical facts that contained both (3) numerical and (4) 
non-numerical information. The results of the experiments show that while 
there was no performance cost when performing the approximate numbers 
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tasks in the language they were not taught in, performance on the exact 
numerical skills was greatly affected by performing the skill in the untaught 
language.  
 
The studies also show that ability to recall facts that contained numerical 
information was more efficient when the fact was recalled in the language that 
it was taught in, but training language had no effect when recalling facts that 
contained no numerical information.  
 
These findings appear to demonstrate that language is the format of thought 
about exact number; the extra time required to give answers in a second 
language represents the cognitive effort required to translate the exact number 
information from the language it is mentally represented in to the language 
required for the communication in the experiment. This translation also 
appears to have been required even when recalling facts that contain 
numerical information in a language that is different from the language those 
facts were learnt and stored in, whereas with the approximate and non-
numerical thought it appears bi-lingual speakers can simply perform the 
cognitive processes pre-linguistically and can easily output the information in 
whichever language is required. 
 
These findings are backed up by anecdotal evidence from bilinguals who claim 
that, despite total fluency with a second language, they still perform counting 
or enumeration tasks in their first language, even if the first language is never 
used for anything else. 
 
All three sources of evidence seem to speak to the involvement of language in 
number cognition but they do almost nothing to clarify the exact nature of this 
relationship. In fact, the internal tensions in the aphasic and Pirahã evidence 
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show that further clarification of Spelke’s account is necessary before we can 
see whether or not the evidence supports it. 
 
Clarifications of Carruthers’s account 
 
It may seem obvious that up to now we have not looked at exactly how 
Spelke’s conjunction mechanism is supposed to work, only at what it is 
supposed to produce. We can use Carruthers account of the cognitive functions 
of language (which actually cites Spelke’s work on number as evidence for it) 
to flesh out the mechanism Spelke hints at, in a little more detail. 
 
For Carruthers, the language faculty occupies a unique and important place 
within the wider mental architecture. While other modules, both perceptual 
and conceptual, draw their inputs from a relatively confined number of sources 
(for computational economy), the language faculty can take the outputs of 
almost any other module as its inputs – for it to be a tool for communicating 
the full gamut of our mental representation it must have access to all these 
representations (which are the outputs of the other mental modules). 
 
Before the language faculty can conjoin the information from these various 
cognitive faculties into a single linguistic representation the language faculty 
must first parse all the conceptual representations from the various cognitive 
faculties, each originally in their own unique representational format, into a 
unified linguistic format. This linguistic form is referred to by Carruthers as 
logical form (LF). Having the various pre-linguistic representations in LF is 
what allows representations to be cognized together or conjoined using 
ordinary linguistic processes. The LF representations can be activated without 
our being consciously aware of them and so we can parse things into LF 
without actively thinking about forming a sentence about them. This is critical 
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for Spelke’s account as it explains why we do not have to consciously entertain 
sentences about numbers to form our linguistic numerical representations. 
 
Following Spelke and Carruthers’s assertion that the case of number follows 
the same sort of mechanism as navigation we can now sketch out the 
mechanism behind the formation of number concepts in more detail: imagine 
that the representations from the small and large pre-linguistic proto-numeric 
systems are both activated in response to perceived quantity or because we are 
actively trying to think numerically. The language faculty parses both the 
distinct representations into LF; once they are in this single format, the speech 
production subsystem can conjoin the two distinct representations into one 
single unified representation using a syntactical conjunction. This linguistic 
representation is then for Spelke, our true representation of a number. Still in 
LF it can then be used as the input of other cognitive faculties downstream 
from the language faculty (Carruthers posits a general action-planning faculty 
as one potential LF consumer) and thus our numeric representations get 
brought into our wider cognition. 
 
As mentioned above Spelke makes it clear that she sees the examples of 
navigation and number as two sides of the same coin, frequently addressing 
both sets of data in the same paper to explain her overall position that 
language is the mechanism of “conceptual development” (Spelke, 2011; Spelke 
& Tsivkin, 2001a). While both case studies have an amount of experimental 
backing, it seems that the mechanism from navigation is relatively robust and 
spelled out in great detail, while the mechanism for number is somewhat 
underdeveloped in Spelke’s own writing and a certain weakness in the account 
become clear when we question how far the similarities with the navigation 
case run and how many assumptions we make about the mechanism behind 
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number simply because Spelke constantly presents it alongside the navigation 
example.  
 
To start, it seems obvious that when we navigate we must generate fresh 
representations each time. Each situation in which we are disorientated is 
likely to be different from the last (or else we might not have become 
disorientated). And the mechanism behind navigation allows for us to be 
responsive to this changing environment by allowing for the generations of 
appropriate novel representations each time, each tailored to aiding 
reorientation given both the spatial and landmark information available to us 
in a given situation. In each novel situation the two different representational 
pre-linguistic faculties will contribute something different, representing their 
remitted information about the space in which we find ourselves. From these 
context-relevant pre-linguistic ingredients the language faculty is able to 
generate a novel representation that contains information that is relevant 
exclusively to the problem of reorientation in the given situation.  
 
However, this requirement of constantly refreshed and novel representations 
seems to be totally superfluous in the case of number cognition. Each time we 
think of the number three it is unnecessary for us to generate a novel and 
situationally appropriate representation of that number. In fact, we normally 
see number as a quality that persists throughout any situation, constant over 
any variation in texture, appearance or even modality. The number two, it 
intuitively seems, has never changed and never will change, therefore our 
representation of it once formed seems never to need to be updated. The idea 
of the impossibility of changing our representation of a number is even used to 
generate the tension in the denouement of Orwell’s 1984 when the regime tries 
to get our semi-subversive hero to alter his beliefs about the number two such 
that he believes 2+2=5 (Orwell, 1990). In fact, it seems potentially risky to 
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have a system that represents number, which generates fresh representations 
from the old ingredients each time, for instance, if our ANS is playing up one 
day then all of our mathematical judgements, which happen downstream of its 
representations, will be affected too. 
 
However, if we are to follow Spelke and Carruthers in saying that the case of 
number and the case of navigation follow the same overarching mechanism, it 
seems like Spelke’s account suggests that every time we use the representation 
of a number we do construct it afresh from the two distinct representations of 
the activatated pre-linguistic numerical faculties, if this is the case we must use 
the language production faculty every time we represent number – and 
currently there is no conclusive evidence that this is the case (the evidence 
Spelke seems to rely on infers that language is a necessary tool in developing 
number concepts but it does not speak to the constant involvement of 
language), and perhaps a little evidence that it is not in the form of numerate 
aphasic patients. 
 
Further, other accounts of mathematical cognition take for granted the fact our 
number concepts are persisting mental representations and do not get created 
from constituent parts over and over again. This is not a conclusive argument 
that shows that Spelke’s mechanism is false but it does illustrate that the 
assumption of a twinned mechanism between the number and navigation cases 
puts the Spelke account at odds with the perceived wisdom of all other 
accounts that presume we generate at some point in development, by whatever 
means, a fixed and stable mental representation of number.  
 
Spelke and Carruthers’ assumption that number and navigation follow the 
same mechanism would be vindicated by experiments that show that 
occupying the linguistic elements of the brain inhibited people’s ability to 
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represent exact number at all, just as evidence for the linguistic conjunction 
thesis in navigation is supported by the Hermer-Vazquez’s verbal shadowing 
experiments (Hermer-Vazquez et al., 1999). But such evidence does not appear 
to be forthcoming. 
 
It seems that to rehabilitate Spelke’s ideas about language’s role in number 
cognition we must distance it from the claims that it follows the same basic 
structure as the account of navigation both Spelke and Carruthers support. 
Instead of assuming that the number concepts get formulated on a constant 
basis we might want to see the process of linguistic conjunction as the process 
by which we develop more stable, enduring linguistic representations of 
number.  
 
The representations of number that are generated by the conjunction process 
might, instead of just being used once, be stored so that they might be called 
upon later without the need to generate them again from fresh. Linguistic 
representations are stored in the lexicon and there is no doubt that ‘two’ is an 
object in our lexicon; we use it on a daily basis in contexts where we do not 
need to activate our corresponding number concept, for instance in sentences 
such as “Take the two-four-two to Finsbury Park,” we use the lexical item ‘two’ 
without using the conceptual representation of the number two. 
 
However, we must remember that Spelke is not just claiming that we have 
linguistic representations of number – this much is obvious – but moreover that 
these linguistic representations are the representations of number we use to 
represent large exact numbers in our wider numeric cognition. So is the lexical 
item ‘two’ the conjunction of our pre-linguistic numerical representations and if 
so do we do mental arithmetic with it? 
 
		 122	
The problem is that it is clearly not the case that the lexical item ‘two’ is exactly 
equivalent to the syntactic conjunction of the two pre-linguistic outputs; 
further it is unclear how such a lexical item might be able to be utilized in the 
full and rich numerical cognition that characterizes human interaction with 
quantity. Though the process of conjunction seems to make sense in the 
navigation case, it is not quite clear what representations of number such a 
process would generate would be like or how they might function in number 
cognition. 
 
Spelke’s written accounts do attempt to answer the question of what do the 
LNRs produced by the conjunction look like. However, there is a lack of explicit 
examples from Spelke and the two sketches give slightly contradictory pictures 
of what is supposed to be going on. 
 
In the first case, Spelke describes what happens when a child is presented with 
a visual array containing two things. She suggests that after a while with 
exposure the child will come to realize that the word ‘two’ (already in her 
lexicon, learnt by rote) maps onto both representations from the ANS and the 
object tracking faculty, and eventually that this child will come to conjoin both 
sets of representations around this single linguistic anchor (Spelke & Tsivkin, 
2001a). 
 
However, Laurence and Margolis show that if we follow her lead that the 
conjunction of the two representations occurs through a syntactic operation 
akin to linguistic conjunction, it is not clear what the resulting representation 
of the two will look like. Spelke characterises the output of the object tracking 
system when confronted with a visual array containing two things as (i) ‘an 
object x and an object y such that x≠y’. She then follows Gallistel and Gelman 
in describing the output of the ANS as (ii) ‘-------’ (representing a blur on the 
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number line) (Spelke & Tsivkin, 2001a). Laurence and Margolis then conclude 
that the product of the strict logical conjunction of these two representations 
would then be something like (iii) ‘an object x and an object y such that x≠y 
and ------’ [formatting adapted to be consistent with this thesis] (Laurence & 
Margolis, 2005). 
 
It is very difficult to see how such a representation could be said to represent 
exactly the number two, and to represent it to such a degree that this 
representation could be the basis of our mathematical thought; or how this 
representation could be tied to the lexical item ‘two’ such that it comes to mean 
“two”. It seems obvious that such a representation simply is not going to be 
able to fulfil the role of a fully-fledged number concept. 
 
Perhaps though this is just a very uncharitable reading of the Spelke account; 
the nonsensical nature of this conjunction may arise because our English 
language characterizations of the initial representations are so far off the mark. 
It is very difficult to see what the LF translation of an attention marker would 
be (in the case of the object tracking system) or of what an approximate 
quantity (in the case of the ANS) would look like. If we somehow had better 
access to the LF form of these representations the final linguistic product might 
seem more sensible. This problem did not arise in the case of the navigation 
example where the English language is equipped to deliver descriptions of the 
kinds of features of an environment each of the pre-linguistic faculties 
represented. Perhaps it is only fair to abandon any criticism of Spelke’s 
conjunction that relies on accessing the validity of the product of a strict 
conjunction when we cannot confidently know what the inputs are likely to be. 
 
More importantly, the conjunction detailed above appears to work only in 
those cases where both pre-linguistic faculties fire when shown the same visual 
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array containing number information. If one of the faculties does not generate 
a representation then there is no conjunction to be performed. Problematically 
for Spelke, experiments seem to show that we do not use the ANS when 
representing small sets, and instead entirely rely on the object tracking system 
when dealing with small numerosities. It has been shown that infants fail to 
discriminate between visual arrays of 2 versus 4 dots but succeed in 
discriminating between 4 versus 8 dot visual arrays, even though the ratio of 
dots being distinguished is the same in both cases(Xu & Spelke, 2000). These 
findings make it clear that the system simply does not operate over smaller 
numbers and infants rely exclusively on the object tracking system to make 
numerical judgements. Further evidence of the reliance on this system comes 
from Feigenson et al.’s findings that infants consistently choose offerings of 3 
cookies over 2 cookies when offered the choice despite the fact that this ratio 
of 2:3 is above the threshold of what is discriminable by their ANS at this age 
of development (Feigenson, Carey, & Hauser, 2002). 
 
These findings do not necessarily demonstrate that the ANS is unable to, or 
does not represent small sets: The lack of reliance on the ANS when dealing 
with small numerosities might be due to a mechanism of suppressing the 
representations from the ANS which at this size are too vague to be relied on. 
The behaviour of ignoring one set of representations that might prove 
unreliable is similar to the behaviour witnessed in rats when navigating after 
disorientation, which, though capable of navigating using landmark 
information, ignore this information in favour of navigating solely by geometric 
information. It is not clear whether a similar mechanism is happening in 
human infants when confronted with small visual arrays or not; but in the 
name of giving Spelke’s account the most charitable reading we will presume 
that the ANS does fire in the case of small numbers but its output is not 
utilized during certain tasks because it is suppressed by some other 
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mechanism. It is then not unreasonable to suggest that the ANS 
representations are generated for these small sets and do go on to be taken up 
by the language faculty and conjoined with the information from the object 
tracking system, even though in the absence of language the representations 
would have been suppressed and not utilized in numerical cognition. 
 
Even if we grant the possibility of the ANS generating representations of small 
quantities, the conjunction detailed above can only ever operate in those few 
cases where the representations from the two distinct pre-linguistic systems 
overlap, at best this can be the case of 1, 2, 3 and potentially 4. And so Spelke 
must give a different account of what is happening in cases where the number 
in question is one which is not explicitly represented by the object tracking 
system. 
 
One thing we might notice in the above sketch of a conjoined representation is 
just how much work the object tracking system representation is doing in 
describing the features of what we expect from a fully-fledged representation 
of a number. It highlights that there are distinct individuals, not just a measure 
of stuff (think of the distinction between count nouns and mass nouns), and 
that there is an exact number of these individuals. Perhaps then we might want 
to argue that instead of the object tracking system producing accurate 
representations of the cardinality of sets it provides us with more general 
information about form and information required in the construction of our 
robust number concepts. Concepts of integers differ in many important ways 
from the representations from the ANS of approximate quantity: number 
concepts represent an exact quantity and that this quantity differs from the 
previous integer by exactly one and that each member of the set being 
represented is a distinct single unit; all these qualities seem to be exemplified 
in the representations from the object tracking system, and so perhaps what 
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the object tracking system provides is an understanding of these qualities that 
is combined with our approximate representations of quantity to generate 
accurate large-scale number representations. 
  
If this is the case we have to give up on the idea that the conjunction of the 
two pre-linguistic representations is a syntactic operation, where 
representations are simply stuck together. Instead we should begin to view the 
conjunction as a process of cognitive development, where we generate a new 
form of representation in which information gleaned from one cognitive faculty 
is brought to bear on the information generated by another.  
 
Laurence and Margolis characterise this suggestion as like trying to combine 
the concepts RED and EXACT to produce the concept of EXACT RED, a concept in 
which they claim that the EXACT element is doing no work and renders the 
concept no more meaningful that the pre-existing representation RED. This 
seems a little unfair: while it is true that the concept of EXACT RED is 
nonsensical, and does not map on to anything in experience, it does not 
necessarily mean the same is true of EXACTLY SEVEN. EXACTLY SEVEN is clearly 
sensible and maps directly onto something we can experience, it seems in this 
case the idea of exactitude does add something to the vague representation of 
seven that we get from ANS (Laurence & Margolis, 2005, pg. 231). 
 
There is another problem with the idea of EXACTLY SEVEN: it is not clear that 
there is any way for the child developing these concepts to know exactly what 
EXACTLY SEVEN is supposed to apply to if we have no way of representing a set 
of exactly seven things in the first place.  
 
Laurence and Margolis argue that adding the concept EXACT to an approximate 
numerical representation, such as those generated by the ANS, does not give us 
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the integers as there is no way to know which is the next representation from 
the ANS that should be represented by a number word. There is nothing in the 
notion of EXACT that guides which representation from the ANS it should be 
conjoined with to generate the number concept EXACTLY SEVEN. 
 
However, we must remember that for Spelke’s account to be correct we do not 
have to assume that the language faculty has the cognitive capacity to do the 
mathematical calculations, in her picture of the mind this can be handled by 
some other cognitive faculty further downstream of the language faculty that 
utilizes the LNRs produced by the language faculty. No, all that we need of 
Spelke’s account is that the LNRs can contain and represent all the information 
pertaining to number that we want our fully-fledged number concepts to do. I 
do not believe this can be the case. Even if we grant the possibility that the 
combination of the pre-linguistic representations could generate exact 
representations of large numbers, it still appears that this representation does 
not contain all the information that might be relevant to complicated 
mathematical tasks that we might have to do in the course of normal 
numerical life. Spelke’s mechanism at best provides a LNR that accurately 
represents the cardinal value of a number but it does not have the means to 
store other information about the number. The LNR produced by Spelke’s 
system of six does not tell us that six is a multiple of two and three or that the 
sum of its factors is itself (thus making it a perfect number), or that it is the 6th 
ordinal number. All of these facts might be part of the semantic information 
contained within our fully developed concept of six and should be stored as 
part of it, we should not have to work them out each time from the basic 
representation of exact quantity generated by the conjunction. For Spelke’s 
account, which posits no other conceptual device that can store or generate 
concepts of number, all this extra information pertaining to each number must 
be stored as part of the linguistic concept, but it is not clear that items stored in 
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the lexicon contain this much conceptual information; it is far in excess of what 
is necessary for efficient speech production and comprehension. In the case of 
the lexical item ‘six’ it seems that the necessary semantic information to 
facilitate rapid comprehension of sentences containing it might at best stretch 
to indicating that it is a number word and should be used in appropriate 
syntactic contexts, some indication of the associated cardinal value and which 
integers it precedes or follows. This information allows for an understanding of 
sentences that have numeric content, and allows us for example to respond 
quickly to sentences such as “He had six wives,” with shock and “You’ve won 
six pounds on the lottery,” with dismay. The LNR for six certainly does not 
contain the information that six is a perfect number or that it was of special 
significance in the Babylonian calendar, so this information must be stored 
somewhere else.  
 
Language is not a domain-general conceptual faculty and the types of mental 
representation it can store are limited to lexical items that are developed to be 
used in speech production to aid the transfer of conceptual representations, but 
not conceptual representations themselves. It seems that Spelke’s account is 
flawed fundamentally because the tools language has for representing 
conceptual information are insufficient for representing fully all the 
information we want our number concepts to contain, so there must be some 
other form of number representation at play in adult humans.  
 
That lexical items cannot contain this richness of information is not really a 
problem for an account that sees language as essential for developing the true 
number representations but that does not claim that these representations are 
linguistic themselves. It is down this route that I would like to turn this current 
investigation.  
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Part 3. Lexical priming and the developmental role of language 
 
The preceding investigations indicate that language’s role in number cognition 
is most likely one of facilitating the formation of non-linguistic conceptual 
number representations, as the accounts that suggest that linguistic 
representations of number are our number concepts or simply map onto our 
pre-existing number concepts both appear to be unsustainable. 
 
We will therefore proceed assuming that we do have non-linguistic conceptual 
representations of number as well as the lexical number representations, or 
number words. The nature of these non-linguistic concepts will be addressed at 
length further on in this chapter but for now I would like to focus on the 
relationship between language and these non-linguistic number concepts. 
 
We now turn to the work of Susan Carey who proposes a form of bootstrap 
mechanism to explain how we use language to develop our numerical concepts 
(Carey, 2004; 2009). This account faces a number of problems but by framing 
it in the language of the associated access account we have been developing 
over the previous chapters, I believe we will be able to overcome them. Within 
this framework, we will clarify the format and the relationships of the lexical 
numerical representations; and will show that by clarifying these relationships 
we can shore up Carey’s bootstrapping account. Particular attention will be 
paid to the role of lexical priming, which is one of the key mechanism within 
the associated access account’s picture of language, but that gets no mention in 
Carey’s exegesis of the development of number concepts.  
 
The secondary aim of the section is to show that language’s involvement in the 
development of number concepts, or how children come to give meaning to 
number words is not simplistic or straightforward, that it plays subtly different 
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roles at different stages that is not captured in descriptions such as 
“conjoining” or “facilitating cross modular thought”. None of roles ascribed to 
language in this mechanism require it to have any cognitive capacities that go 
beyond everyday language learning and production. It is not by ascribing to 
the language faculty new capacities or powers that I hope to show the 
importance of language in number cognition but by clarifying how, at each 
stage, normal linguistic processes help the child overcome the challenges posed 
by trying to develop robust concepts of large numbers. 
 
To begin with I think it is important to frame the developmental mystery we 
are trying to explain. Children clearly have some grasp of number words and 
can display counting behaviour (sounding off the number words in order) from 
an early age, though it is clear that these words do not always mean the same 
things as they do for adults. Some behavioural studies make it look like infants 
treat number words that are beyond their ability to enumerate as general 
quantifiers such as “some”, “many” or “lots” (E. V. Clark & Nikitina, 2009). The 
question is then, how do children get from knowing the number words to 
knowing what the number words mean? One simple solution would be that it 
is very much like knowing anything: we have pre-linguistic representations 
that we simply must learn to map onto our words. The trouble with this is that, 
as we have seen in the previous sections of this chapter, none of our number-
like pre-linguistic representations can be described as number concepts proper, 
that is none of them can provide accurate representations of large quantities. 
So then, the story of how we come to map the number words to our 
representations of exact quantities mirrors the story of how we develop these 
representations.  
 
Carey’s, and linked accounts, fundamentally claim that our ability to create 
ordered symbolic structures that are devoid of content, beyond their internal 
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relationships, allows us to develop new concepts that go beyond our pre-
linguistic conceptual repertoire. Carey refers to this process of learning the 
meaning of a word that we have no conceptual representation for as 
bootstrapping, to capture the idea that by doing so we achieve something 
seemingly impossible. 
 
In the case of number, the count list (the ordered set of number words) 
provides a set of placeholders. Each term in the count list is defined completely 
by its relationship with the other count terms; they have no meaning outside of 
the system they are learnt in. And at this stage, children have no knowledge of 
what the terms of the count list mean or signify to other members of the 
language group. The number words come gradually to acquire meaning for the 
child by processes of induction, supposition and analogical reasoning. As they 
develop meaning we can see that the child is developing their concepts of 
number. 
 
Laurence and Margolis provide a good breakdown of the overall process of 
development of the number concepts and the inductive reasoning the child 
must make at each step (Margolis & Laurence, 2008). At the end of this 
process the child’s number words map on to large accurate number 
representations and the child understands that each number differs from its 
predecessor by exactly one. We will look at how the child achieves the crucial 
induction in each stage in turn as well as looking at what particular role 
language plays at each juncture. 
 
1. Learning the meanings of the small number words: Children must first 
develop robust conceptual representations of the first small number words and 
have these mapped onto the appropriate lexical items in their count list. This 
set of knowledge is the basis for the inductions that follow. How we develop 
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these small number representations is an interesting question in itself, and 
various alternatives have been proposed. 
 
2. Working out the cardinality principle: In the second stage of learning infants 
must learn that the final word in a count gives the cardinal value of a set, this 
is known as the cardinality principle. This is a fairly abstract realization and 
requires the child to have a rigidly established count list and to be able to 
consistently label objects with number words in a one-to-one pattern; once 
they can do this they are able to work out the cardinality principle. This stage 
begins to tie together the notions of numerical value of a set and the number 
words that will be capitalized on to make the crucial final induction. 
 
3. Working out the successor function: Under the bootstrapping account, the 
final feat that a child must achieve before being credited with having mastered 
advanced counting is grasping the successor function, the realization that every 
number in the count sequence refers to a cardinal value one greater than the 
one it follows. This realization gets at the very structure of the integers and 
confers on the child the ability to generate accurate large scale number 
concepts for any given number word in their count list. 
 
Concurrent to these stages of development, children must also learn by rote the 
count list, that is the ordered set of number words. To begin with it is clear 
that children attach no meaning to these terms, they are empty placeholders. 
We learn them just like we learn the rhyme “eenie, meeny, miny, mo” or the 
days of the week. The human brain clearly has quite a capacity for 
remembering verbal lists, and the importance of this skill and the lexical 
systems that underpin it will be examined later. It is just important to bear in 
mind that this learning process happens alongside the learning of the meaning 
of numbers though it itself deals with no numerical information.  
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Step one: small sets 
 
Laurence and Margolis’s breakdown makes it clear that to begin the process of 
learning what the large number words mean, we must have in place an 
understanding of the small number words. This conclusion is evidenced by 
studies from Karen Wynn that show that children learn the proper meanings of 
the first few number words before they learn to enumerate generally (Wynn, 
1992b). 
 
Wynn’s work has shown that after approximately a year and half of knowing by 
rote the count list but without appearing to know that any particular word on 
that list applies to a particular number or quantity, children come to learn that 
the word “one” applies to an individual object and, when asked to, can pick 
one and only one object from a pile. These behaviours seem to imply that a 
child has a fairly robust understanding of the use of the word “one” and 
accordingly must have a fairly robust concept of ONE. However, they treat all 
other number words as meaning something like “more than one” and respond 
to requests to pass any number of objects other than one by handing over a 
random number of objects but always more than one. For English speakers, 
this stage happens at roughly between 2 and 2.5 years of age. 
 
Children at the next stage in development know that, as well as “one” meaning 
one, the word “two” applies to sets that contain exactly two objects, and can 
correctly identify sets that contain two objects. It takes another 6 – 9 months 
for one-knowers to become two-knowers. At this stage all other words in the 
count come to mean approximately MORE THAN TWO. After another six months 
or so children similarly come to learn the meaning of the word “three”.  
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While some children then proceed to learn the meaning of the word “four” in 
this piecemeal fashion most children appear to make a crucial development at 
this stage and come to realize that all items on their count list have cardinality 
value and can correctly use the count routine to enumerate and give sets of any 
value on their count list. Wynn calls children at this stage Cardinal-Knowers. 
This stage is marked by an interesting behavioural change: up until this stage 
children asked for a certain number of objects that is beyond the number 
concepts they know just grab a random number of things; but once they 
become Cardinal-Knowers they endeavour to give the right number by 
embarking on a counting routine to get to the right number of things. Though 
they might still get the wrong number through errors in counting, they appear 
to appreciate that the right number can be ascertained by counting to it 
(Wynn, 1990; 1992b). 
 
Wynn’s exegesis gives us a time frame and a developmental trajectory for 
describing how children learn the first few number terms but it does not tell us 
anything about how children come to learn the first few count terms in this 
piecemeal fashion. It has been variously suggested that we develop them from 
the representations of the ANS, from the object tracking representations, 
analogy to the linguistic quantifiers or from a dedicated number module. 
Though commentators stress the fact that it does not matter for the final stage 
of the bootstrap how they are learnt so long as they are in place (Rips, Asmuth, 
& Bloomfield, 2006), to complete our investigation into how much language is 
involved with the development of our number concepts we should look at all 
the possible alternatives. 
 
Could the small number system be the root of our initial number concepts? 
This seems unlikely because, as we saw before, it does not contain any 
representations with numeric content. The representations it generates are of 
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individuals, that it can individuate up to four individuals simultaneously does 
not in any way show that it generates a representation of set size. In fact, to 
count the representations of individuals the object tracking system generates 
we would need another system that represents set size, which is exactly what 
we are looking for. It may be key in explaining how children can physically 
come to count things, providing the mechanism by which they individuate 
them, and which thereby facilitates subsequently enumeration, but it cannot, 
alone, be the source of our initial number representations. 
 
We might instead claim that it is the ANS that furnishes the child with the first 
few number concepts that are necessary to proceed with the bootstrap: it is the 
most numerate of our pre-linguistic systems and people have long assumed a 
developmental continuity between the representations of the ANS and our 
more developed representations of the integers (but see (Rips, Bloomfield, & 
Asmuth, 2008) for a lengthy critique of this assumption). However, we have 
already looked at the difficulties of building a system that assumes that the 
ANS produces representations of small numbers, namely that it appears that it 
does not function over small numbers or at best its output is masked, plausibly 
because they are too inaccurate to be useful. Further to this there is evidence 
from Le Corre that children do not in fact map their pre-linguistic 
representations from the ANS onto the number words until about six months 
after they have grasped the successor function and completed the bootstrap 
process (Le Corre & Carey, 2007). Given that we do not map these 
representations onto our number words until we have already developed the 
number concepts, these representations cannot be the source of the meanings 
of the first few number words we need to ground the initial stages of the 
bootstrapping process. 
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A more promising suggestion comes from Carey following work done by Bloom 
and Wynn (Bloom & Wynn, 1997) who propose that initially our 
understanding of how number words function is from analogy to quantifiers 
found in natural language. While growing up children are surrounded by 
number words and quantifiers, presented within very similar syntactic 
contexts, and there is evidence that to begin with they view them as 
interchangeable elements of language. 
 
Firstly, children learn the meaning of the term “one”, roughly as synonym of “a” 
and in line with the singular/plural distinction in language. At this stage, they 
misinterpret all other words in the count list as being a general plural marker.  
 
What about languages without singular/plural distinction? There is evidence 
that speakers of languages that do not have plurals become one-learners six 
months later than English speakers. This demonstrates that it is difficult to 
grasp the meaning of “one” without the singular/plural distinction being firmly 
understood and utilized, and speaks to the importance of the syntactical 
information about quantifiers in the learning of the first few numbers. Though 
Chinese and Japanese speakers take longer to get to this stage, their progress 
at learning the numbers from here on seems to proceed at the same rate as for 
English-speaking children, becoming two-knowers then three-knowers and 
then cardinal-knowers roughly six months later than English speakers 
(Sarnecka, Kamenskaya, Yamana, Ogura, & Yudovina, 2007). 
 
This pattern of misinterpreting the meanings of the number words as general 
quantifiers continues through the one-, two- and three-knower stages. Until 
they grasp the cardinality principle children treat the number words that they 
have not learnt yet as having general quantificational meanings, even if the 
exact number they apply to is not known. This implies that children 
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understand that the number words refer to numerosity even if they do not 
know what particular numerosity applies; to do this, the number words at this 
stage must have some usage conditions specified as syntactic information as 
part of the lexical item. 
 
The syntactic information that is attached to the number terms at this stage is 
very important, it provides information about the kind of things the number 
words can range over and allows children to make inductions about the 
difference between number words. This analogy between number words and 
quantifiers allows learners to realize that the number words pick out the 
quality of quantity.  
 
Once they have understood that the first few number words function like 
quantifiers and therefore range over numeric information, infants are in a 
position to start mapping them onto our pre-existing representations pertaining 
to quantity. The child now has in place the cognitive faculties to label and 
enumerate small sets of things. 
 
An alternative account is given by Carey, who instead suggests that the 
representations we map our number words onto are representations of sets of 
things, stored in long term memory. These sets of things were presumably once 
individuated using the small object tracking system and the remembered 
representations of them might contain representations of the indexing tags 
from the object tracking system. These stored representations are probably just 
abstracted sets: [a], [b,c], [d,e,f] etc. though she suggests that they might be of 
actual remembered sets of things such as [mum,dad]. 
 
These representations of sets are clearly not number concepts proper. Set size 
is not represented, only sets of different sizes; it is only when they are mapped 
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to number words appropriately that we come to see how these representations 
of sets are analogous to abstract quantity. These representations of sets 
mapped to the first few number words become the first few representations of 
number. These number representations do not seem like the adult 
representations of number. As discussed above there is more to our number 
concepts than a description of the quantity with which it is syntactically 
appropriate to use the term. These primitive number concepts develop as 
children become more familiar with the counting routine but we will see that 
even at this stage they suffice to facilitate the induction that follows. 
 
Alternatively, Laurence and Margolis suggest a system based on a specific 
number module (Laurence & Margolis, 2005; Margolis & Laurence, 2008) that 
is a weighted network rigged in such a way that a different number of nodes 
are activated in response to different numerosities. This small number module 
has its numerical content by virtue of responding consistently and distinctly to 
different numerosities, it is numerical in that it is “reliably connected” 
((Margolis & Laurence, 2008), p.937) to the perceivable quantities in the 
world.  
 
It might be argued that this system negates the need for the bootstrap by 
making number concepts innate: if children need to have concepts of number 
to learn the concepts of number, what is there left to do? I would argue that 
the richness of the representations of number generated by Laurence and 
Margolis’s number module is modest and that, though these number concepts 
respond exactly to different numbers, they do not provide children with any of 
the richer understanding of numbers that are required to become an advanced 
counter. In this sense, they function exactly as the representations of sets of 
different size, which Carey favours, do; and it is only when they are mapped to 
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the correct number words that they come to have a meaning in the wider 
context of counting and the integers. 
 
Fundamentally these two proposals offer the same thing to the aspiring 
number learner: They generate representations of sets of exact size, for sets of 
between one and four objects. It is important to realize that having these 
representations does not qualify the child as an advanced counter, as the 
triggering of these representations does not allow the child to discern the 
numerical relationship between the two sets nor does it allow them to 
enumerate in order, that is to say, having these representations does not 
automatically make them cardinal-knowers. These systems just have to provide 
the representations of quantity that we can map the first few number words to. 
For ease of reference I shall call whatever system it is that generates these 
accurate small representations of set size the small set system. 
 
At this stage then, aspiring counters have in place two important things: firstly, 
similarities between quantifiers and number words, and secondly the mapping 
between the number words (with their syntactic information) onto the first few 
accurate representations of set size (from the small set system). The syntactic 
information from the analogy to quantifiers specifies that the number words all 
pick out different quantities, where what these quantities are is contributed by 
the appropriate mapping (or access point establishment) to the representations 
of set size from the number module. 
 
Infants who have learnt the first few number terms then have lexical 
representations of the first four numbers with the access points to the 
appropriate representations of set size from the small set system and syntactic 
information, stored as part of the lexical item, determining under what 
numerical conditions it is grammatically appropriate to use them. 
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These representations are beginning to look a lot like the number words 
entertained by adults, and this is reflected in the similarities in the way in 
which children use them: infants use the first few number words in the system 
properly, to refer to sets of exact quantity. However, the other number words 
still behave in a mysterious ways or as generic plural markers; this is quite 
distinct to more advanced number learners who realize that even if they do not 
know what numerosity is associated with a number word they still treat them 
as referring to a single, unknown, number. 
 
Step two: cardinality 
 
At this stage, children are in a position to make the inductive inference that 
generates them the cardinality principle (that the last term given in a count 
gives the cardinal value of the set). By now, children are practised at reeling 
off the count list in order when prompted and can assign members of the set to 
be counted a number word in an exact one-to-one correspondence. This comes 
through practice at the counting routine, aided by parental guidance. With this 
one-to-one counting routine and the first few number words endowed with 
numerical meaning, children are in a position to come to realize that the last 
word given in a counting routine gives the cardinal value of the set of things 
being enumerated. For instance, a child will come to realize that a counting 
routine that ends on three will always happen when the set of things being 
enumerated contains exactly three things, the same is true for the word “two” 
and sets of two things. The cardinality principle can be worked out from only 
the modest number of number concepts at the child’s disposal and eventually 
goes on to aid the child in developing concepts of the rest of the numbers on 
their count list. 
 
It may simply appear as coincidence to start with, but the solidity of the 
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counting routine ensures that the same result is given enough for the child to 
come to grasp the robustness of the cardinality principle. Familiarity with the 
practice of verbal counting ensures that the count list always follows the same 
order and that its terms are given in a one-to-one correspondence with the 
objects of the set. 
 
Step three: the bootstrap and the successor function 
 
Once children have in place the first few number concepts accurately mapped 
onto the first number words, and the child is beginning to grasp the cardinality 
principle, the child is on the brink of becoming an advanced counter. All that is 
needed is a process that allows children to acquire the meanings of words for 
large numbers. This is done by a piece of inductive reasoning from the 
meanings of the words for small numbers already at their disposal. This final 
stage of the bootstrap concludes with children working out the successor 
principle, that the next word on a count list applies to a number one more than 
its predecessor. 
 
If they recognize the analogy between the relationship between a number word 
and its successor in the count list and the representations of set size associated 
with each term, Carey suggests that children will be able to make the crucial 
induction: “if “x” is followed by “y” in the counting sequence, adding a[n] 
individual  to a set with a cardinal value X results in a set with the cardinal 
value Y” ((Carey, 2009), pg.327). From here the child simply has to realize that 
a single individual is the equivalent of one to get them to the successor 
function.  
 
Remember that grasping the successor function is presumed to indicate that a 
child has become an advanced counter and can enumerate any number in their 
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count list. Whether they have mapped appropriate numerical concepts to each 
lexical item in their count list is irrelevant, the point is that with the successor 
function in place they have the capacity to give meaning to large number 
words. This is something that is impossible with only the pre-linguistic numeric 
capacities. 
 
Children are now in a position to work out from their concept FOUR and the 
successor principle that the lexical item ‘five’ means five by adding one to their 
representation of four, this can be repeated for ‘six’ and ‘seven’ and so on. This 
appears to be a rather piecemeal system of learning and it is unlikely to explain 
how all number words come to be given meaning - it seems unlikely that we 
generate our conceptual representation of 132 by working out that it is one 
more than 131. We shall look at the alternative pathways to forming number 
concepts that are opened up after this crucial induction takes place in the next 
section. 
 
By this mechanism children start to learn the meanings of number words and it 
provides us with one firm way in which we formulate the conceptual 
representations of large number that are necessary for mathematical thought. 
It is important to bear in mind that these conceptual large number 
representations are not purely linguistic, the lexical number representations in 
the lexicon provide just a focus point to which the conceptual representations 
are mapped, this relationship is the same for other concepts with associated 
lexical items. The key difference in the case of number is that these conceptual 
representations are not the product of some pre-linguistic conceptual module, 
that we can just map to a word, as is the case with say the concept RED, but are 
the unique product of socially guided, conceptual construction. It is therefore 
impossible for us to entertain these concepts without previously constructing 
them. Carey’s bootstrapping process shows how we use language to do this. 
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The conceptual representations, not the lexical representations of number are 
the representations that we use to complete numerical cognition and we can 
utilize them without activating the corresponding lexical numerical 
representations; this is a key point of difference with the view of Spelke that 
we looked at in the last section. 
 
The diabolic counters: an argument against Carey’s bootstrap 
 
Rips et al. contest that this inductive process cannot be the way in which 
children learn to count, arguing that the number in the counting sequence that 
comes immediately after any given number is not well defined and so the child 
cannot be ensured of getting from the initial stages (knowing the small 
numbers) to a fully-fledged understanding of the integers (Rips et al., 2006). 
They argue that the induction does not guarantee that learners will generate 
the integers as normally understood because no part of the induction defines 
what numeral comes next in a count list. 
 
They illustrate this problem with a devious example. They ask us to imagine 
twins who have acquired, through whatever method, a solid understanding of 
the first three count terms and the cardinal principle. Then they both make the 
crucial induction that whatever item comes next on their count list is exactly 
one more than the predecessor, and they both learn to count up to nine like 
any normal child – at this stage they clearly have conceptual representations of 
the integers up to nine that we would comfortably call normal. But while one 
of the twins, Fran, learns the normal counting system, one of the twins, Jan, is 
led astray by a diabolic parent who teaches her that the number that follows 
nine is zero. Accordingly, the child then continues to use what she knows 
about the numbers to work out the number that follows ‘zero’ is ‘one’. If Jan 
was asked to count out a set of 11 cookies, she would conclude by counting the 
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10th cookie as “zero” and the 11th as “one”; if she was tasked with counting out 
21 cookies the concluding verbal response would be the same – “one”.  
 
She thereby comes to have a cyclical number system where the lexical item 
‘one’ comes to apply to sets that contain 1, 11, 21… objects, and the lexical 
item ‘two’ would map onto 2, 12, 22 etc. In mathematics this system of 
counting is called Mod10.  
 
It is not just that Jan is simply using the words in an unusual way but that her 
concepts of number are not normal. Using the cardinal principle, she would 
conclude that any count list that ends in the word “one” would have one 
object, and so her conceptual representation ONE would mirror this. Her 
concept of ONE would be a representations of sets with quantities of 1, 11, 21 
and so forth; it is clearly possible to have conceptual representations of certain 
sets of numbers, for instance our concept of PRIME NUMBER is a concept that 
contains lots of different numerosities, much like Jan’s concept ONE. 
 
Jan’s cyclical naming system seems a little implausible but remember, we often 
learn, and are correct in learning, cyclical naming patterns in many other 
cases; the days of the week and the months of the year both follow a pattern 
that is analogous to Jan’s peculiar counting routine; there is clearly nothing 
intrinsic in the child’s ability to create ordered lists that precludes the 
possibility of learning a Mod10 counting system. 
 
Rips et al.’s key argument is that there is nothing in the workings of the 
bootstrap as described above that precludes learning such a numbering system. 
They argue that Jan’s number system is entirely consistent with Carey’s 
induction “if “x” is followed by “y” in the counting sequence, adding a[n] 
individual to a set with a cardinal value X results in a set with the cardinal 
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value Y” and embodies it just as well as the normal integers do. This striking 
conclusion, they believe is due to the fact that there is nothing in the inductive 
conclusion that accurately defines what the next thing in the counting 
sequence should be. They claim, “The bootstrap is undermined because it 
presupposed a system of numerals that tracks them.”(Rips et al., 2006) It is 
important to note that this counterexample does not speak to the falsity of the 
bootstrap induction but merely claims that the conclusion of the bootstrap is 
under-determined and cannot, by itself, get us to the natural numbers. 
 
However, Rips et al. want their diabolic counters to show that we should not 
credit the induction with being the way in which we learn the proper number 
concepts, arguing that if the induction cannot be guaranteed to get learners to 
the proper concepts of numbers then it cannot be the system that young 
learners use. This conclusion is a little hasty. 
 
Rips et al. are right in that their devious counterexample does show us that the 
bootstrap is not enough to get us to the natural numbers – but it does not show 
that we must give up on it entirely, it might equally well lead us to the 
conclusion that some other mechanism acts in tandem to support it, to ensure 
children do not use induction to generate incorrect number concepts. 
 
In fact elsewhere in their paper, Rips et al. suggest that something must restrict 
the concept of next number to ensure that young learners end up learning the 
correct numeral system (Rips et al., 2006). They themselves suggest that the 
only thing that can get learners to the right answer is a set of axioms that 
aggressively and accurately define the natural numbers, akin to those known as 
the Dedekind-Peano axioms that mathematically define what we mean by the 
term, “natural numbers”. They go on to argue that if we do ascribe to the 
young brain these axioms then the bootstrap is superfluous as the axioms 
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already define the natural numbers, the very thing the bootstrap is supposed to 
get us, and so we should give up on it. 
 
Ascribing this level of knowledge to young brains is excessive, children can get 
to be numerate without ever representing the Dedekind-Peano axioms either 
consciously or subconsciously. It is only with investigation that we develop 
these broad understandings of the abstract relationships that define the natural 
numbers. 
 
In insisting the infant mind must grasp the Dedekind-Peano axioms to be able 
to represent natural numbers, Rips et al. are conflating our concept of NATURAL 
NUMBER with our concepts of the natural numbers themselves; the former is a 
highly conceptualized mathematical notion, the latter are invisible parts of 
everyday cognition. We do not need an understanding of what the natural 
numbers are to be able to use accurate numerical representations; we do not 
need representations of the axioms that define natural number, we just need 
number concepts that comply with them. If these can be attained via another 
process that does not require representation of the Dedekind-Peano axioms we 
must still accept that children have learnt to count. 
 
So what alternative might explain a child’s ability to come to have an 
appropriate understanding of what the next term in a count list should be. I 
suggest it is another feature of the symbolic structure of the count list, 
overlooked in both Carey and Rips’s sparse accounts of the functions of 
language required for the induction.  
 
Understanding how the count list works is key to understanding how children 
learn numbers concepts, but is a much neglected element of inductive accounts 
of number learning. That children can learn the number list is taken for 
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granted as a relatively unimportant pre-requisite for learning number concepts 
and not treated as part of the process in general. If we look at how we are able 
to learn and produce the count list I believe we will gather some insight into its 
role in the wider picture of learning number concepts in general.  
 
Let us then look at exactly what learning a list by rote involves and how far it 
gets us in the proper learning of the number words. When we learn by rote a 
serially ordered verbal list, such as “Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, 
Friday”, or “eenie, meeny, miny, mo” each item in the list results in a separate 
lexical item stored in the lexicon. As discussed earlier they can, to begin with, 
have no semantic content themselves (or even syntactic content in the case of 
the nonsense words, “eenie”, “meeny” etc.). These lists exist purely as a set of 
relationships between these lexical items – that ‘meeny’ follows ‘eenie’ and 
precedes ‘miny’ etc. These lists may be cyclical as in the case of the weekdays, 
where ‘Monday’ follows ‘Sunday’ in much the same way as ‘Wednesday’ follows 
‘Tuesday’ or they may be linear, as with the count list. 
 
The relationships between the terms must be stored somewhere. We do not 
store lexical items in one part of the brain and then a conceptual description of 
their relationships elsewhere; the information pertaining to the order of the list 
is stored in the lexicon, as a function of the access points between associated 
lexical items in the list(Hoey, 2005). These connections between lexical items 
facilitate speech production via the process of lexical priming.  
 
When we speak a word aloud, we prime or activate the words that we are 
likely to use next during speech production. For instance, if we were talking 
about British car manufacturers and I say the word “Rolls”, my language 
faculty automatically primes (partially activates ready for inclusion in a 
sentence) the lexical item ‘Royce’, so that when I come to form sentences I do 
		 148	
not have to choose amongst all potential lexical items that might follow ‘Rolls’ 
but only select from those that are appropriate to the current context, so as to 
maintain fast communication. These primings are context-dependent and allow 
us to deal with the complicated linguistic problem of polysemy. For instance: 
‘Royce’ is much more likely to be activated after the lexical item ‘Rolls’ is 
activated in scenarios where one is talking about cars than in one in which the 
conversation is about favourite sandwiches. By priming lexical items we can 
communicate effectively despite the incredible number of words that have 
multiple meanings, ensuring that we rarely get confused by which meaning of 
the word, say “Rolls”, was intended. Effectively lexical priming makes it such 
that saying one word makes another, related, word more likely to be said than 
other non-related words. This effect is compounded if a number of lexical 
items are activated in an order that builds up a rich lexical context: such a rich 
lexical context can limit the choice of which lexical item will follow hugely, 
potentially even to just one. 
 
Lexical priming allows us to be able to form sensible sentences quickly without 
having to choose from the thousands of possible words (Hoey, 2005). Further 
lexical priming allows us to understand people quickly from the context of the 
conversation. For instance, when hearing someone else, possibly from 
Sheffield, talking about sandwich preferences and they say “breadcakes” my 
lexical item for ‘breadcake’ will slightly prime my lexical item for ‘roll’ so that 
when I hear the word ‘rolls’ I know they mean the bread variety not the car 
variety by virtue of the semantic context that has been built up via the previous 
lexical item activations. This priming is facilitated by the nexus of connections 
between lexical items, that effectively embody their semantic content. Each 
lexical item is associated via a series of access points with semantically linked 
terms, such that when the lexical item is activated, it primes those lexical items 
it is semantically linked to making them more likely to be activated during 
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subsequent speech production or comprehension. 
 
The process of lexical priming is well established and has historically been used 
to probe the background mental states, biases or perceived contexts of patients 
using association. The mechanism underlies the “say the first word that comes 
to your mind when I say…” type of psychological studies; though these studies 
may or may not be efficient at diagnosing psychological disorder, they trade on 
the fact that when we hear or say a word we activate those words that are 
semantically linked to it. 
 
When we learn empty symbolic systems, such as the count list, what we are 
learning is these activation links and their appropriate activation weightings. 
When we learn an empty list of placeholders, such as the count list, we are 
setting up these activations for the lexical items in the list, that have no access 
points to conceptual representations and therefore the only context that might 
trigger them is the internal linguistic prompt of the previous member of the list 
being spoken. And so, we end up with lexical items that can only easily be 
triggered by other words and in a set and stable order. In these cases of 
placeholder lexical items, the lexical primings take on an even larger role. 
When we do not know the meanings of the number terms, i.e. when there are 
no conceptual number representations associated with the words, then there is 
nothing else that can trigger the number words other than the lexical priming 
via the previous number terms. That makes it is unlikely for a child to say the 
wrong number word after having said the preceding number terms 
consistently; there might be errors occasionally but the system is very strong 
once the count list has been firmly established. 
 
Understanding that this mechanism underlies our verbal counting habits allows 
us to see why the case of Jan’s Mod10 system seems so counter intuitive to us 
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non- Mod10; it is hard for those of us who have a firmly established standard 
count list to conceive of saying zero after saying “four, five, six, seven, eight, 
nine” when engaged in a counting task, it is uncomfortable and manifestly 
counter-intuitive. 
 
If Jan had in place a proper set of count terms with appropriately weighted 
relations then it would be seemingly impossible for her to learn a Mod10 system 
as she would be very unlikely to repeatedly say “zero” after “nine” when lexical 
priming is leading her to say “ten”. 
 
I agree that if her diabolic parent had taught her exclusively and consistently 
that the word that follows “nine” is “zero” then she would inevitably learn the 
Mod10 system, not the standard system. However, this realization only 
highlights that what determines the number system we learn is determined by 
the count list we are working from, Jan’s situation brings home the importance 
of language and lexical priming in supporting the successor function to ensure 
we learn the proper, culturally endorsed, counting system. If we have correctly 
learnt the proper integer count list, then it seems that the induction process 
cannot help but get us to a proper understanding of the integers. 
 
Mapping more information to the bootstrapped concepts 
 
Earlier we briefly mentioned that, though the successor function provides 
learners with the tools to generate accurate representations of large numbers 
on their count list, it seemed unlikely that all of our conceptual representations 
of number are generated one by one, through application of the successor 
function. 
 
After becoming advanced counters our number concepts do not cease to 
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develop. One suggestion is that after a while we learn to map our 
representations of large quantity from the ANS onto our number words. 
Though these representations of quantity do not form the seed of our initial 
representations of number, there is a great deal of evidence that shows after a 
while we do learn to map the approximate representations from the ANS to the 
number words, as shown by our ability to give an estimate of the quantity of 
objects in a visual array that is presented to us in such conditions that we do 
not have a chance to count verbally using the number words. For this to work 
our number words must be associated somehow with our approximate 
representations of number activated during the task. The representation from 
the ANS obviously has an access point to the verbal representations. However, 
these representations still do not have the ability to become our accurate 
conceptual representations of numbers. 
 
Rips et al. suggest that a lot of the processes behind the development of our 
number concepts are processes of rational reflection (Rips et al., 2008). They 
show how we come to build up accurate number representations through the 
processes of learning and through reflection on the numbers we have already 
developed representations for. For instance, we might come to understand that 
seventy is the quantity equivalent to ten lots of seven as we learn our ten times 
table. Beyond just learning the remainder of the cardinal values of number 
concepts, there is conceptual information attached to certain number concepts 
that is distinct from their cardinal value that must be learnt to if we are to have 
fully fledged numerical concepts. We learn this information as we learn other 
non-numeric conceptual matters. For instance, learning the prime numbers or 
the perfect numbers does not simply come about through familiarity with the 
counting routine and cardinal values attached to its terms. Learning the prime 
or perfect numbers requires a reflective inquiry or teaching about the number 
concepts we already have in place and the system of mathematics that they are 
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a part of. Over time, all of this information gets incorporated into our 
conceptual representation of a number in much the same way our concepts of 
non-mathematical things grow and develop over time. 
 
There are two distinct types of mechanism at play in the examples given above 
of the broadening of our number concepts, that can be distinguished by 
looking at what each entails in terms of the associated access account of lexical 
representations. On the one hand the representations of the ANS, a separate 
cognitive faculty, are mapped onto a lexical numerical item which opens up an 
access point between the lexical item and a conceptual faculty. This broadens 
the applicability and meaning of the lexical item by allowing it to be used to 
communicate conceptual representations that were previously inexpressible. 
However, the number concept associated with the lexical numerical 
representation is unchanged. 
 
And on the other hand, the process of the conceptual representations of the 
numbers themselves, developing through learning and rational reflection, does 
not open up access points between the conceptual faculties and the lexical 
numerical representations; it merely increases the amount of information the 
conceptual representation contains. 
 
One process develops the breadth of the lexical number representations by 
mapping it to new representational faculties, the other increases the amount of 
information incorporated in the conceptual representations of number. 
However, the perceptible effect of both is an increase in competence and 
understanding of mathematical concepts. 
 
Further indication of the partial independence of the lexical number 
representations and the number concepts behind them comes from the 
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observation that in everyday use we often find ourselves using the lexical 
number representations without calling to mind an exact representation of the 
integer it is associated with. For instance, when we are dealing with words for 
very large numbers we often seem unable to grasp the actual magnitude of the 
quantity associated with the term despite linguistic familiarity with it. Imagine 
hearing someone report the size of a crowds as “twenty-five thousand, four 
hundred and thirty three people”, it is very hard to understand, in terms of 
exact quantity, what this means. 
 
In this case, despite the fact that a lexical item is fully formed and therefore 
comprehendible when heard in speech, it seems that we have not yet tied it to 
a conceptual representation of a number or to a representation of approximate 
quantity from the ANS. Nonetheless, the lexical item can still function in a 
conversational setting. These empty lexical number representations pose an 
issue for communication and we have developed many techniques of 
approximating, rounding up, visual aids and metaphor to help communicate 
larger integers that people have not generated rich conceptual representations 
for. 
 
Similarly, when we remember telephone numbers, we appear to only 
remember the lexical representation of the number not the numerical concept 
of the associated integer - I do not call to mind my conceptual representation 
of the number seven billion, eight hundred and seventeen million, nine 
hundred and sixty-seven thousand, three hundred and eighty-eight when I try 
and remember my phone number but just the lexical items, with a little help 
from lexical priming and verbal memory loops. This shows that the lexical 
number representations can have a cognitive life all of their own and we can 
utilize them without thinking of the numerical concepts associated with them; 
conversely we can use the conceptual representations of numbers during 
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mathematical thought without thinking of the names of the numbers at all. 
The associated access account of cognitive semantics details how we can use 
the semantic information associated with lexical items to facilitate linguistic 
communication, without having to activate the conceptual representations 
associated with the lexical items. This is the case for lexical number 
representations that we can utilize in speech even if we have not gone on to 
formulate conceptual representations of the number they will eventually come 
to stand for. This is just as true of our learning the first few count terms as 
children to our eventually getting our heads around pi or the square root of 
minus one later in our education. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although it seemed at the outset that the case of number might have been 
similar to the navigation case study – with language involved in the integration 
of knowledge from two distinct pre-linguistic cognitive faculties, Carruthers’s 
assumption that the two case were distinct instantiations of the same 
mechanism was clearly mistaken. It appears that very different mechanisms are 
at play in navigation, where language plays an active online role in problem 
solving; and number, where language is critical for development of conceptual 
representations. 
 
Further, language’s role, even within number cognition is varied; many of the 
mechanisms that play a part in the wider picture of how children develop 
number concepts fall outside of the bootstrap’s remit. For a start, we have seen 
the importance of learning by rote and the lexical priming mechanism in 
learning the first few count terms and also in making sure that number 
learners cannot help but learn the proper integer count list. Further, after the 
bootstrap has been concluded we saw how lexical number representations act 
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as a focal point of the broadening concepts of numbers by forming various 
access points between the number words and the corresponding 
representations of the ANS and our more conceptual representations of 
number. 
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Tying the threads together 
A conclusion and a taxonomy 
 
In the introduction, we came across Carruthers’s dissection of the functions of 
language into either communicative or cognitive. This distinction was made 
with the intention of highlighting the possibility of a more cognitively 
important role of language within wider cognition than is normally assumed 
within the field of cognitive science. Clearly, I too believe that the role of 
language in cognition is often understated within the study of cognition, and 
share Carruthers’s intentions of highlighting a more cognitively active account 
of language. However, I feel that Carruthers’s distinction between cognitive 
and communicative conceptions of language actually leads us away from the 
correct view of language’s role in cognition and towards Carruthers’s own view 
of the architecture of cognition, which he expounds in The cognitive functions of 
language, after highlighting the distinction. 
 
In the first section of this chapter I will look at how Carruthers’s dichotomy 
leads towards his own strong, cognitive conception of language, by showing 
how actually the cognitive repercussions of language’s functions are by-
products of the normal communicative mechanisms of language, rather than 
the product of some other, more computational, capacities of language. 
Further, such an account of language, which runs together, what Carruthers’s 
terms, cognitive and communicative elements of language, does not fit into 
Carruthers’s distinction happily, and so by following the lines of thought 
proposed by the distinction we might overlook it as a possibility. I fear that 
Carruthers is trying to tease language’s roles in cognition apart in a place that 
does not make sense.  
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I will also try to make it clear that Carruthers’s distinction assumes a naïve 
view of the communicative functions of language, which makes it seem like his 
computational account of language’s role in cognition is the only viable way of 
establishing the importance of language’s function within cognition and 
explaining the evidence for language’s involvement in various cognitive 
domains.  
 
If we give up on a naïve view of communicative language it becomes easier to 
see the interesting cognitive effects of language on thought as simply upshots 
of its communicative functions. The second section of this chapter then will 
flesh out the sketches of language function that we began to develop over the 
course of the investigations into the case studies that make up the previous 
chapters. 
 
The third section of this chapter will then attempt to build a taxonomy of the 
roles of language in cognition starting from a more mature view of language’s 
functions. We will draw lines of similarity between the mechanisms we looked 
at in the foregoing case studies and draw from them some more general 
conclusions about the means by which language plays a role in the wider 
picture of cognition; thereby hoping to explain humanity’s long-held intuition 
that language is one of the key factors in our advanced cognitive capacities. At 
the same time, we will also touch upon a few other mechanisms suggested by 
other commentators on the interaction of language and thought and see how 
they fit with our account of language. The basic taxonomy I present splits the 
mechanisms of interaction between language and thought between (a) those 
where language has a subtle, implicit and wide ranging effect, but in ways 
which are not consciously aware of, and so seem to us like normal cognitive 
behaviour; and (b) those where we use language consciously, as a cognitive 
		 158	
tool for expanding our capacities by exploiting some of the mechanisms that 
evolved to meet the demands of effective communication. 
  
Part 1. Carruthers and the misleading dichotomy  
 
Carruthers’s motivation in The cognitive functions of language (Carruthers, 
2002) is to evidence and support the general claim that language has a greater 
role to play in cognition than merely expressing the thoughts that the suite of 
pre-linguistic conceptual modules generate. He proposes a taxonomy which 
splits language’s functions into either communicative functions, those which 
are used during normal linguistic communication, and cognitive functions, 
more controversial functions through which language plays a role in wider 
cognition. By producing this taxonomy he hopes to draw us away from the 
view that is prevalent in cognitive science that language is purely 
communicative, merely a tool for transmitting thoughts generated by pre-
linguistic modules between thinkers. 
 
I am sympathetic to Carruthers’s cause, and believe that any attempt to 
highlight the potential importance of language within cognition is worthwhile. 
By giving a label to, and legitimizing, the non-trivial cognitive functions of 
language Carruthers helps us bring into line with the modularist point of view 
the intuitions we all have about the deeply interrelated nature of language and 
thought. However, the dichotomy Carruthers suggests leads us towards 
viewing the cognitive role of language as quite distinct from the 
communicative roles it performs. 
 
But what are the cognitive functions language performs that Carruthers 
believes need bringing to light? By reminding ourselves what Carruthers is 
arguing for we might be able to see why he puts forward the distinction he 
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does. Carruthers puts forward an account that sees language’s role in wider 
cognition in its role as a cross-modular, domain-general faculty that allows us 
to generate novel representations, which contain information from two distinct 
conceptual modules. 
  
These complex linguistic representations cannot be entertained by the pre-
linguistic conceptual modules and allow us to perform flexible online cognition 
that is not bound by the encapsulated limits of the cognitive modules. The 
potential mechanisms behind this thought are exemplified in his account of 
reorientation behaviour in humans, which we looked at in the first case study. 
For Carruthers, language’s main cognitive capacity is to combine information 
from distinct pre-linguistic representational faculties into one unified linguistic 
representation that can be used during problem-solving cognitive behaviour by 
first translating the conceptual representations into a symbolic linguistic format 
and then conjoining the representations.  
 
Carruthers’s argument makes massive claims about the scope of language’s 
involvement in cognition, viewing it as a key cross-modular thinking device. Its 
apparent domain generality (language is domain-general in so far as it can 
represent seemingly anything) and computational potential leads Carruthers to 
suggest that language is behind vast swathes of our more complex cognitive 
behaviour, especially those that appear to utilize information from two distinct 
conceptual representational faculties simultaneously, which covers a lot of our 
cognitive behaviour. Yet Carruthers cites evidence from only two distinct 
cognitive domains to support his general theory of language – navigation and 
number and in both cases, we have found Carruthers’s account of language’s 
role unpalatable. 
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In both case studies explored by Carruthers, the fundamental issue was a lack 
of evidence that the language faculty does function in the way he suggests. For 
instance, in the case of navigation we saw that into order to generate a 
representation which could be used for reorientation from the two distinct pre-
linguistic conceptual representations, the language faculty would have to 
perform quite complicated inductions, beyond the scope of the syntactic 
conjunction he suggests. There is just no reason to suppose that language has 
such complicated and advanced computational capacities, and such a 
suggestion goes against the general wisdom of developing a cognitive 
architecture that does not rely on domain-general symbol manipulators. Such 
domain general symbol manipulators have been shown to face insurmountable 
problems from computational intractability. 
 
We must conclude that language does not function as Carruthers suggests, it is 
not in fact like a domain-general computer, able to take inputs from any 
module and combine their representations in logical inferences. So why might 
Carruthers posit such an extreme view of the computational power of 
language? I think that part of the reason why he is drawn to such a picture 
(besides it being consistent with many of our intuitions about the importance 
of language in thought) is due to his assuming a naïve view of how the 
communicative side of language works, which leads him to neglect the 
potential for interesting cognitive behaviour that a language faculty that 
adapted solely to meet communicative ends might generate. 
 
Despite positing communicative functions as one half of his dichotomy, 
Carruthers at no point goes into how they actually work. By failing to do so, he 
effectively negatively defines the communicative role of language by describing 
the raft of mechanisms that cause interesting effects on cognition as part of the 
cognitive roles of language and labelling everything we are left with as 
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communicative. By removing all interesting linguistic behaviour from the 
communicative side, we are left with a view of the communicative functions of 
language is that is oversimplified and unelaborated. 
 
It seems that Carruthers implicitly sees the communicative functions of 
language as simple translational mechanisms from conceptual representations 
to linguistic representations, seeing language qua communication as purely a 
vessel for thought. Such a view is sometimes called a Pure Translation view of 
language (A. Clark, 2006). Carruthers sees sentence production as translation 
first from conceptual representations into LF, a format of representation that 
contains all the information from the conceptual representations in a syntactic 
form, and then, if the thoughts are going to be expressed verbally, from LF into 
natural language. The process of speech comprehension then becomes simply 
the reversal of this process. In The cognitive functions of language Carruthers 
admits that this story is oversimplified but states that he does not see how it 
will lead to any problems for his account, as it is the view assumed by both 
sides of the debate: “How, then, does the sentence get assembled? I have to 
confess that I don’t have a complete answer to this question in my pocket at 
the moment! But then this need be no particular embarrassment” (Carruthers, 
2002), p.669). Though Carruthers is right to say that he is not alone in being 
without an answer to the problem of sentence production, by not having a 
story Carruthers assumes an overly simplistic picture of the process. And by 
doing so Carruthers implicitly acknowledges the possibility of linguistic 
versions of conceptual representations, containing all the same information.  
 
The Pure Translation view is obviously an overly simplistic view but one that 
we assume on an everyday basis. It is a shorthand way of viewing the 
functioning of the language faculty that has snuck into cognitive science as the 
default position. 
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It is unclear in his writing if Carruthers does hold a Pure Translational view of 
language’s role within cognition but if we follow the dichotomy he provides, 
we are led to assuming it. Further I believe this assumption leads Carruthers 
towards overly complex accounts of language’s involvement in thought that 
require positing extraneous mechanisms and functional capacities within 
language to make up for the dearth of interesting interactions between 
language and thought left by assuming an overly simplistic view of 
communicative language. 
 
If we do not subscribe to a purely translational view of language functioning 
then we might be able to show that language does play an important role in 
cognition, without having to credit it with explicitly domain-general 
computational powers as Carruthers does. We must remember that to assume 
that language evolved for communication, and therefore to see communication 
as its primary function, is not necessarily to endorse a purely translational role.  
 
So, what is wrong with a pure translation view? We do not have to push very 
hard before the pure translation view begins to give way under pressure. In 
fact we, probably, have all come across its shortcomings as a description of 
language faculty’s functioning in our everyday life. Intuitively then it seems 
that when we fail to put our ideas into words or when we are unclear what 
somebody means by a statement it seems that an exact translation of thought 
to words is impossible.  
 
The Pure Translation view seems to require that, to be able to express our 
thoughts we have to have corresponding linguistic representations of them, 
which capture the same information about the world. This is clearly impossible 
– we would need too many words, far more than the language faculty could 
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store or process. For instance, think about how many different colours we are 
able to perceive, yet languages have relatively few colour words – in some 
cases as few as two, yet communication still proceeds effectively so it cannot be 
the case that Pure Translation is required for effective communication. It 
appears we cannot represent all the colour representation we might possibly 
entertain linguistically. We might argue that we can linguistically represent all 
colour tones either through analogical description: a certain hue might 
linguistically be captured as: “old-pine-cones-that-have-been-drying-by-a-fire-
in-a-barn-for-the-winter-brown”, or via a formal method where we analyse the 
make-up of the colour scientifically. But even these attempts do not get us 
exactly to our colour representations. The embellished linguistic description 
does not specify whether the pine cones were from one or other species which 
might lead to a difference in final dried hue; and the formal process is only as 
fine-grained as our analysis; It does not seem possible that we will be able to 
describe each of the colour representations that humans are able to pick out. It 
seems that just as we can have no single, perfect translation between sentences 
from one language into another, we cannot have pure translation between 
concepts and words.  
 
Evans characterizes the difference between conceptual representations and 
linguistic representations as the difference between parametric and analogue 
representations (Evans, 2015). He says that we should think of linguistic 
representations as parametric, in that the information they contain is highly 
abstracted from the richness of experience and purely schematic. Whereas, our 
conceptual representations can contain an incredibly rich amount of analogue 
information (obviously, some mental representations are likely to be far 
simpler than this). These analogue representations are simulations of some of 
the information in world. Linguistic representations should not be seen as 
representations of information in the world but as a representational format 
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that is a means of communicating our conceptual representations to other 
speakers; they cannot hope to contain all the information the conceptual 
representations contain. The fundamental difference in the type of 
representation each system generates means that it is fundamentally 
impossible to translate exactly the information stored in one form into the 
other, yet somehow communication continues.  
 
The preceding arguments against Pure Translation merely trade on intuitions 
gathered from the experiencing the difficulty of expressing our thoughts and 
cannot possibly hope to do justice to the problem as a whole. However these 
intuitions are supported by the conclusion of the three preceding chapters that 
the relationship between lexical items and conceptual representations is 
complex and leads to interesting cognitive effects. We should then reject Pure 
Translation exactly because these, and linked investigations, illustrate that the 
complexity of language system leads to cognitive behaviours that the Pure 
Translation view cannot explain. The complexity of the system as a whole will 
be brought to light further as we begin to produce our taxonomy of the various 
different mechanisms of interaction between language and thought, and this 
complexity is the ultimate argument against Pure Translation. 
 
By assuming a Pure Translation view Carruthers neglects to investigate the 
possibility that the nature of the mechanisms language evolved to meet 
communicative needs might themselves be the source of rich and interesting 
cognitive behaviours; the very kinds of behaviours that Carruthers tries so hard 
to attribute to language via ascribing it other, more elaborate computational 
functions, distinct from its communication functions.  
 
We have seen how Carruthers, in constructing his taxonomy leads us to believe 
that only what the terms cognitive functions of language can go on to have 
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further roles in our wider cognition by performing explicit computational tasks 
and that the communicative functions of language are without further 
downstream cognitive effects. So, in his attempt to draw our attention to the 
cognitive, computational role of language he actually draws us away from 
seeing the vast cognitive impact that the normal, communicative functions of 
language produce downstream. As we saw in the foregoing case studies, these 
functions can explain the behavioural data that Carruthers cites in support of 
his vastly overpowered computational version of the language faculty.  
 
I believe therefore that we should distance ourselves from Carruthers’s 
distinction; his characterisations of both the computational and communicative 
sides of language fail to do justice to how language truly interacts with 
thought. The first does not accurately represent the functional capacities of 
language, and overstates the computational power of the language faculty, 
leading us down a misleading route when looking at human intelligence in a 
wider sense; the latter oversimplifies the situation in such a way that there is 
no room for language to be particularly important or interesting at all. 
 
Part 2. Communication without Pure Translation  
 
Before we proceed with producing a taxonomy of the mechanisms by which 
language does interact with thought, we should clarify how the language 
faculty meets the requirements of communication. By understanding the 
ordinary workings of the language faculty, we will be better able to understand 
how the interesting cognitive effects it generates arise and how they can best 
be categorized. The upcoming sketch of language comprehension and 
production is not meant to be definitive, it just provides a plausible account of 
the language faculty that does not rely on translating conceptual 
representations into commensurable linguistic representations, it is a fleshed-
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out version of the account of language that I begin to develop in the preceding 
chapters. Instead of seeing the role of language as translating thoughts from 
pre-linguistic cognition, it sees language as activating lexical items in response 
to the activation of conceptual representations; the job of the language faculty 
then is to ensure, through syntactic and semantic rules, stored as part of the 
lexicon, that the sentences produced are grammatical and sensible. Such an 
account mitigates the need for there to be representations produced by the 
language faculty that directly correspond to our conceptual thoughts. 
 
As already discussed, there are two distinct levels of representation in the 
human brain, firstly the homogenous, unified format of linguistic 
representations, and secondly a vast array of different conceptual 
representations that are produced by different conceptual modules and do not 
share a unified representational format. By looking at each in turn we will 
better be able to see how they might relate to each other. 
 
First let us look at the representations produced by the language faulty: these 
are linguistic representations and are seemingly domain-general, insofar as 
they can be represent anything. Complex linguistic representations or strings of 
internal monologue, are made up of atomic elements called lexical items. 
Lexical items are akin to words in spoken language. The lexical items are 
stored in the lexicon, a subsystem of the language faculty. Lexical items are 
connected with particular conceptual representations via a series of access 
points. The activation of a lexical item, either during comprehension or 
production of sentences, leads to the activation of the conceptual 
representations it is associated with. Lexical items can have access points in 
more than one conceptual representations, this happens when words have two 
meanings. For instance, the single lexical item ‘bank’ has (at least) two access 
points to the conceptual representations BANK [FINANCIAL INSTITUTION] and BANK 
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[RAISED EDGE OF RIVER]. Which one is activated on hearing the word “bank” is 
determined by the context of the heard word. A word’s meanings may be 
closely related, in which case perhaps the access points link to two closely 
related conceptual representations, or they may be very distinct and therefore 
have access points in unrelated sections of the conceptual system.  
 
The picture of the lexicon I favour has lexical items for each sense of a word, 
much like how a dictionary has separate entries for different meanings of 
words. Though this might lead to an easier account of sentence comprehension 
(as the language faculty has less work to do in working out which particular 
conceptual representation associated with a lexical item is fired, so long as the 
right lexical item is), I worry that in this case the lexicon is charged with 
having too heavy a burden of storage. Though it is not clear how we might go 
about measuring the limits of the lexicon’s storage capacity we should 
nonetheless favour the more modest account when it comes to prescribing 
mental storage capacities. 
 
Further, a system of lexical representations with potentially numerous access 
points to different, unrelated, conceptual representations, as opposed to a 
system that has a separate lexical item for each sense of a word, alleviates the 
problem of having to give criteria that specify when a related, but subtly 
different, sense of a word warrants a lexical item all of its own. For instance in 
the case of ‘bank [financial institution]’ and ‘bank [raised edge of river]’ it is 
clear that these two items might warrant different lexical representations but it 
is not clear whether the word ‘bank’ when used to refer to raised earth 
boundaries around a clearing or park would warrant a separate lexical item to 
‘bank [raised edge of river]’ given that they are such closely related meanings. 
Under an account that sees the lexical item ‘bank’ having links to many 
conceptual representations, including but not limited to, RAISED EDGES and 
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RIVER and FINANCIAL INSTITUTION it is clear that in the case of talking about park 
boundaries only the first conceptual representation is appropriate to this 
particular tokening of the word “bank”, we do not need to worry about 
whether or not a new lexical item is required for this sense of the word, as in 
our account this new sense is only activating one element of the larger nexus of 
conceptual associations of the lexical item, for these reasons I believe we 
should favour a view of lexical items that have a variety of access points to deal 
with words having many meanings over a system that proposes many distinct 
lexical items for each meaning a word has. 
 
Such an account turns on the idea of a lexical item activating the appropriate 
conceptual representations relative to the linguistic context the lexical item 
was used in. For this to work we need a system that responds to different 
semantic and syntactic contexts. This requires at least some information to be 
stored as part of the lexicon. It is fairly uncontroversial that the rules that help 
us understand syntactical context are stored as part of the language faculty and 
that lexical items contain syntactic information pertaining to their proper usage 
and during language use. For example when we hear the word “lead” 
(pronounced lɛd) used in the context of a noun we activate the conceptual 
representation of a heavy malleable metal and when it is heard in the context 
of a verb we now activate the conceptual representations associated with 
GUIDING. Syntactic context clearly constrains which associated conceptual 
representation should fire during speech comprehension. Thus the syntactic 
information stored as part of the lexical items helps guide meaning construal. 
 
However, I also believe that a similar system is in operation for semantic 
contexts too. To ensure that we are understood we must produce sentences 
that are semantically as well as syntactically sound – as a request such as 
“could you get the milk out of the table for me please?” is just as improbable to 
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produce and impenetrable to understand as “can you please get a milks out of 
the fridge for me please?” We do not tend to pass over semantically 
nonsensical sentences smoothly, we stumble over them and rarely produce 
them. And if we do hear a nonsense sentence we do not activate the 
nonsensical conceptual representation expressed in the sentence unless it is in 
a very deliberate context which encourages us to do so – such as surrealism or 
a joke. On hearing a semantically nonsensical sentence we ignore it, rewrite it 
or question our own understanding of the words involved. This behaviour I 
believe shows that we are just as tuned in to semantic context as we are to 
syntactic. 
 
To achieve this sensitivity to semantic context, lexical items have access points 
between themselves, that increase the chance of the associated lexical item 
being activated when they are activated, and these access points effectively 
follow meaning associations. For instance, the lexical item ‘glove’ might be 
associated with ‘hand’ and ‘clothing’. This means a degree of semantic 
information is effectively stored, not as part of the lexical items themselves but 
as a function of the nexus of associations between the lexical items, encoded in 
the relationship between words that are laid down as we learn a language. The 
lexical item ‘glove’ therefore does not contain the information that gloves are 
clothes for hands, it just happens by virtue of learning associations to be 
connected with the lexical items ‘clothes’ and ‘hands’, because during learning 
it was heard in contexts with these other lexical items. Once these associations 
are established and we hear a sentence in which a lexical item is fired that 
does not fit in with the semantic context built up by the firing of lexical items 
over the course of the sentence, then we notice this: it was not what was 
expected to fire, just like when we hear a sentence that contains a syntactic 
mistake, and it stands out and surprises us.  
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There is a danger that by ascribing lexical items too much semantic 
information we make them into quasi-conceptual structures. However, under 
this picture a degree of semantic information is stored as a set of associations 
learnt through normal language learning between lexical items, meaning that 
we have enough semantic information to ensure the correct, context-
appropriate conceptual representations are fired during language processing, 
but not so much that we begin to treat the lexical items as rich, information-
containing structures. We should see the lexicon as a whole, rather than the 
lexical items individually, as containing a relatively sparse degree of 
information instantiated through associations, and only enough to allow 
effective communication. Linguistic representations do not contain rich 
amounts of information about the world. 
 
Conceptual representations 
 
On the other side of the mental representation coin we have the conceptual 
representations, these are the rich information-containing representations. 
There are various different forms of conceptual representations in the brain, 
collectively representing all the elements of reality to which we can cognitively 
respond. The different types of conceptual representation are all the products 
of distinct conceptual modules, where each of these modules presumably 
evolved to meet some distinct cognitive problem. The workings of these 
modules are, for the most part, inferentially isolated, and are conducted in 
their own particular representational format; further, we are equipped with no 
domain-general faculty in which the different forms of conceptual 
representations can be cognized together. The conceptual representations then 
lead an isolated life, each guiding cognitive behaviour in their own particular 
domain. The degree of isolation of the conceptual representations is quite 
striking at times; we have seen that even when the conceptual representational 
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faculties have overlapping remits, they do not interact with each other and 
produce incommensurable representations of the same situation. This is so in 
the case of the geometry and landmark recognition modules, which both take 
their inputs from the visual array and produce representations of space, though 
they represent different elements of the visual array. 
 
The conceptual representations contain rich information about perceived 
reality. These representations in some cases might be accurate models of 
certain elements of the environment, as with the geometry module, which we 
use to guide further problem solving; and in other cases they might be triggers 
that fire in response to certain stimuli that modulate further cognitive 
behaviour downstream, as with the disgust response firing at watching others 
pulling a gape face after eating something and then later avoiding that thing as 
a potential food source. In this case, the disgust module represents certain 
things as disgusting not by creating cognitive models of the world, but by 
triggering in response to some element in reality; in a similar way that a light 
on the washing machine that tells us the washing is done: the light does not 
represent a rich model containing information about the state of the laundry 
but is just a programmed response to something happening (in this case the 
washing cycle finishing) that guides our behaviour downstream. 
 
Conceptual representations get fed downstream to other conceptual faculties 
that take them as an input, until eventually we get to a faculty that is set up to 
instigate evolutionarily adapted actions. In this way, our conceptual 
representations eventually lead to context-appropriate action without the need 
for a central intelligence to work out the best possible course of action. As an 
example of how this complex context-appropriate behaviour can arise without 
a central planning intelligence we can think of an ant trying to navigate its way 
back to the correct entrance of the nest: it will walk around the nest until the 
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visual image of the nest matches the representation of the nest stored in the 
visual landmark recognition faculty. This matching event will trigger some 
cognitive activity downstream that results in the ant proceeding forwards, 
towards the nest(Judd & Collett, 1998). In this fashion, the ant returns to the 
nest without ever having to entertain general conceptual representations of 
needing to walk towards the right entrance. This sort of behaviour avoids the 
requirement for a general conceptual representational capacity to be able to 
respond to complicated stimuli; so long as the module has evolved to represent 
and respond to appropriate elements of the world to solve the relevant 
problems. Obviously the cases of ant-navigation and human conceptual 
thought are distinct and might arguably be solved on a different computational 
level, but I believe the lesson that complex behaviour can arise out of simple 
modular activity is one that should be taken on board. 
 
 
The above example exemplifies the lack of flexibility inherent in modular 
accounts of the mind, which often claim that there is no general 
representational form that all concepts take. Such a representational format is 
unnecessary if there is no domain-general conceptual device with which to 
think. All these various forms of conceptual representations are entertained by 
cognitive faculties adapted to them. Under such accounts, we have a picture of 
the mind full of distinct conceptual representational faculties, producing 
conceptual representations of different aspects of the world that together allow 
us to respond appropriately to the situations we find ourselves in. 
 
So how do the linguistic representations interact with the conceptual 
representations? 
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So if we wish to distance ourselves from a Pure Translation view we are left 
with? What is the nature of the interaction between the two levels of 
representation? One possibility is that there are two sets of relationships, or 
access points. Firstly, access points between lexical items and secondly access 
points between conceptual representations and lexical representations8. Let us 
look at speech production and speech comprehension in turn to see how each 
set of access points plays a part within these wider processes and allow us to 
deal with the difficulties associated with polysemy and ambiguity. 
 
In the most straightforward case of speech production, the conceptual 
representations we want to express linguistically are activated by perceptual or 
cognitive stimuli. Through the access points these conceptual representations 
have in the lexicon, various lexical representations are activated, those lexical 
items which are most strongly activated form part of the complex linguistic 
representations we are constructing, in accordance with the rules of syntax 
inherent in the speech production subsystem. Obviously, there are always 
myriad words that might be chosen to express any given concept and so often 
the firing of a conceptual representation might partially activate a number of 
lexical items, the basic function of the speech production subsystem is to pick 
the most highly activated one.  
 
When a lexical item is activated, potentially after being activated by association 
with a conceptual representation, it activates any associated lexical 
representations with the same effect as if a conceptual representation had 
																																																						
8 There is a third set of relationships I have not mentioned here: the sets of relationships 
between conceptual representations. I will not discuss them here, but it is obvious that 
conceptual relationships will interact with each other to some degree but as we are 
investigating the functioning of the language faculty in cognition, the interrelationships of 
conceptual representations must remain outside of the scope of this thesis. 
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activated a lexical item; this process is called lexical priming. Lexical priming 
means that during speech production, saying one word activates, and thereby 
makes more likely to be said, any lexical items that it has access points to. 
When we come to select the appropriate word, any lexical items that are 
primed are more likely to be incorporated into the larger linguistic 
representation than those that are not. Often there will be lots of lexical items 
that have been primed by the context built up by the preceding sentence, the 
one that is activated most strongly, by either lexical or conceptual 
representations, will be incorporated into the overall linguistic representation. 
Once this new lexical item has been activated, it will in turn prime the lexical 
items it has access points in, and these activations will compound the existing 
pattern of priming, building up an ever richer lexical context that guides 
further speech production. It is through this means that both semantic context 
and the pattern of fired conceptual representations simultaneously guide 
speech production.  
 
This claim is anecdotally supported by the observation that if you have been 
talking on one specific topic for ages, then suddenly come to talk about 
something entirely different, there is still a propensity to use terms and words 
from the initial context as though, despite the change in which conceptual 
representations are firing (which reflects the change in topic), the lexical items 
to do with the initial topic are still activated (and therefore still likely to be 
incorporated into speech) by having previously been primed by associated 
lexical items from within this topic’s particular vocabulary. 
 
The relative importance of the lexical and conceptual priming during sentence 
production is dependent on the nature of particular lexical items. Some lexical 
items have very strong lexical associations, and only a few weak conceptual 
associations, and are more likely to be primed linguistically; these are words 
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that that have almost no meaning and are only ever used in certain linguistic 
contexts: for instance the lexical item “miny” is more often activated during 
speech production by being primed by the words “eenie, meeny...” than by any 
access points it has to corresponding conceptual representations 
 
Lexical priming in speech comprehension 
 
The process of lexical priming also plays a role during speech comprehension 
by facilitating the grasping of the speaker’s intended meaning. When we hear 
sentences, the lexical items for each word in the sentence are activated, which 
in turn partially activate the associated lexical items, and if a given word is 
partially activated via lexical priming we are then more likely to respond to 
that word when spoken. So, when I hear someone say, “he was driving a 
Rolls…” my lexical items ‘Royce’ and ‘car’ are primed ready; and so when I 
then hear the word “Royce” the system is already primed ready to be easily 
activated. This might seem an overly complex account of listening, but this 
mechanism is especially important in telling apart words that sound the same, 
such as “semantic” and “Semitic”.  
 
Beyond this, by firing those lexical items associated with the lexical items for 
the words we hear, we build up a semantic context which allows us to easily 
understand which sense of an ambiguous word is meant by the speaker, 
without having to activate the conceptual representations associated with each 
possibility, and thereby simulate, each different interpretation. To return to the 
given example: after our interlocutor says, “he was driving a Rolls-Royce,” 
when he goes on to say, “he must have made a mint,” we know that by “mint” 
he means lots of money because hearing “Rolls-Royce” will have primed our 
conceptual representation of WEALTH, and the conceptual representation of the 
confectionary never gets fired (though it might turn out later that we were 
		 176	
mistaken, and the man in question was in fact the CEO of Humbug & Humbug 
Mint co.). 
 
So, say we hear the sentence, “he was driving a Rolls-Royce, he must have 
made a mint,” when we hear the word “driving” it primes not only our lexical 
representation ‘drive’ but also perhaps ‘car’, ‘road’, etc. The semantic 
background begins to take shape. If we were a golfer we might also have a 
competing context of golfing being formulated, but the car context is 
confirmed by hearing “Rolls-Royce”. At this point we have pinpointed the 
meaning of the words in the first phrase and a mental picture of a man driving 
a Rolls-Royce might have been generated by virtue of the activation of the 
atomic conceptual representations. The semantic context generated via the 
associations between lexical representations ensures that the correct associated 
conceptual representations are fired and we activate only the appropriate 
conceptual representation, and thereby generate hopefully a similar pattern of 
conceptual activity as the one the speaker intended us to have. 
 
We can see then that both the understanding of sentences and the choice of 
words during sentence production are mediated by the relationships among 
the lexical representations. This mechanism allows us to overcome the 
problems of polysemy and ambiguity during speech production and 
comprehension. It is with this more variegated understanding of how words 
mediate which conceptual representations are activated that I think we are 
best able to see how language might have interesting effects on cognition. 
 
Part 3. Mechanism and taxonomies  
 
So how might normal language function, so conceived, affect cognition in ways 
that the Pure Translation view might overlook? The answer lies in the complex 
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interactions of the access points between representations. Different systems 
have evolved, adapted themselves or been developed to exploit these 
interaction patterns to produce novel types of cognitive behaviour that we are 
not consciously aware of as being linguistic in origin but which are not feasible 
in the absence of language. 
 
Over the course of this thesis we have looked at a number of different ways in 
which it has been suggested that language leads to increases in cognitive 
capacity, and how it is tempting to claim that language is responsible for the 
cognitive advantage we seem to have over non-linguistic thinkers. Now it is 
time to look at the scope and limits of the effects of language on cognition, and 
how much importance we should credit language with when investigating 
particularly human cognitive capacities. 
 
My aim in this section is to group and categorise certain cognitive behaviours, 
involving the language faculty, that go beyond what a Pure Translation view 
might expect of language. I will explain briefly their workings in terms of the 
foregoing account of language. Further I will extrapolate, from the in-depth 
case studies of the previous chapters, general claims about language’s role in 
cognition and also touch on a few new case studies. We will also go on to look 
at some other contemporary theories of language’s role in cognition and see 
how they fit into our picture of the language faculty.  
 
I have divided these various mechanisms into two main groups. They are not 
grouped so much by the nature of the workings of the mechanisms, for I 
believe that all the mechanisms by which language leads to interesting and 
novel cognitive behaviour, beyond that which is predicted by the Pure 
Translation view, are grounded in the same set of mechanisms that have 
evolved to deal with the problems associated with communication; but rather 
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they are grouped by their differing ability to be consciously utilized by 
speakers. Firstly, we have the changes language causes in cognition that are 
invisible to us, these are system wide-spread changes that arise from the 
increase in potential patterns of activation opened up by the nexus of access 
points embodied by the language faculty. And secondly, we have those 
mechanisms where we actively use features of the language faculty to achieve 
cognitive ends that are not necessarily communicative. We might call the 
categories “implicit” and “explicit” effects on cognition, but I prefer the terms 
“systematic mechanisms” and “cognitive tools”. 
 
Though I have framed each of the mechanisms below in terms of the access 
points account of language functioning I favour, the taxonomy itself does not 
stand and fall with this account and each class of mechanism might just as well 
be framed in any alternative framework; the empirical phenomena (including 
those looked at in the preceding chapters) are the basis for the divisions of the 
taxonomy, and come before the framework into which they have been placed. I 
have described each type of mechanisms within the framework of the access 
points account because I believe it allows us to highlight the subtle differences 
between the mechanisms, while simultaneously illustrating the point that that 
they all arise from the functioning of a unified and consistent language faculty. 
 
 
1: Systematic mechanisms 
 
This category covers those effects that language has on cognition that are 
system-wide, as opposed to task-focused. They focus around the effects which 
language’s ability to cause novel activation patterns of conceptual 
representations has on downstream behaviour. As we shall see the novel 
activation patterns that are made possible by the nexus of access points 
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between linguistic and conceptual representations we lay down as we learn a 
language. We are not consciously aware of these processes happening and so it 
is hard to judge intuitively just how widespread they are or how important we 
should view them in terms of accounting for those uniquely human cognitive 
capacities.  
 
1.1 Flexibility  
 
The language faculty introduces an element of flexibility into the modularly 
structured mind9. By using the term “flexibility”, I do not mean to suggest that 
possessing a language faculty endows us with the power to engage in totally 
domain-independent rational thought, but more modestly, that we are 
potentially able to respond to perceptual stimuli with conceptual responses 
that differ from those that the pre-linguistic modular system would otherwise 
respond with.  
 
We came across this kind of flexibility in the case of navigation. To recap: 
when a lexical items fires in response to the activation of a conceptual 
representations (itself triggered by perceptual cues) the lexical item in turn 
activates other conceptual representations it is associated with, which 
themselves were not fired by the perceptual cues. In the case of reorientation, 
in which humans attend to two sets of conceptual representations of space 
simultaneously where non-linguistic animals do not, the geometry module is 
activated after being disorientated, which in turn activates the linguistic 
representations associated with the conceptual representations of the geometry 
modules via the process of lexical priming, in this case perhaps ‘left’ and ‘right’. 
This lexical priming is a normal part of the language faculty’s functioning, that 
																																																						
9	I am not claiming by this that it is the only source of flexibility as I am not tied to a 
traditional Fodorian account of modules as necessarily inferentially isolated.	
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ensures ready communication. These activated lexical items in turn trigger the 
other conceptual representations they are associated with, in this case the 
representations of the landmark recognition module.  
  
Via the patterns of association and activation in lexical and conceptual 
representations, the language faculty allows two conceptual representational 
faculties of the brain to be activated simultaneously and attended to in action 
planning, which would not happen in the absence of language. The upshot of 
this is that humans are able to respond to a greater number of stimuli 
simultaneously which gives rise to the flexible reorientation behaviour that 
characterizes human navigation. 
 
This mechanism has come about because we have a linguistic system that deals 
with the problems arising from communicating information from two different 
pre-linguistic conceptual faculties with overlapping remits, by having them 
share lexical items. It seems likely that there are many conceptual faculties that 
will have overlapping remits and therefore shared lexical items; and it 
therefore seems likely then that the mechanisms like those seen in navigation 
may well occur frequently. 
 
I suggest that social cognition might offer a particularly rich topic of research 
in trying to identify more cases of such a mechanism. The overlapping use of 
lexical items used to communicate representations from the cognitive faculties 
tasked with knowledge ascription, emotion gauging and facial cue reading 
cognitive faculties suggests that this domain might be rife with interesting 
linguistic effects (see (J. G. De Villiers & De Villiers, 2000), for one potential 
account of language’s role in social cognition). 
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This account of flexibility in cognition offered by language should be 
contrasted with that proposed by Carruthers (Carruthers, 2002; 2006) and 
Mithen (Mithen, 1996), who suggest that language provides flexibility by 
allowing us to combine any pre-linguistic conceptual representations into one 
single lexical representation, effectively bypassing the encapsulation that a 
modular architecture hardwires into our cognitive systems. Unlike with 
Carruthers’s account, I am not suggesting that language provides a novel 
means of representing information from distinct conceptual modules; we are 
still left with the same representational capacities, but we are just not bound 
by their original adapted activation cues to utilize them. Through language old 
conceptual representations can be co-opted into serving other ends. Under this 
account, language brings flexibility to cognition because it allows our 
traditional conceptual representations to fire in response to novel stimuli, as 
mediated by associations with lexical items.  
 
These novel activation patterns of conceptual faculties may seem relatively 
insignificant but they can lead to novel behaviour by creating action plans that 
respond simultaneously to two distinct conceptual representations that would 
not have been formulated in the absence of language. However, during these 
novel activation patterns it does not seem to us like we are performing any 
particularly remarkable or difficult cognitive feat; think about how it feels to 
reorient yourself – it does not feel to us like we are engaged in some 
particularly advanced cognition. Despite the evidence that shows it to be a 
significantly more complex process than those found in even our closest animal 
relatives, it just seems like normal brain functioning. Because of the 
imperceptible nature of the process it is very hard to judge through 
introspection how widespread or significant these kinds of processes are in a 
wider sense of cognition without empirical investigations, like the ones that 
highlighted the interesting way humans navigate. I am inclined to believe that 
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the flexibility language endows us with has a subtle effect on cognition but on 
a wide scale: anytime we use words that have more than one conceptual access 
point to describe a situation they may well be priming other cognitive 
representations to fire and accordingly leading us to form action plans that 
would not be available to non-linguistic animals.  
 
The limits on flexibility are determined by the nexus of relationships; learning 
any given language involves establishing in the speaker a different set of lexical 
representations and associations between those lexical representations and 
cognitive representations. The make-up of the nexus of access points will 
determine what associations are made between conceptual modules and will 
delimit what potential cognitive behaviour language might engender. The 
degree of flexibility is, in another sense, limited by the demands on language 
for communication: words that have lots of meanings, and therefore lots of 
conceptual access points, may well increase the opportunities for flexible 
application of conceptual representations, but if a word has too many 
meanings it is prevented from being a practical tool for communication; it can 
become just too ambiguous. If a word has an impractically large range of 
meanings, and the ambiguity amongst them is detrimental to effective 
communication, it will eventually drop out of the lexicon, being replaced by 
other terms - they are to borrow Dennett’s genetic analogy, unfit (Dennett, 
2009). Therefore, the defgree of flexibility that language adds to the modular 
framework is delimited by the nexus of connections between lexical items and 
conceptual representations; which in turn is moulded by social factors and the 
requirements for communication. 
 
Another limit on the scope of this mechanism to shape cognition comes from 
the fact that not all the conceptual representations that get primed via lexical 
means during cognition will go on to be incorporated into action plans, if say 
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they are not activated strongly enough or if the representation is not pertinent 
to the current cognitive problem being faced. We saw that in the navigation 
case the landmark recognition module is adapted to representing the situation 
being dealt with, and so the conceptual representations it generates of the 
situation also get fed into the action planning faculties, and accordingly we 
respond to the problem of reorientation with an action plan that attends to 
conceptual representations from two distinct conceptual faculties. But during 
other occasions the activation of a second cognitive module via lexical means, 
akin to how the landmark recognition module is activated in the navigation 
example, might not lead to the formation of action plans that contain 
information from two pre-linguistic representational sources because the 
second module that is activated is either only partially activated or does not 
generate appropriate representations of the given situation. Just because 
lexical items have access points in two very distinct conceptual representations 
they do not necessarily go on to get conflated or used together during 
cognition; if one simply has no bearing on the situation and is therefore not at 
all activated by other perceptual or conceptual stimuli, it will not be 
incorporated into an action plan. Again, we can see that the kind of flexibility I 
am talking about is far from the totally domain-general kind of intelligence 
that other commentators propose language grants us. 
 
1.2. Expansion of the domains of emotions 
 
There is an important subset of the flexibility mechanism that we addressed in 
the chapter on swearing. This is the use of language to expand the domain of 
our emotions, leading to an emotional response that has evolved to guide 
behaviour in one scenario becoming applicable to another.  
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The case study we looked at demonstrated language’s role in the spreading of 
the basic emotion of disgust, which primarily evolved to limit the risk from the 
spread of disease (Rozin et al., 2008), into the realm of social and moral 
behaviour. Through swear words, language facilitates the expansion of 
disgust’s applicable domain.  
 
The mechanism outlined for disgust, relied heavily on the particulars of the 
pre-linguistic disgust response’s propensity towards spreading through 
contagion; which does not seem to be a quality shared by all other emotions 
(though laughing appears to spread happiness in a similar way). So, should we 
think that this type of mechanism is restricted to disgust only or might there be 
other cases where linguistic functioning has led to the spread of an emotion 
traditionally associated with one situation to be used in another? Cognitive 
domains that might yield positive results are those where a noted emotional 
response is at odds to the one we might expect. Two examples that spring to 
mind are euphoria at physical pain in zealous religious practices and gallows 
humour: the propensity to laugh about even the most serious and dangerous 
situations. Both examples are interestingly also associated with their own 
particular and peculiar form of language use, and the occurrence of both 
behaviours is associated with a particular and unusual type of linguistic 
practice. In the case of religious self-flagellation we have the overwhelming 
language of revelation and almighty godly redemption, a linguistic form very 
far removed from the quotidian linguistic practice of describing perceptible 
existence. And in the case of gallows humour we have the linguistic practice of 
making jokes by playing with the relationship between the situation and the 
language we use describe it, to make light of even the most serious or sombre 
of situations. This is a deliberate abuse of the normal practice of language to 
describe things accurately. 
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Both cases require further investigation to test this hypothesis but I am sure 
with enough looking we will find more cases where language has played an 
important role in the spread of an emotion’s domain. It will probably be the 
case that, where the spreading of emotional responses from one situation to 
another has happened, it may not even have been noted it is felt to be normal 
and appropriate. This is why the people quizzed about disgust elicitors, in 
Haidt’s studies, saw nothing interesting or notable in describing both bloody 
wounds and ambulance-chasing lawyers both as disgusting (Haidt, Rozin, 
Mccauley, & Imada, 1997). To us disgust feels just as appropriate a response in 
the extended context (moral disgust) as in the context the response originally 
adapted to (visceral); it is not consciously clear to us when an emotional 
response’s remit has been extended and so perhaps other emotional responses 
might also have been extended via this linguistic mechanism without our 
recognizing which ones. Without further investigation, it is hard for us to 
assess how widespread the mechanism of language extending the remit of our 
evolved emotional responses is. 
 
1.3 Thinking for Speaking 
 
One of the most important accounts of the interaction between language and 
thought in recent years is Dan Slobin’s Thinking for Speaking hypothesis. He 
suggests that instead of looking for areas where language appears to determine 
the categories of perception, as the traditional linguistic relativity supporters 
have done, we should look more seriously at the implications of speaking one 
language, rather than another, has on the processes of encoding experience 
(Slobin, 1987 1996;). He suggests that the language we think we are going to 
be reporting experience in changes which elements of experience we actively 
pay attention to. To give an example, it is obvious that speakers of all 
languages can attend to the number of objects in the visual array but English 
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speakers necessarily have to encode this information if they are to make 
grammatical sentences about any given situation, since English requires that 
we specify whether there is one thing or many things being talked about via a 
system of pluralization. On the other hand, in some languages there is no such 
requirement, for instance Turkish has no grammatically mandated 
pluralisation, so any number of cups on a table could be talked about without 
ever having to reveal whether there was one or more than one, this is 
impossible with English’s pluralization system. Further Turkish requires other 
information to be encoded in order to make grammatical sentences, including 
some epistemological facts, particularly whether a reported event was 
experienced first-hand or is known through testimony. Slobin argues that the 
grammatical requirements set by each language determine what things we as 
observers pay attention to during experience, and channels our attention and 
therefore to some degree our cognitive behaviour. 
 
How does such a view fit into our proposed account of language? The 
grammatical requirements on sentence production of a given language are 
instigated by controlling which lexical items are primed during experience. 
Whenever conceptual representations are activated through perceptual stimuli, 
the corresponding lexical items are primed ready for us to communicate our 
experience and use it. We have seen already that which lexical items are 
activated though heard speech can have significant cognitive effects 
downstream by activating interesting conceptual patterns that might not 
otherwise be triggered. It seems like Slobin’s thinking for speaking mechanism 
might offer the same sort of rippling effect, where different languages spoken 
by people will trigger the same perceptual experiences to trigger different 
lexical items, depending on the grammatical requirements of each language. 
These different patterns in turn will activate different conceptual 
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representations depending on the make-up of the access points between lexical 
items and conceptual representations.  
 
It is not clear how much effect Slobin’s account of thinking for speaking will 
have in the wider cognitive behaviour of an individual but the account of 
language that we are working with indicates that some effect is indeed likely 
and so I include it here, even without the solid case studies we have in place 
that we have for the other mechanisms. 
 
2. Cognitive tools and lexical items  
 
The second set of mechanisms by which language affects our cognition I am 
calling “cognitive tools”. They are mechanisms and techniques which we can 
actively engage in to achieve cognitive ends. Through practice (either as a 
society or as individuals) we have learnt ways of using the workings of the 
language faculty to achieve non-communicative goals. The effects are much 
more explicit effects than the ones looked at in the previous section, though 
perhaps have less wide-reaching consequences. These mechanisms see 
linguistic representations not as merely alternative translations of the 
conceptual representations but as independent cognitive entities that can be 
entertained and utilized in ways that differ to the ways we cognize and utilize 
the pre-linguistic conceptual representations.  
 
2.1. Lexical representation as memory 
 
In the chapter on numbers we saw that one of the pre-requisites of learning the 
meanings of the number words was the ability to learn, by rote, ordered sets of 
meaningless symbols. This ability was facilitated by the mechanism of lexical 
priming, which meant that the deliberate activation of the first lexical item in 
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the list activated the following one and this in turn activated the one after that, 
thereby allowing us to activate in order the lexical items in the list without 
requiring us to store the information about their order explicitly in some other 
cognitive repository. The ability to easily recall large strings of lexical items can 
be exploited to help aid memory of information that might be beyond other 
memory capacities.  
 
The mechanism of lexical priming, necessary for effective communication, can 
be deliberately co-opted during cultural practices (teaching children to recite 
ordered lists or rhymes) to serve another purpose, as a means of remembering 
large quantities of information. And we often use linguistic tools to help us 
remember things that we could not remember otherwise. A good example is 
telephone numbers: we often store telephone numbers not as an accurate 
number representation but as a linguistic pattern. And, though we cannot 
extract from that verbal pattern information about parts of the number because 
it all depends on the production of the linguistic representation via lexical 
priming it does allow us to remember a series of digits that is beyond our 
capacity to recall otherwise. Another common example is the mnemonics 
which we are taught to help us remember semi-arbitrary rules that we might 
not be able to entertain or remember conceptually, such as the number of days 
in the month, or the colours of the rainbow. Even knowing the alphabet is for 
most of us nothing more than the ability to rattle of the letters in the correct 
order, which we do via lexical priming. Saying “a, b, c, d, …” sets up such a 
strong lexical priming condition that it becomes almost impossible for us to say 
anything other than “e” and so forth. In this situation, the role of lexical 
priming is so strong that only very deliberate cognitive behaviour can make us 
alter the course of speech production and say a different term. 
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The claim that the alphabet is stored solely as a function of the lexical access 
points between the lexical items that make it is supported by the difficulty we 
have in manipulating the information contained in the list to achieve different 
tasks, such as saying the letters in the reverse order, saying whether a letter 
comes before or after another one, or saying what position a letter comes in 
the alphabet. If the alphabet was stored as part of the conceptual system we 
would expect that we would be able to perform conceptual processes over 
these representations to yield these answers easily. 
 
The skill of remembering the larger linguistic representation works by setting 
up strong access points between the constituent lexical items via deliberate 
over-learning of linguistic representations, i.e. repeating a phone number over 
and over to ourselves. This system does not work by remembering the required 
object as a whole – there is not a lexical item of the whole alphabet, but 
instead, the recall of the whole pattern works by laying down access points 
between the atomic lexical items that make up the pattern. By exploiting a 
feature of the workings of the language faculty we are able to utilize it to 
perform cognitive behaviours that would otherwise not be possible. 
 
2.2. Bootstrapping 
 
Further, we saw in the chapter on number, that the ordered lexical lists learnt 
by rote provide the foundations for the development of number concepts via 
the bootstrapping process. We should conclude that language is essential in 
our conceptual development in a more significant way than just being the 
means by which we learn about concepts that are beyond our perceptual 
faculties.  
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Carey and others (Carey, 2004; 2009); (Beck, 2017) suggest that the 
bootstrapping process is responsible for the development of many of our more 
advanced conceptual representations. Besides the case of number which we 
have looked at, Carey also suggests the possibility that the bootstrapping 
process is key to overcoming the developmental discontinuities in theory of 
mind reasoning (Carey, 2009; 2011) and it seems likely that a bootstrapping 
mechanism is behind the development of lots of our more complex concepts.  
 
I am fairly confident that it is the formation of the ordered sets of lexical items, 
whose order is determined and stabilized by the set of access points, which 
provides the prerequisite ordered set of empty placeholders required for the 
bootstrapping process to take place, and so we should consider language a 
fundamental tool in the bootstrapping process. However, whether language 
plays a role beyond just providing the placeholders is a different question; the 
investigation into the problem of learning number concepts makes me suspect 
that it does. In the chapter on learning number concepts we saw that the 
language faculty, as well as just being the means by which we remember and 
entertain the blank placeholders, also guarantees that the process of 
bootstrapping can take place by offering a firm and stable order that means 
that crucial inductions can take place by offering repeatable experiences; the 
linguistic code guides the non-linguistic inductions by ensuring that the mental 
objects which induction operates on always occur in a stable order. 
 
2.3. Scaffolding action 
 
We can use language to structure our environments in such a way as to make it 
easier to complete complicated actions. This is especially true of situations in 
which we are learning novel actions, that we do not yet understand fully; and 
research shows that a properly structured linguistic environment makes it 
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possible for children to complete tasks that would otherwise be beyond them, 
such as tying a shoelace (as reviewed in (Berk, 1992)).  
 
The simplest way a learning environment can be structured is by a teacher 
telling the learner how to complete a task by breaking it down into a series of 
simple action instructions. Under the guidance of these instructions a child 
might succeed where otherwise they might fail. But we do not need to rely on 
external guidance for long. By remembering the instructions linguistically 
children can then call them up and recite them to themselves and thereby 
direct their own actions. Evidence that this system of reciting remembered 
instructions to oneself does enhance children’s cognitive abilities comes from 
Berk and colleagues; who show that children engage in self-directed speech 
more when task demands are greater, indicating that it is a strategy employed 
when faced with a difficult problem, and moreover, are more likely to succeed 
than those children that do not engage in self-directed speech (Berk, 1985; 
1992).  
 
And this is not a cognitive tool that is used exclusively during learning: there is 
evidence that, as adults, we can linguistically enhance our own performance at 
practised behaviours by engaging in self-directed linguistic instruction. Evans 
gives the example of a darts player who really does slow their breathing down 
by telling themselves to, under their breath, before making a shot (Evans, 
2015); and in our everyday lives, we often talk ourselves through a 
complicated procedure before embarking upon it. 
 
The importance of this practice was brought to light by Soviet psychologist Lev 
Vygotsky, who argued that the kind of talk children engage in during problem 
solving is not a simple monologue – as Piaget claims(Piaget, 1926) – that is 
qualitatively different from communicative language in adults, but instead 
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should be viewed as an instance of self-directed communicative language 
(Vygotsky, 2012). This self-directed language is both practice for future 
communicative situations and a tool employed during problem solving. 
 
This system works because, as we saw above, we can remember large amounts 
of information in sentence form without necessarily needing an accompanying 
conceptual representation of the situation. In this case, these linguistic 
representations are a series of sentences which each detail some part of the 
broken-down whole action plan required to complete the overall task. The 
linguistic representations break down the whole problem into smaller actions 
that we have the corresponding conceptual capacities to understand and 
therefore complete. 
 
When we say these sentences to ourselves, the activated linguistic 
representations trigger the conceptual representations required to complete 
different stages of the overall task. In this way we can trigger the movement of 
lifting one end of the lace over the other end of the lace without ever having to 
represent the topological structure of a bow and work out from this 
representation an appropriate action plan for completing the bow. This 
happens in exactly the same fashion as if we had triggered the linguistic 
representations ourselves, by thinking about how to tie a bow or if we had had 
specific verbal instruction. The firing of the linguistic representation of ‘left end 
over,’ etc. is enough to set off the representations of the appropriate actions 
regardless of how it was fired. In these situations, language acts as a shortcut 
for triggering behaviour that we might struggle to understand in a wider 
context and thereby trigger otherwise. After a while, with familiarity through 
practice, the action plan for tying a bow gets stored in another mental faculty 
and we no longer need to repeat the mantra to ourselves to trigger the 
behaviour. 
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2.4. Drawing attention: thought as the object of thought 
 
Recent accounts of language by Jackendoff and Clark detail language’s role as 
a cognitive tool that we utilize to expand our cognitive abilities (A. Clark, 
1998; 2006; Jackendoff, 1994). Both focus on the idea of externalizing thought 
by distilling it into linguistic objects. These linguistic objects are stable and can 
become the subject of further computational procedures themselves, outside of 
the thoughts which original triggered them. 
 
Jackendoff argues that this is the only means by which conceptual 
representations generated in cognition can come to be analysed in and of 
themselves instead of merely being had in response to perceptual or conceptual 
stimuli. Whether he is right that it is the only means that we can come to 
entertain thoughts about our own thoughts is an issue that is outside the scope 
of this particular analysis. For our purposes, we just need to assess whether 
this mechanism is (a) feasible in terms of the account of linguistic functioning 
we are using and (b) whether it might lead to interesting cognitive behaviours 
that would not have happened without language. 
 
So, can we adapt Jackendoff’s claims to fit within our own account of language 
functioning? Prima facie it seems like there might be trouble, since Jackendoff’s 
story revolves around the ability to consciously entertain thoughts while in 
linguistic form and analyse them. This is how language apparently allows us to 
entertain thoughts which otherwise we cannot have – i.e. those about the 
nature of our own thoughts. One of the key rationales behind our investigation 
was to move away from accounts of language that see it as a domain-general 
computational device that can entertain propositionally structured thoughts, 
that cannot be entertained within one of the pre-linguistic conceptual faculties.  
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However, if we consider that there is a module that responds to the mental 
states of our conspecifics, we can see how Jackendoff’s proposed mechanism 
might come about due to the normal functioning of the language faculty. When 
the language faculty comes to represent our conceptual representations, say for 
example our being sad, we might form the lexical representation ‘I am sad’, 
where the original conceptual representations triggered the activation of the 
lexical items ‘I’, ‘am’ and ‘sad’. If the lexical item ‘sad’ is triggered strongly, as it 
may well be in this emphatic context, it might activate the other conceptual 
representations associated with it, amongst which are representations from 
some faculty that has evolved to represent the mental states of others (such a 
module must exist if we are to exist in large social groups ). The representation 
SAD (OF ANOTHER) is not produced by the same system that produces our own 
emotional states and therefore would not have been activated as part of our 
initial mental state that led us to form the lexical representation ‘I am sad’. By 
this means language sets up a feedback loop by which our own cognitive 
representations can be analysed by the same faculties that normally respond to 
the conceptual representations of others. 
 
This is a very hypothetical claim but I am merely trying to show that there is a 
way that Jackendoff’s claims can be understood in terms of an account of 
language that downplays computational abilities in favour of a rich nexus of 
associations between lexical and conceptual representations. Jackendoff sees 
language’s role as one of directing attention; it is not clear how to parse this 
into our account of language functioning but we can see how language might 
allow us to analyse our own conceptual representations by effectively passing 
them back to different faculties in the brain. 
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Conclusion  
 
I hope it has become clear that language produces effects in cognition that go 
beyond what we expect from a system that sees its role purely as to 
communicate our conceptual thought to other speakers, by rejecting the Pure 
Translation view of linguistic communication view we can begin to see that 
these interesting effects arise out of the normal communicative functions of 
language and not because of any extraneous computational or representational 
capacities we might be tempted to ascribe to it. All the mechanisms and case 
studies we have looked at play on the disconnect between the representational 
capacity of lexical items and conceptual representations that leads us to 
interesting cognitive behaviour that we might not have expected under a view 
of language functioning that assumes a simplistic translation between thoughts 
and language. The richness of the access points, built up over the course of 
language learning leads to conceptual patterns firing in the brain that go 
beyond those that perceptual stimuli alone can cause and so we should credit 
language with an important role in our cognitive behaviour. 
 
 
During the course of this thesis I have analysed three different areas of 
cognition and shown that in each case language plays a role in cognition 
beyond simply expressing our thoughts, these interactions between language 
and thought contribute to the richness of human cognitive behaviour. Further, 
in each of these cases we have seen that language plays a subtly different role. 
We have thereby shown that language’s role in cognition is not only more 
significant than often assumed by cognitive science as a whole, but also more 
varied than most commentators, even those who think that language has an 
important role in cognition(Carruthers, 2002; A. Clark, 1998; Jackendoff, 
1994), suppose. 
		 196	
 
Then, in response to the varied mechanisms looked at in cognitive domain I 
have produced a taxonomy which groups mechanisms by their ability to be 
actively called upon during human thought and then suggests further avenues 
of research into which we could look at to fill out the taxonomy further. 
 
Alongside this, throughout the thesis I have begun to sketch out a model of 
language processing that can accommodate within its framework all the 
different mechanisms within the taxonomy. Although this thesis does not 
provide much independent argument for this access point account I believe its 
ability to incorporate, readily, the different mechanisms the case studies 
highlight, speaks to its plausibility and suggest it should be developed further. 
On the other hand, if you are not swayed by the access points view I favour, 
the taxonomy provides a set of fixed points around which an alternative 
account of language functioning should be built. 
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